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The connectedness of social networks inspires the study of social networks for ap-
plications in various fields such as sociology, marketing and biology. Online Social
Network Sites (SNSs) allow users to discover and share information about them-
selves and their peers. Data that is produced on a large scale from these networks
brings challenges to the exploration of data utility, as well as the protection of data
privacy.
We look into both problems from a graph perspective. In particular, we focus
on community detection and graph anonymization. Graphs analyses facilitate the
study of relationships or social interactions of online social networks modeled as
graphs. Community detection constitutes an important tool for the analysis, by ex-
ploring the network structure and associated information. It provides insights into
the network characteristics and structural properties, and thus, the social phenom-
ena that take place. On the other hand, to protect data from private information
disclosure, prevent malicious use and to ease the user concerns, graph anonymiza-
tion approaches are in demand. Graph anonymization approaches perturb graphs
under certain constraints such that the released data has a certain level of guaran-
teed privacy or data utility.
In this thesis, we discuss the concepts, related works and the problems of graph
anonymization and community detection. We then design algorithms to solve the
problems, respectively.
First, we study the problem of graph anonymization that protects the privacy of
sensitive information in social network data. The target is to perturb the structures
of naive anonymized graphs in such a way that, after anonymization, the graphs are
capable of resisting attacks and preserving usersp´rivacy. We study the shortcomings
of an existing state-of-the-art algorithm and propose a heuristic algorithm that not
x
only overcomes the shortcomings, but also improves the effectiveness and, most
importantly, the efficiency of large graphs. Next, we propose a user-centric utility-
driven paradigm, as opposed to the commonly used privacy-driven paradigm, and
an algorithm that anonymizes graphs with a utility guarantee, while certain graph
properties are preserved. We aim to offer an informative view of the network for
users while resisting certain structural attacks.
Second, we study the problem of community detection on a simple graph that
explores beneficial knowledge, based on the graph structures underlying social net-
works. The target is to discover structural communities utilizing various graph
properties. We propose three algorithms that detect communities based on a wide
range of graph structural properties, including the degree and clustering coeffi-
cient, closeness among the vertices, and the physical forces among the vertices
when simulating the whole graph as a physical system, respectively. Through a
comprehensive experimental study on both the real world network and synthetic
data sets, the proposed solutions are shown to be efficient and effective.
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Milgram’s small world experiment in the United States [110], forerunner in the field
of social network analysis, identified the small-world phenomenon. The experiment
was designed to count the number of intermediaries via which letters could be sent
to the target contact, from individuals who are in different cities and randomly
chosen. The result suggests that the distance between two individuals is usually
rather small, not exceeding six steps. Similarly, Watts’s experiment [154] shows
that the average number of intermediaries via which an e-mail message can be
delivered to a target was around six. Leskovec and Horvitz [94] found the average
distance among users of an instant messaging system to be 6.6. In view of the
connectedness of real-world social networks, it is of the same interest or even more
to study online social networks that have grown sharply, and are producing huge
quantities of data.
Online Social Network Sites (SNSs) allow users to discover and share infor-
mation about themselves and their peers, while they provide researchers with a
valuable tool for social, cultural, and media studies via data analysis and mining
[120]. The capacity to exchange information in such networks rests on an assumed
1
underlying trust among users [65]. While trust is thicker among people with strong
interpersonal ties, it also affects one’s ability to cultivate and mobilize weak social
ties for the transfer of valuable information [97]. Trust is thus essential not only for
bonding social capital, associated with strong ties, but also for bridging social cap-
ital, associated with weak social ties and information-seeking behavior [75]. SNSs
are valuable for the development of both types of social capital, while the posi-
tive effects of their use may be stronger for bridging social capital [55]. In short,
the technological affordances of SNSs provide leverage in building weak ties and
bridging social capital, while the value of these ties for an individual is mediated
by interpersonal trust [97].
In order to safeguard such trust, as well as the institutional trust that users
place in the owners and administrators of the SNS, the privacy of users has to
be guarded from malicious users, as well as from malicious data recipients when
data is published to third parties. The data from online social networks raises
the interest of marketers, politicians, and sociology researchers, as well as hackers
and terrorists. Mining and analyzing the data should only benefit legitimate users
while no one, and more critically, no malicious user, should be able to access or
infer private information.
We use simple graphs, graphs with only vertices and edges, to model social
networks. Each vertex represents a user, and each edge connecting two users rep-
resents the strong social ties in the form of relationships or interactions between
these two users. Ever since the emergence of graph theory in the 18th century
[57], and developments in the following centuries [19], graphs have become useful
representations of systems in numerous areas, e.g. biology, sociology and trans-
portation. Graph analysis has gradually become crucial to social network analysis
which started in the 1930’s. Graph analysis facilitates the study of relationships or
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social interactions of the underlying networks represented.
However, the publication and analyzing of social network data entails a privacy
threat to their users. Researchers, such as the authors of [7], quickly observed
that simply hiding the identities of the users in a social network may not suffice
to protect privacy. Indeed, the structure of the graph itself may leak sufficient
information for an adversary with minimal external knowledge to infer the identity
of users, for instance. Consequently, several graph anonymization algorithms have
been proposed, that not only remove identity, but also perturb graph content and
structure while trying to preserve utility for the sake of mining and analysis.
Therefore, we focus on both aspects in social network analysis. In the utility
aspect, we study the detection of structural communities in graphs. In the privacy
aspect, we study graph anonymization techniques that anonymize the graph data
before data releasing, such that graphs after anonymization are capable of resisting
attacks and preserving users’ privacy.
1.1 Graph anonymization
Graph anonymization emerges from the privacy concerns in data publication. It
is observed that simply hiding the identities of the users in a network may not
sufficient to protect privacy [7]. Indeed, the structure of the graph itself may leak
sufficient information for an adversary with minimal external knowledge to infer the
identity of users, for instance. Consequently, graph anonymization algorithms have
been proposed that not only remove identity but also perturb the graph content
and structure while trying to preserve utility for the use of analysis.
In some cases, users want to keep their private relationships or personal infor-
mation to themselves, therefore the goal of graph anonymization has been extend
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to prevent not only identity disclosure but also link disclosure and attribute disclo-
sure. Ways to perturb the graph include the addition/deletion of vertices/edges,
generalization of attributes associated with vertices or edges, generalization of ver-
tices, etc. To measure how much perturbation is induced to the graph and thus
how much utility is left, one common method is to compare the measurements on
the graphs before and after anonymization.
1.2 Community Detection
Community study constitutes an important part of the graph analysis [157]. It pro-
vides insights into the network characteristics and structural properties [153, 135],
and thus, the social phenomena that take place either online or oﬄine [16, 145, 148].
Communities can be described as explicit or implicit, where explicit communities
are created based on human decisions and member consent, e.g. Facebook Groups,
and implicit communities are assumed to exist in the network and waiting to be
discovered [122]. The implicit communities are related to network structure and
are the targets of the most community detection methods.
Community is a group of vertices that have more connections to each other
inside the group, than to the vertices outside the group. As a feature of social net-
works, it was first called community structure in [69]. For social network, communi-
ties suggest quick channels of information flow or better connectedness. Efficiently
discovering such structures helps users to identify individuals who are closely re-
lated, and facilitates information dissemination, which is instrumental for the study
of social behaviors [2], viral marketing [26], politics [56], and etc.
Community detection is sometimes referred to as graph clustering. While find-
ing communities is similar to clustering analysis in the sense that they generate
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clustering assignments for each object, community detection focuses on the net-
work topology. A variety of methods have been proposed to detect communities.
As a user may belong to more than a single community, which is common in social
networks, some methods are designed to discover overlapping communities instead
of disjoint communities. Modularity is one of the popular concepts applied to mea-
sure the quality of the communities. Modularity is defined based on this idea that
edges between vertices in the same community are dense, but are sparse between
different communities. It is defined as the number of edges falling within groups
minus the expected number in an equivalent graph with edges placed at random,
where the equivalent graph means the graph with same number of edges and the
same distribution of degree[115].
1.3 Contributions
Our main contributions in this thesis include the design of algorithms in two im-
portant parts of social network analysis: privacy protection of sensitive information
in social network data and exploration of beneficial knowledge based on the graph
structures underlying social networks.
We first design algorithms to anonymize graphs so that social network data can
be revealed in a way that restricts information from malicious users while benefiting
benevolent users, e.g. expanding social circles and establishing new social ties.
Then, we propose techniques to assist the users with the effective analysis of data
in a manner of community detection, which provides users with insights into the
densely connected groups in the social networks and thus, the diffusion of influence
and information and users’ social opportunity.
Social network is modeled as simple graph. We explore the structural informa-
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tion rather than semantic information. Edges are of the same type, and so are the
vertices. Edges are not associated with weights, and vertices are not associated
with attributes. Nevertheless, our methods consider the connectedness between
individuals who may or may not connect. We quantify such connectedness based
on several graph properties, e.g. degree, clustering coefficient, closeness centrality,
geodesic distance, etc. While we conduct experiments to examine the effectiveness
and efficiency of our algorithms, the empirical results give a good indication of the
effectiveness of the quantifications.
We list the achievements so far as follows.
1.3.1 Fast Identity Anonymization on Graphs
Liu and Terzi proposed the notion of k -degree anonymity to address the problem
of identity anonymization in graphs. A graph is k -degree anonymous if, and only
if, each of its vertices has the same degree as that of, at least, k -1 other vertices.
The anonymization problem is to transform a non-k -degree anonymous graph into
a k -degree anonymous graph, by adding or deleting a minimum number of edges.
Liu and Terzi proposed an algorithm that remains a reference for k -degree ano-
nymization. The algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase anonymizes
the degree sequence of the original graph. The second phase constructs a k -degree
anonymous graph with the anonymized degree sequence by adding edges to the
original graph. We propose a greedy algorithm that anonymizes the original graph
by simultaneously adding edges to the original graph and anonymizing its degree
sequence. We thereby avoid testing the realizability of the degree sequence, which
is a time consuming operation. We empirically and comparatively evaluated our
new algorithm. The experimental results show that our algorithm is indeed more
efficient and more effective than the algorithm proposed by Liu and Terzi on large
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real graphs.
1.3.2 Graph Anonymization with Reachability Constraints
Existing research addresses the graph anonymization problem by following an ap-
proach popular in the database community: a model of data privacy is defined,
and the data is rendered in a form that satisfies the constraints of that model while
aiming to maximize some utility measure. Still, there is no consensus on a clear
and quantifiable utility measure over graph data. We take a different approach: we
define a utility guarantee, in terms of certain graph properties being preserved, that
should be respected when releasing data, while otherwise distorting the graph to
an extent desired for the sake of confidentiality. We propose a form of data release
which builds on current practice in social network platforms: A user may want
to see a subgraph of the network graph, in which that user as well as hisconnec-
tions and affiliates participate. Such a snapshot should not allow malicious users
to gain private information, yet provide useful information for benevolent users.
We propose a mechanism to prepare data for user viewing under this setting. In
an experimental study with real data, we demonstrate that our method preserves
several properties of interest more successfully than methods that randomly distort
the graph to an equal extent, while withstanding structural attacks proposed in the
literature.
1.3.3 Fast Community Detection
We propose algorithms for the detection of disjoint and overlapping communities in
networks. The algorithms exploit both degree and clustering coefficient of vertices
as these metrics characterize dense connections, which we hypothesize as being in-
dicative of communities. Each vertex independently seeks the community to which
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it belongs, by visiting its neighbouring vertices and choosing its peers on the basis
of their degrees and clustering coefficients. The algorithms are intrinsically data
parallel. We devised a version for Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). We empiri-
cally evaluate the performance of our methods. We measure and compare their
efficiency and effectiveness to several state-of-the-art community detection algo-
rithms. Effectiveness is quantified by metrics, namely, modularity, conductance,
internal density, cut ratio, weighted community clustering and normalized mutual
information. Additionally, average community size and community size distribu-
tion are measured. Efficiency is measured by the running time. We show that our
methods are both effective and efficient. Meanwhile, the opportunity to parallelize
our algorithm yields an efficient solution to the community detection problem.
1.3.4 Force-directed Layout Community Detection
We propose a graph-layout-based method for detecting communities in networks.
We first project the graph onto a Euclidean space using the Fruchterman-Reingold
algorithm, a force-based graph drawing algorithm. We then cluster the vertices
according to Euclidean distance. The idea is a form of dimension reduction. The
graph drawing in two or more dimensions provides a heuristic decision as to whether
vertices are connected by a short path approximated by their Euclidean distance.
We studied community detection for both disjoint and overlapping communities.
For the case of disjoint communities, we used k-means clustering. For the case
of overlapping communities, we used fuzzy-c means algorithm. We evaluated the
performance of our different algorithms for varying parameters and number of it-
erations. We compared the results to several state of the art community detection
algorithms, each of which clusters the graph directly or indirectly according to
geodesic distance. We show that, for non-trivially small graphs, our method is
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both effective and efficient. We measure effectiveness using modularity when the
communities are not known in advance and precision when the communities are
known in advance. We measure efficiency with running time.
1.3.5 Local Closeness Community Detection
We propose an algorithm for the detection of structural communities in graphs,
which leverages a local notion of closeness centrality. The algorithm is able to
detect communities in the presence of overlaps. We define this local notion of
closeness centrality by adapting the measures used in the local outlier factor algo-
rithm to graphs. The main idea is to restrict the local neighborhood explored for
the computation of a local notion of closeness centrality. This is done by computing
distance, reachability distance and density of a vertex within its nearest neighbors.
It is inspired by the local outlier factor algorithm where local reachability density
and local outlier factor are computed with their nearest neighbors. The efficiency
of our algorithm arises from the definition and application of this local notion of
closeness centrality. We present the notion and the algorithm using this notion. We
found that our algorithm is more effective and efficient than the algorithm using
closeness centrality. We also compared the performance of our algorithm with that
of two state-of-the-art community detection algorithms for overlapping communi-
ties: a label propagation algorithm, a game theory algorithm and a probabilistic
model algorithm. We empirically evaluated the performance of our algorithm with
varying parameters, and assessed effectiveness by calculating the normalized mu-
tual information and omega index between the set of communities found, and the
known set of communities. We show that our algorithm displays generally com-
petitive performance on both synthetic graphs and real world graphs. It is more
effective and efficient than the three algorithms for large sparse graphs.
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1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a detailed review
of background knowledge and related work. Chapter 3 and 4 present the main
contributions in this thesis, which includes two graph anonymization algorithms
(Section 3.1 and 3.2), a force-directed layout-based community detection method
(Section 4.1), a vertex-centric community detection method (Section 4.2), and a
local closeness community detection method (Section 4.3). Finally we conclude and
propose the possible directions in the future work in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
Our framework starts by modeling social networks as graphs. Anonymization tech-
niques are applied to the graphs if they are going to be released, so that user
privacy is preserved. On the other hand, we analyze the graphs, either original or
anonymized, for practical applications. Out of all the kinds of graph analysis, we
focus on the techniques that find dense structural communities according to graph
topology. In the following discussions, we first review the general notions about
graphs in Section 2.1. Then we review the community detection approaches in
different categories in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 discuss the concepts and approaches
related to graph anonymization.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Graph Models
Social networks are modeled by graphs with vertices corresponding to individuals or
entities, and edges corresponding to relationships or interactions among individuals.
Vertices may have attributes. For example, in social networks, individuals may
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have profiles containing information about their age, date of birth, occupation and
interests. Edges may have attributes such as edge type or weight.
In a simple and usual case, a network is formally modeled as a simple graph
G = (V,E). V is a set of vertices representing entities in the network and E,
{(u, v)|u, v ∈ V }, is a set of edges representing relations or interactions between
entities. G is undirected, un-weighted, and has no self-loop.
Other types of graphs have also been used to model social networks, such as
bipartite graphs, graphs with weighted edges, graphs whose vertices have attributes
and edges have attributes, graphs whose edges have been distinguished by sensitive
or non-sensitive, etc. In our work, we focus on the simple graph where structural
information is the main consideration.
2.1.2 Metrics
In this thesis, we are concerned with the topological properties of social networks.
We therefore consider the metrics that quantify various structural properties of
graphs. These properties or features of graphs such as connectivity and centrality
are typically used for studying, for instance, information diffusion in social networks
[73].
Degree of a vertex v of a graph is the number of edges incident to the vertex.
Eccentricity of a vertex v means the greatest distance between v and any other
vertex.
Diameter is the maximum graph eccentricity of all the vertex in a graph.
Radius is the minimum graph eccentricity of any vertex in a graph.
Density is the ratio of the number of edges to the number of possible edges in
an undirected simple graph, defined as: D = 2e
n(n−1) . n is the number of vertices. e
is the number of edges.
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Average shortest path length, also known as mean geodesic distance, is
the average of shortest paths for all possible pairs of vertices. The shortest path
length between two vertices in a simple graph is defined as the least number of
hops from one vertex to the other.
Degree centrality of vertex v is the number of vertices adjacent to it in
graph G. For comparison between different graphs, we use the normalized degree
centrality: CD(v) = dn−1 , d is the degree of vertex v, and n the number of vertices
of graph G. A higher degree centrality may mean more connections one individual
has, thus indicating a larger social circle in a social network.
Closeness centrality of vertex vi is the inverse of the mean geodesic distance
of vi to all the other vertices in the graph: CC(vi) = n−1∑n
i 6=j g(vi,vj)
where n is the
number of vertices of graph G, g(vi, vj) is the geodesic distance between vi and any
other vertices in graph G. Closeness centrality measures how close a vertex is to all
the other vertices. The higher the value is, the important the vertex is, since the
closer a vertex is to the other vertices in a social network or information network,
the faster information can be exchanged for example.
Betweenness centrality of vertex vi is the ratio of the number of shortest




. σst is the total number of shortest paths between vertex vs and
vertex vt, and σst(vi) is the number of shortest paths between vertex vs and vt that
pass through vertex vi. The higher the value of betweenness centrality, the more
important a vertex is.
Eigenvector centrality of vertices is the principle eigenvector of the network’s
adjacency matrix. It indicates each vertex’s importance according to its connections
to important vertices (the concept used in Google’s Pagerank algorithm [25].)
Algebraic connectivity [35] is the second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian
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matrix of a graph G. It suggests how well connected a graph is. If the graph is
disjoint, which is to say the graph has more than one component, then its algebraic
connectivity value is 0. Otherwise the upper bound for algebraic connectivity for
the graph is the minimum cut set [48] while the lower bound is 1
nD
where n is the
number of vertices of graph G. D is the diameter of graph G.
Earth mover’s distance (EMD) [131] measures the distance between two
probability distributions. It suggests the minimum amount of work that must be
performed to transform one distribution to another. To further analyze degrees of
vertices, we apply it to the degree distributions of graphs.
Edit distance is used as the total number of edges deleted inserted: Cost(G,G∗) =
(E(G)
⋃
E(G∗))−(E(G)⋂E(G∗)), where E(G) is the set of edges in graph G, and
E(G∗) is the set of edges in the anonymized graph G∗.
Clustering coefficient indicates the extent to which vertices in a graph tend to
cluster together. It can be measured globally and locally.
Global clustering coefficient is the count of triangles and triples in the whole
graph. It is defined as: 3∗4
Λ
. 4 is the number of triangles, and Λ is the number of
connected triples.
Local clustering coefficient is defined for each vertex. Local clustering co-
efficient of vertex vi is Ci = |ejk|ki∗(ki−1) . vj and vk are the neighbors of vi. |ejk| is
the number of edges between the neighbors of vi while ki is the number of vi’s
neighbors.
We introduce community related metrics as follows.




Σi,j∈V (Aij − kikj
2m
)δ(ci, cj) (2.1)
where Aij = 1 if i and j are connected, otherwise Aij = 0, and δ(ci, cj) = 1 if i
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and j belong to the same cluster, otherwise δ(ci, cj) = 0. Modularity is defined
based on this idea that edges between vertices in the same community are dense,
and are sparse between different communities. To find communities with natural
division, modularity is defined as the number of edges falling within groups minus
the expected number in an equivalent (the same number of edges and the same
degree distribution) graph with edges placed at random [115].










where Oi is the number of communities to which vertex i belongs, and Oj is the
number of communities to which vertex j belongs.





where cs = |(u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ S, v /∈ S|. It is the number of edges with one end in
the set and the other end outside the set. ms = |(u, v) ∈ E : u ∈ S, v ∈ S|. It is
the number of edges in S.
Internal density for a set of vertices S is defined as
InternalDensity(S) =
ms
ns(ns − 1)/2 (2.4)
where ms is the same as above. ns is the number of vertices in S. Internal Density
is the internal edge density of S.





Cut Ratio is the fraction of existing edges out of all possible edges having one end
outside the cluster.







where f(x, S) = t(x,S)
t(x,V )
∗ vt(x,V )|S\x|+vt(x,V \s) if t(x, V ) 6= 0; f(x, S) = 0 if t(x, V ) = 0.
t(x, S) is the number of triangles that vertex x closes with vertices in S and vt(x, S)
is the number of vertices in S that form at least one triangle with x.
High modularity suggests dense connections between the vertices within com-
munities, but sparse connections between vertices in different communities, while a
modularity value of zero suggests the connections within communities are no better
than those in random graphs which have no community structures. Conductance,
internal density, and cut ratio measure the quality of communities in terms of in-
ternal and external connectivity. WCC measures the community quality based on
the closed triangles. High WCC suggests a higher probability of closed triangles
among the vertices within communities, compared to those between communities.
Additionally, we can use a widely adopted metric called normalized mutual in-
formation (NMI ) [91] to measure the similarity between detected disjoint or over-
lapping communities and ground truth.
Normalized Mutual Information (NMI ) of two sets of communities {C1}
and {C2} is defined as:
NMI(X|Y ) = 1− [H(X|Y ) + H(Y |X)]/2, (2.7)
where H(X)(H(Y )) is the entropy of the random variable X(Y ) associated with
the set of community {C1}({C2}), and H(X|Y ) is the conditional entropy of X
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with respect to Y . NMI indicates the similarity between two sets of communities.
Omega Index is also a metric based on two sets of communities. It measures how
many pairs of vertices belong together in the same number of communities. Both
the NMI and Omega Index yield values between 0 and 1, with value 1 corresponding
to a perfect match between the two sets of communities.
2.2 Community Detection Related Work
Community detection dates back to Weiss and Jacobson’s work [156] in 1955. They
sought work groups within a government agency by studying the matrix of working
relationships. A large number of approaches were proposed after Girvan and New-
man’s work [69, 114] in 2002. Their method identifies and removes the between-
cluster edges iteratively, according to the betweenness centrality. The graph is
disjointed, and consequently results in communities.
2.2.1 Traditional methods
Community detection is sometimes referred to as graph clustering. Basically, it
can be categorized into partition clustering, hierarchical clustering, and spectrum
clustering [61]. Hierarchical clustering can be further divided into divisive cluster-
ing, and agglomerative clustering. Partition clustering is dividing the vertices into
groups with a possible predefined size or predefined number of groups, so as to
maximize/minimize a given metric. Hierarchical clustering computes the pairwise
vertex similarities, and then iteratively merges the vertices with sufficient high sim-
ilarity or divides clusters by removing the edges between vertices with sufficiently
low similarities. Spectrum clustering projects vertices to some spaces and partitions
them, based on the eigenvectors of matrices.
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In the following sections (2.2.3-2.2.7), we review the specific methods according
to a different classification scheme that is based on the features of the methods.
We emphasize that many methods may fall into more than one category. In this
case, we only classified them according to what we consider their main features.
2.2.2 Random-walk based methods
Several methods [123, 84, 149, 107, 129] are based on the idea of random walks.
Pons and Latapy [123] calculated the similarities which they call distance, between
pairs of adjacent vertices and between communities, by using short random walks,
Then, they adopted Ward’s [152] agglomerative hierarchical clustering approach to
find communities. Community structures are obtained and represented as a tree
called dendrogram. Jin et al. [84] proposed an algorithm based on the Markov ran-
dom walk to unfold the communities, and extracted them with a cut-off criterion
based on conductance. Dongen [149] utilized the Markov Chain to simulate the
random walks. This work is based on the idea that if starting at a vertex and then
traveling to other vertices randomly, the possibility of staying within the clusters is
higher compared to travelling between the clusters, because there are more edges
within the cluster than between clusters. The method is based on the transition
probability matrix with adjustments. In the long run, this effect will disappear,
so Dongen designed an algorithm that stops half way in the Markov Chain. [107]
proposed using random walks with restarts to find significant clusters in large-scale
protein networks. The idea is to expand a given cluster to include the protein with
the highest proximity to the current cluster. Rosvall and Bergstrom [129] com-
bined an information theoretic approach and random walk to detect communities
in weighted and directed network.
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2.2.3 Modularity-based methods
Several authors [114, 36, 117, 76, 77] focused on modularity, which was first pro-
posed by Girvan and Newman [69]. Girvan and Newman in [114] proposed a
divisive method to identify communities. The edges with the highest betweenness
are removed iteratively, thus disconnecting the graph and creating communities.
The best partition has the highest modularity. Clauset [36] proposed a method
based on the assumption of a lack of global knowledge about the graph, and thus
communities are detected by exploring one vertex at a time. Clauset defined a
local measurement of community structure called locally modularity, and proposed
an agglomerative algorithm to maximize the local modularity of the communities
detected. Nicosia et al. [117] optimized modularity for overlapping communities on
directed graphs. Gregory’s method [76] finds overlapping communities by extend-
ing Girvan and Newman’s method. Instead of removing an edge after identifying
the edge with high betweenness, vertices are split. They defined vertex between-
ness, which is calculated according to the edge betweenness, for the vertices to
decide which, how and when to split. Gregory [77] improved the complexity of the
algorithm by computing local betweenness instead of global betweenness. Still the
problem with these methods is the scalability of the algorithms due to betweenness
computation.
2.2.4 Clique-based methods
Some methods are based on cliques. Du et al. [50] used maximal cliques for com-
munity detecting instead of star-shaped subgraphs. The problem of star clustering
[6], as they pointed out, is that the verteice with high degrees do not necessarily
mean involvement in a community. Therefore, they proposed an algorithm called
ComTector. It enumerates all maximal cliques, finds the clustering kernel in each
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group of the overlapping maximal cliques, assigns the rest vertices to the closest
kernels, and then merges fractional communities. Palla et al. [67] designed the
clique percolation method which finds all cliques of size k and thus the communi-
ties. They defined a community as the union of all k-cliques that can be reached
from each other through a series of adjacent k-cliques, where two k-cliques are ad-
jacent if they share k-1 vertices. Communities are connected union of k-cliques.
Cui et al. [43] focused on finding overlapping communities given an online query
vertex. They pointed out that defining a community as a k-clique component, an
example of which can be seen in [67], is too restrictive. They relaxed the com-
munity requirement by defining a γ-quasi-k-clique and define a community as a
γ-quasi-k-clique component. The components are obtained by a depth-first search
on the clique graph.
2.2.5 Agglomerative algorithms
The methods [37, 3] detect community in an agglomerative way. Clauset et al. [37]
proposed a greedy hierarchical agglomerative algorithm. It starts from each vertex
being a community, and joins two communities at each iteration. Two communities
are selected, based on the requirement of maximizing modularity increment. They
used a dendrogram to represent the whole process. Ahn et al. Ahn et al. [3] defined
clusters as sets of edges. They found hierarchical community structures through
single-linkage hierarchical clustering, which groups edges pairwise according to their
edge similarity until all edges are in the same cluster. Edge similarity is defined
by the Jaccard index, where the sample sets are the immediate neighboring non-
common vertices of the two edges.
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2.2.6 Local algorithms
Some methods [11, 12, 72, 91, 41, 36] detect community locally. Baumes et al.
[11, 12] proposed two heuristics to detect locally dense subgraphs as communities.
Two subgraphs with significant overlap can be locally optimal, and are overlapping
communities. The first heuristic finds disjoined clusters by deleting high-ranking
vertices, and then adds the deleted vertices to one or more clusters. The second
heuristic starts from randomly chosen seeds, and then adds or deletes one vertex
at a time until the density metric cannot be further improved. Goldberg et al. [72]
proposed an additional requirement to Baumes et al.’s algorithms, that requires
the community to be a connected sub-graph. According to a density metric, the
density of a community cannot be improved with the removal or addition of a single
vertex. Lancichinetti et al. [91] proposed an algorithm that is capable of finding
both hierarchical and overlapping communities. A fitness function of clusters is
designed. Each cluster starts from a single vertex. Neighbors of vertices in the
clusters are added and deleted one by one, as long as the fitness increases. The
cluster is formed when the fitness reaches a local maximum. Then another unvisited
vertex is chosen randomly to start forming a cluster. The algorithm proceeds until
all vertices have been assigned to clusters. The vertices may be assigned to different
clusters, which forms overlapping communities. Michele et al. [41] proposed an
algorithm that democratically allows each vertex to choose their communities in
their local views. Specifically, the method extracts the ego network of each vertex,
applies a label propagation algorithm to the subgraph and then combines the results
of all vertices. The algorithm is parallelizable and incremental.
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2.2.7 Alternative algorithms
As time evolves, a sequence of networks is generated. Some methods [44, 17] con-
sider dynamic networks. Cuzzocrea et al. [44] proposed a match-based community
detection algorithm for dynamic network. Algorithms were proposed to capture
and model various kinds of community transitions, by matching network snapshots
of adjacent time steps. Boden et al. [17] detected communities at each time step
using the DB-CSC approach [78], and then match the communities by projecting
the vertices of a graph onto a dimensional vector space and check whether the two
given samples were generated from the same underlying distribution.
Some methods detect communities based on structural and extra information,
e.g. vertex attributes, edge content, and event information [99, 130, 126, 17]. Li
et al. [99] proposed an agglomerative clustering method for detecting communities
based on event information. They designed a special type of edge called virtual links
connecting a pair of vertices representing individuals from different events who do
not have direct interactions but who work on some similar topics. The algorithm
starts by having the members from each event form an initial community. Then it
detects similar events in terms of overlapping vertices and virtual links, and then
merges them to form bigger communities in an agglomerative way until the quality
of the detected communities in the merging process have become maximal. Ruan
et al. [130] designed a method for community detection by combining content and
link information to strengthen the community signal. The similarity of content
is measured and is used to sharpen the link strength, where link strength is an
estimation of probability for an edge to reside within a community. Content edges
are constructed based on the content similarities. The algorithm samples the union
of content edges and normal graph edges with bias to retain edges that are relevant
in local neighborhoods for each vertex. Then graph partition algorithms can be
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applied to the sampled graph and output clusters. Qi et al. [126] proposed an
edge-induced matrix factorization model to detect community incorporating edge
content, which they believe provides a number of distinguishing characteristics of
the communities which cannot be modeled by vertex content. They designed a
latent representation which can effectively expose the community factors with the
use of both structure and edge content, and then well-known clustering methods
can be applied to the latent vectors to find communities of edge. Finally, vertices
can be assigned to those communities correspondingly.
Jierui and Boleslaw [161] improved the speaker-listener label propagation algo-
rithm to make it possible for disjoint community detection [127] to be capable of
detecting overlapping communities. Each vertex holds one or multiple labels and
iteratively updates the labels according to the popular labels among its neighbors.
The algorithm scales linearly with the number of edges. Similarly, [93] used la-
bel propagation, but their method detects community in an active semi-supervised
way.
Zhang et al. [173] proposed a method that combines spectral mapping, fuzzy
clustering and the optimization of a quality function. Graphs are projected to a low
dimensionality Euclidean space, and then the vertices are clustered by fuzzy c-mean
algorithm. Yan and Gregory [164] proposed an optimization for existing community
detection algorithms. Pairwise vertex similarities are measured beforehand, and
existing algorithms are applied on the graph with the vertex similarities as edge
weights.
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2.3 Graph Anonymization Related Work
The need for more involved graph anonymization stems from one shortcoming
of naive anonymization [7]. Naive anonymization replaces the identities of ver-
tices with synthetic identifiers before publishing the graph. With minimal external
knowledge, adversaries may be able to recover these identities from the graph struc-
ture. In this section, we discuss the attacks, anonymity, and the anonymization
approaches proposed previously.
2.3.1 Attack Taxonomy
Backstrom et al. [7] proposed active attack and passive attack on social net-
works. An active attack uses a strategy that plants a unique small graph into
the network by creating fake accounts before releasing, and then tries to find this
planted graph in the anonymized graph after release, so as to get information about
the targets. A passive attack , as opposed to an active attack, aims to identify
targets in anonymized graphs according to graph patterns that are formed by ex-
isting accounts in the social networks, instead of accounts purposely created by
attacks. For these two attacks, adversaries have the structural information about
subgraphs in the released graphs.
Adversaries can have various types of background knowledge to breach the
privacy of data. The ability to attack depends on background knowledge of adver-
saries. For example, an adversary may use knowledge of quasi-identifiers to detect
the identities in tabular data. Because of the versatile information contained, ad-
versaries’ background knowledge may be any of the following:
• vertex knowledge: An individual vertex has information such as degree,
attributes and labels. Degree is one of the most important topology charac-
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teristics about one vertex in graph. It represents the number of relationships
or interactions an individual has with other individuals. Accurate degree in-
formation is not hard to get as long as it has not been perturbed. Vertex
attributes (identity excluded) can be sensitive or non-sensitive and may func-
tion as identifiers, similarly to tabular data. One example is NodeInfo [33],
which is defined as information that is attached to a vertex, and any identi-
fying information such as name or personal identify number is excluded.
• link knowledge: We define any link-related but not structural information
as link knowledge, such as edge weight and type.
• structural knowledge: Structural knowledge includes the paths between
pairs of vertices or neighborhood structural information of a certain vertex,
such as a subgraph around the vertex. This kind of information is the main
background knowledge for adversaries and makes the biggest difference be-
tween graph data and tabular data. The authors of [33, 81, 175, 177, 169]
focus on attacks based on this kind of background knowledge.
• graph metrics knowledge: Adversaries may achieve attacks with knowl-
edge about metrics, such as graph eccentricity, diameter, average path length,
clustering coefficient, betweenness centrality, subgraph centrality and transi-
tivity. Hay et al. [81] mentioned hub fingerprint queries utilizing information
about degree and betweenness centrality.
• auxiliary knowledge: Besides information that an adversary may obtain
within the network graph, there is “outside” information, called aggregate
auxiliary information [4]. It is defined as large-scale information from other
data sources and social networks whose memberships overlap with the target
network, as opposed to individual auxiliary information [4] which is identifi-
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able details about a small number of individuals from the target network and
possibly relationships between them.
The background knowledge may be accurate but not complete. Hay et al. [81]
discussed the possible effects arising out of whether the background knowledge
is complete or not. They view an adversary with absent facts as a closed-world
adversary while assuming that absent facts are not true. On the contrary, if the
absent facts are just unknown, then the adversary is an open-world adversary.
Information Disclosure can be categorized into three main types: identity
disclosure, attributes disclosure, and edge(link) disclosure. We view information
disclosure and attacks as being the same.
• Identity disclosure : The identity of the individual (vertex) is disclosed.
• Attributes disclosure : The privacy of information associated with each
vertex is disclosed. It can also be called content disclosure.
• Link disclosure : Sensitive relationships between two individuals are dis-
closed.
Several authors, e.g. [14, 102, 174] describe attacks according to this classifica-
tion. Attacks have also been classified by other standards too. Cheng et al. [33]
divided attacks into two types: attacks on NodeInfo, and attacks on edge informa-
tion which they call LinkInfo. NodeInfo attack includes both identity disclosure and
attributes disclosures. LinkInfo is the information about the relationships among
the individuals, which may be sensitive or non-sensitive.
Cormode et al. [40] partitioned link disclosure into static attacks and learned
link attacks in terms of whether adversaries have prior knowledge about relation-
ships between individuals.
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• Static attack : Adversaries analyze solely the information which is pub-
lished, and try to deduce explicit relationships.
• Learned link attack : Adversaries use the published graph and a few
relationships that are already known, to deduce other explicit relationships.
Some authors concentrate on structural attacks, particularly since structural
information specializes in social networks, compared to tabular data, and its versa-
tility makes it the most difficult part to analyze. This kind of attacks may involve
all the disclosures we mentioned early. Attacks such as the degree attack, sub-
graph attack, 1-neighbor-graph attack, and hub fingerprint attack all belong to the
category of structural attacks. Similarly, [109] proposed three structural queries:
vertex refinement query, subgraph query, and hub fingerprint query, corresponding
to degree attack, sub-graph attack, and hub-fingerprint attack separately.
2.3.2 Anonymity
Anonymity usually refers to an individual’s identity being publicly unknown. For
privacy preservation in social networks, the concept becomes more diverse. Re-
searchers have used this term to indicate anonymous sensitive attributes, anony-
mous sensitive relationships, or anonymous sensitive weights of edges. A huge
amount of work related to anonymity has been done with tabular data, e.g. k-
anonymity [142], l-diversity [106], t-closeness [98]. However, these concepts cannot
be applied to graph data directly, since each record is independent in tabular data.
But still concepts such as k-anonymity have been introduced and developed in the
domain of graph anonymization.
k-anonymity [175] Let G be a social network and G’ an anonymization of G.
If G’ is k-anonymous, then with neighborhood background knowledge, any vertex
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in G cannot be re-identified in G’ with confidence larger than 1/k.
k-degree anonymity [102] A vector of integers v is k-anonymous if every
distinct value in v appears at least k times. A graph is k-degree anonymous if the
degree sequence of G is k-anonymous.
k-candidate anonymity [109] Let Q be a structural query. An anonymized
graph satisfies k-candidate Anonymity given Q if for any x in V, the probability,
given Q, of candidate y for x is less than 1/k. It implies that the target vertex
cannot be distinguished with other at least k − 1 vertices.
k-security [33] Let G = (V,E) be a given graph with unique vertex information
I(v) for each vertex v ∈ V . Each vertex v ∈ V is linked to a unique individual
U(v). Let Gk is k-secure, with respect to G if for any two target individuals A and
B with corresponding neighborhood attack graphs GA and GB that are known by the
adversary, the following two conditions hold: 1)(NodeInfo Security) the adversary
cannot determine from Gk and GA(GB) that A(B) is linked to I(v) for any vertex
v with a probability of more than 1/k; 2) (LinkInfo Security) the adversary cannot
determine from Gk, GA and GB that A and B are linked by a path of a certain
length with a probability of more than 1/k. In other words, the adversary cannot
disclose a certain vertex’s NodeInfo with a probability of more than 1/k with the
published graph and the query results, and cannot determine path of a certain
length with probability of more than 1/k.
τ-confidence [172] Given a vertex description type, the confidence of a graph
G is defined as confd(G) = 1−maxPG,D, where PG,D = {pij|Ci, Cj ∈ PD(G), i ≤ j}
is the set of linking probabilities calculated based on the type-D partition of G. A
graph G is τ -confidence w.r.t. D if confd(G) ≥ τ . Here,linking probability is the
probability that an edge in edge equivalence class Eij links a target individual in
vertex equivalence class Ci and another target individual in vertex equivalence class
28
Cj.
k2-degree anonymity [143] A graph G is k2-degree anonymous if, for every
vertex with an incident edge of degree pair (d1, d2) in G, there exit at least k-1
other vertices, such that each of the k-1 vertices also has an incident edge of the
same degree pair.
k-symmetry anonymity [158] Given a graph G and an integer k, if ∀4 ∈
automorphism partition of G, |4| ≥ k, then G is k-symmetric.
2.3.3 Anonymization Approaches
Hay et al [81] focused on the risk of re-identifying entities in an anonymized network
using primarily structural information. Attacks are classified and expressed through
three variants of knowledge query: vertex refinement query, subgraph query and
hub fingerprint query. They studied the re-identification risks caused by these at-
tacks on three real network data sets and found that the impacts of attacks differed
significantly across different data sets. For vertex refinement, the biggest change is
between the query for the degree of target vertex and the neighbors’ degrees of the
target vertex. Compared with the subgraph query and the hub fingerprint query,
vertex refinement is more efficient, which suggests that privacy undergoes more
risks under such queries at the same time. Conducting tests using random graphs
and power law graphs, they also integrated the attributes of vertices into adversary
knowledge and evaluated the result with regard to the number of distinct attributes
values and attribute-structure correlations. They proposed the k-candidate anony-
mity model and advised anonymizing graphs by grouping vertices into partitions
and publishing the number of vertices and the edge density in each partition, and
also the edge density across partitions. Liu and Terzi [102] specifically focused on
attacks leveraging an adversary’s background knowledge of degree and proposed
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an anonymization framework focusing on identity disclosure. They divided attacks
which they mention as privacy breaches into three categories: identity disclosure,
link disclosure, and content disclosure. They proposed k-degree anonymity as pri-
vacy guarantee and the approach to achieve k-degree anonymity is completed in
two steps: constructing a new degree sequence according to the original degree se-
quence aimed at maximum degree similarity and constructing the graph, which is
the supergraph of the original graph in general based on the new degree sequence.
We study this work in detail in Section 3.1 and Appendix A. Stronger privacy
guarantees than those adaptions of k-degree anonymity are provided by models
such as k2-degree anonymity by Tai et al. [143]. A k2-degree anonymous graph
prevents re-identification by adversaries with background knowledge of the degrees
of two vertices connected by an edge. Even stronger privacy guarantees than k-
degree anonymity and k2-degree anonymity are provided by k-automorphism [177].
Zou et al. focused on identity disclosure and structural attacks, and proposed
to modify the graph to be k-automorphic before releasing. Any vertex in such
a graph cannot be distinguished from other at least k − 1 vertices via the graph
structure, so all kinds of structure attacks are prevented. The modifications are
achieved by the addition and deletion of edges and, occasionally, the addition of
vertices. A method for dynamic publishing of social network data was designed as
well. Similarly, Wu et al. [158] proposed the k-symmetry model to prevent identity
disclosure. In a k-symmetric graph every vertex is structurally indistinguishable
from at least k − 1 other vertices. Cheng et al. [33] considered the same prob-
lem as Zou et al. [177], as they also tried to prevent general structural attacks
on published graphs and protect against not only the disclosure of identity, but
also those involving links and attributes. They proposed a k-isomorphism model,
that forms k pairwise isomorphic subgraphs, to provide sufficient privacy guarantee
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by resisting all kinds of structural attacks. Specifically, they proposed a k-secure
privacy preserving network publication, by publishing an anonymized graph with
intact vertices, minimal anonymization cost and vertex information, whereas the
graph satisfies k-security. They used a compound vertex ID mechanism and the
anonymization method to deal with dynamically released networks. Information
loss is qualified by anonymization cost that is measured by mainly edit distance.
To ensure minimal anonymization cost, the number of different edges is minimized
and the edit distance is minimized.
Zhang and Zhang [172] focused on the preservation of sensitive edges in social
networks, which they called it edge anonymity. From their study of edge disclo-
sure on two real world data sets, they believe that edge disclosure is more likely to
happen in dense graphs, and the k-anonymous algorithm cannot guarantee com-
plete protection against edge disclosure. They state that edge additions are more
likely to cause edge disclosure, and edge deletion can always reduce linking proba-
bilities. They proposed τ -confidence and degree-based algorithms to partition the
naive-anonymized graph by degree, according to the pre-decided threshold of graph
confidence τ , and then do edge addition or deletion to achieve better graph confi-
dence. The authors [170, 168, 169, 88, 103, 174] considered link disclosure as well.
Korolova et al. [88] studied the link disclosure by adversaries using a typical social
network interface, and the information about links provided in terms of lookahead,
and advised limiting the lookahead of social network interface to one or two. Ying
et al. [170] considered adversaries’ ability to infer sensitive edges on the anonymi-
zed graph, while in[168] the authors focused on both identity disclosure and link
disclosure, assuming that all vertices and edges are sensitive. They investigated the
relationship between the extent of randomization of the anonymization algorithm
and the risk of disclosure, and found that, as expected, the more perturbation there
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is, the more privacy is preserved, and link protection needs far fewer perturbations
than identity protection. Ying and Wu [169] analyzed the effects brought by a
simple random edge adding or deleting algorithm and random edge switching al-
gorithm. Randomization approaches for anonymization, such as those proposed in
[109], have a significant impact on relevant topology features. They propose a ran-
domization method that can preserve the spectrum by controlling the changes of
eigenvalues of the adjacent matrix of the graph when adding or deleting or switch-
ing edges. Bonchi et al.[20] reconsidered the impact of randomization algorithms
for identity disclosure and utility preservation from an information-theoretic per-
spective, and show that randomization techniques may achieve meaningful levels
of obfuscation while still preserving characteristics of the original graph.
Several authors [175, 176, 171, 27, 40, 100, 171, 103, 46, 14] looked at graph
models other than simple graphs, such as bipartite graphs. Bhagat et al. [14] mod-
eled a social network as a rich interaction bipartite graph with entity set V and
interaction set I. The edge between vertex in V and vertex in I indicates that the
entity participates in the interaction. To preserve the privacy of interactions they
proposed Class safety. The graph was anonymized by partitioning the vertices into
classes of Class safety condition and revealing only the number of edges, or gener-
ating labels to replace the identifiers of vertices and grouping vertices into classes.
Cormode et al. [40] modeled social networks as bipartite graphs too. They consid-
ered static attack and learned link attacks. They proposed to use (k, l)−groupings.
The principle is to group vertex set V into groups of size at least k, and group ver-
tex set W into groups of size at least l. After anonymization, the published edge set
E ′ is isomorphic to the original edge set E, but the mapping information is hidden
either partially or completely. Campan et al. [28] modeled social networks as a
simple undirected graph G = (N,E). N is a set of vertices with attributes that are
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partitioned into three categories: identifier attribute, quasi-identifier attribute and
sensitive attribute. They considered both link disclosure and attribute disclosure.
Vertices are divided into clusters according to the values of their quasi-identifier
attributes (of categorical type or numerical type) with at least k entities, and gener-
alized to one super-vertex for each cluster while edges are generalized inside clusters
and across clusters. Compared with Zheleva et al’s algorithm [174], the structural
information loss caused by vertices clustering and generalization is slightly smaller
in general. Liu et al.[103] modeled social networks as weighted graphs. To preserve
the sensitive weights of edges, edge weights were perturbed according to Gaussian
distribution. They also perturbed the edge weights of the input graphs by apply-
ing the Gaussian randomization multiplication strategy in order to achieve privacy
preservation while reserving the globe structure of the graph such as the shortest
path lengths. Zheleva et al. [174] modeled the social network as a graph with a
single vertex type and multiple edge types, among which one of the edge types
represents sensitive relationships. To prevent adversaries from predicting sensitive
edges based on the observed non-sensitive edges, methods for different quantities
of revealing edges were proposed and compared.
Zhou and Pei [175, 176] and Yuan et al. [171] were the first to consider modeling
social networks as labeled graphs. To prevent re-identification attacks by adver-
saries with immediate neighborhood structural knowledge, Zhou and Pei [175] pro-
posed a method that groups vertices and anonymizes the neighborhoods of vertices
in the same group by generalizing vertex labels and adding edges. They enforced
a k-anonymity privacy constraint on the graph, each vertex of which is guaran-
teed to have the same immediate neighborhood structure with other k − 1 vertex.
In [176], they improved the privacy guarantee provided by k-anonymity with the
idea of `-diversity, to protect labels on vertices as well. Yuan et al. [171] tried to
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be more practical by considering users’ different privacy concerns. They divided
privacy requirements into three levels, and suggestted methods to generalize labels
and modify structure corresponding to every privacy demand. Nevertheless, neither
Zhou and Pei, nor Yuan et al. considered labels as a part of the background knowl-
edge. However, in the case which adversaries hold label information, the methods
of [175, 176, 171] cannot achieve the same privacy guarantee. Moreover, as with
the context of microdata, a graph that satisfies a k-anonymity privacy guarantee
may still leak sensitive information regarding its labels [106].
Most methods focused on a single snapshot of social networks, and authors
considered graph anonymization on dynamic network release [15, 177, 33], and Yang
et al. [45] and Narayanan et al. [4] studied the problem of graph anonymization on
multiple social networks containing common information.
Privacy protection comes with the cost of data utility. We empirically quantify
such utility and privacy trade-off for two of the anonymization algorithms, k-degree




Mining social network data provides us with useful information, while privacy con-
cerns arise when data is released. User identities may be disclosed. Sensitive
connections may be disclosed. Malicious data recipients may use the data illegally
or cantankerously [7]. For instance, providing users with information about their
position among their peers in the network could help users in building their weak
social ties and bridging social capital [97], i.e., expanding their social or profes-
sional circles in a desired direction. But this could pose privacy risks, i.e. the
possible exploration of sensitive relationships by malicious users. The need arises
for methods that provide privacy protection for sensitive data and therefore safe-
guard the interpersonal trust and institutional trust that users place in the owners
and administrators of the SNS.
This chapter introduces our contribution to privacy protection for social network
data in two aspects. First, we study the shortcomings of the k-degree anonymity
algorithm, an algorithm that guarantees that after anonymization, the graph is
capable of resisting attacks by adversaries with knowledge of degrees. To improve,
we propose a new algorithm, which is not only more effective but also more efficient
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(Section 3.1). Second, we focus on the privacy problem of revealing user data to end-
users of SNSs to help them network better (Section 3.2). This problem is related
to, but distinct from, the problem of revealing whole-network data to third parties.
We propose a user-centric utility-driven paradigm, as opposed to the privacy-driven
paradigm in previous research.
3.1 Fast Identity Anonymization on Graphs
3.1.1 Overview
Liu and Terzi [102] addressed the issue of identity disclosure of network users by
adversaries with the background knowledge of vertices degree. To prevent such
attacks they proposed the problem of k-degree anonymity. A graph is said to
be k-degree anonymous when each vertex in the graph has the same degree as
at least k − 1 other vertices. In other words, any vertex cannot be identified
with a probability higher than 1/k if the adversary has the degree information
of the graph. The degree sequence of such a graph is said to be k-anonymous.
Next, the problem is to transform a non-k -degree anonymous graph into a k -degree
anonymous graph by adding or deleting a minimum number of edges. For the sake
of simplicity, we consider only the addition of edges. Liu and Terzi [102] proposed
a two-phase algorithm. The first phase (degree anonymization) anonymizes the
degree sequence of the original graph to be k -anonymous. They proposed a dynamic
programming algorithm which reproduces the algorithm in [68]. The second phase
(graph construction) constructs a k -degree anonymous graph with an anonymized
degree sequence based on the original graph. We call this algorithm K-Degree
Anonymization (KDA).
Typically, the degree distribution of large real world networks follows a power-
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law or exponential distribution [9, 38]. Consequently, there are few vertices with
very large degrees and many vertices with the same small degrees. Moreover, the
difference between consecutive large degrees is great.
The dynamic programming in the degree anonymization phase of KDA is de-
signed to minimize the residual degrees, namely the difference between the original
degrees and the degrees in the anonymized degree sequence. On large real world
graphs, it generates a sequence at the expense of large residual degrees for large
original degrees, as the differences between these large original degrees are great. It
also generates a sequence with a small number of changes from the original degree
sequence, as many vertices with small original degrees are already k -anonymous. It
may then be impossible to compensate the large residual degrees. The sequence is
thus unrealizable. Our experience suggests that, unlike what is claimed by Liu and
Terzi, this situation occurs frequently. For instance, as illustrated in the example
below, their dynamic programming in the degree anonymization phase does not
generate a realizable degree sequence from the given data set.
Example 1. Email-Enron is the network of Enron employees who have communi-
cated through the Enron email. It is an undirected graph with 36692 vertices and
367662 edges. Each vertex represents an email address. An edge connects a pair
of vertices if there is at least one email communication between the correspond-
ing email users. The data set is available at http://snap.stanford.edu/data/email-
Enron.html. The first 10 degrees of its degree sequence in descending order are
1383, 1367, 1261, 1245, 1244, 1143, 1099, 1068, 1026, 924. After the degree se-
quence is anonymized for k = 5, the 10 degrees become 1383, 1383, 1383, 1383,
1383, 1143, 1143, 1143, 1143, 1143. We see that the degree of the last vertex is
increased by 1143 − 924 = 219. This means that 219 vertices with residual degree
are required, in order to compensate the residual degree of 219. However, during
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the anonymization, the number of vertices that have their degrees increased is 212.
Moreover, most of these vertices are those with small original degrees which are
already connected to that vertex. Thus, there are not enough vertices with resid-
ual degrees to be wired to the last vertex. The k-anonymous degree sequence is
unrealizable.
Moreover, even if the anonymized degree sequence is realizable, the graph con-
struction phase of the algorithm may not succeed.
Liu and Terzi catered for these two situations by proposing a Probing scheme
that enacts small random changes on the degree sequence until it is realizable and
the graph is constructed. Our experience shows that a large number of Probing
steps are, in effect, necessary to obtain a realizable sequence for practical graphs.
After each Probing is invoked, the realizability-testing is conducted. The testing
has a time complexity O(n2), where n is the number of vertices. As Probing is
invoked for a large number of repetitions, the complete algorithm is very inefficient.
Motivated by the above observations, we study fast k -degree anonymization on
graphs at the risk of marginally increasing the cost of degree anonymization, i.e.,
the edit distance between the anonymized graph and the original graph.
We propose a greedy algorithm that anonymizes the original graph by simulta-
neously adding edges to the original graph and anonymizing its degree sequence.
We thereby avoid realizability testing by effectively interleaving the anonymization
of the degree sequence with the construction of the anonymized graph in groups of
vertices.
Our algorithm results in a larger edit distance on small graphs, but a smaller
edit distance on large graphs, compared to the algorithm proposed by Liu and
Terzi. Our algorithm is much more efficient than their algorithm.
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3.1.2 Algorithm
The algorithm that we propose simultaneously adds edges to the original graph
and anonymizes its degree sequence in groups of vertices.
The main idea of the algorithm is to cluster and anonymize the vertices of the
original graph into several anonymization groups. Each group contains at least k
vertices. The graph is transformed so that vertices in each group have the same
degree. In order to achieve a low local degree anonymization cost, the vertices
in each group should have similar degrees. For this reason, our algorithm sorts,
examines and groups the vertices in the descending order of their degrees in the
original graph. This choice is motivated by the observation that practical graphs
often follow a power or exponential law with a long tail, according to which many
vertices have and share a small degree. We therefore wire vertices with larger
degrees to vertices with smaller degrees in groups until the degree sequence is k -
anonymous, if it can be achieved.
Let v be the sorted vertex sequence. The greedy examination algorithm clus-
ters vertices into an anonymization group. An anonymization group is the smallest
subset of v that has at least k members and whose members have a degree strictly
higher than the remaining vertices. The cost of the subsequent anonymization
of such a group is necessarily the sum of residual degrees after anonymization,
namely, for an anonymization group (vi, · · · , vj) in descending order of degrees,∑j
l=i(di − dl), where dl is the degree of vertex vl.
The edge creation algorithm adds edges in order to anonymize the vertices in
a group. It wires vertices with insufficient degrees in the anonymization group to
vertices with lesser degrees in v until all vertices in the group have the same degree
di for an anonymization group (vi, · · · , vj) in descending order of degrees. However,
we constrain the algorithm never to increase the degrees of vertices in and outside
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the group beyond that of the highest degree in the anonymization group, namely,
di, for an anonymization group (vi, · · · , vj) in descending order of degrees. After
adding edges, v is reordered according to the new degrees. At the next iteration,
vertices outside the group may be further added to the newly anonymized group
by greedy examination, if their degree is di.
The anonymization group is now k -anonymous, because it contains at least k
vertices with degree di.
The design choices in the algorithms above, in particular the wiring constraint,
have been made in order to minimize the need for reordering v and to allow the
processing of vertices and groups to be as sequential as possible .
Because of the wiring constraint, it is however possible that the above determin-
istic process does not find enough vertices to wire. Therefore, it does not construct
a graph with an anonymized degree sequence. The relaxed edge creation algo-
rithm caters for such possible failures. It relaxes the wiring constraint.
The complete algorithm, Fast K-Degree Anonymization (FKDA), combines the
above three algorithms. FKDA always constructs a k -degree anonymous graph.
3.1.2.1 The greedy examination Algorithm
At each iteration, the input to greedy examination is a sequence of vertices v of
length n, sorted in the descending order of their degrees, an index i such that the
vertex sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vi−1) has been k -anonymous and the value of k. The
output is a number na such that the vertices vi, vi+1, . . . , vi+na−1 are selected to be
clustered into an anonymization group. Then greedy examination passes v, i and
na to edge creation.
The algorithm begins with an sequential examination of v starting from vi,
until vj such that dj < di. If there is no such vj found, vi, vi+1, . . . , vn have the
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Algorithm 3.1: The greedy examination algorithm
Input: v: a sequence of n vertices sorted in the descending order of their
degrees, i: an index, k: the value of anonymity.
Output: na: the number of consecutive vertices that are going to be
anonymized.
1 Find the first vertex vj such that dj < di;
2 if vj is not found then
3 na = n− i+ 1;
4 else
5 if di = di−1 then
6 if n− j + 1 < k then na = n− i+ 1 ;
7 else na = j − i ;
8 else
9 if n− i+ 1 < 2k or n− j + 1 < k then na = n− i+ 1 ;
10 else na =max(k, j − i) ;
11 Return na;
same degree already. Below we show that there are at least k vertices from vi
to vn. Thereby v is already k -anonymous. na is set to be n − i + 1, i.e., the
number of all the remaining vertices. If vj is found, there are two different cases
depending on the result of comparison between di and di−11. If di = di−12 which
means that vi has the same degree as the degree of the last anonymization group,
greedy examination clusters vi, vi+1, . . . , vj−1 in a group and merges them into the
last anonymization group. Then na is set to be j−i. However, there is an exception
when n− j+1 < k. This means that there are less than k vertices after the current
group. These vertices cannot be transformed to be k -anonymous in a separated
group. Thus greedy examination has to cluster vi, vi+1, . . . , vn into a group. na
is set to be n − i + 1. In the other case where di < di−1, greedy examination
forms a new anonymization group starting from vi. If j − i ≥ k, which means
there are at least k vertices having the same degree, greedy examination clusters
vi, vi+1, . . . , vj−1 into the new group. na is set to be j− i. Otherwise, there are less
1If i = 1, the comparison is between d1 with n.
2This is caused by edge creation.
41
than k vertices in the sequence (vi, vi+1, . . . , vj−1). Thereby greedy examination
clusters vi, vi+1, . . . , vi+k−1 in the new anonymization group. na is set to be k. How-
ever, there are also two exceptions when n − i + 1 < 2k or n − j + 1 < k. The
former means that vi, vi+1, . . . , vn cannot form two anonymization groups. The lat-
ter means that vj, vj+1, . . . , vn cannot be clustered into a separated group. In either
exception, greedy examination has to cluster vi, vi+1, . . . , vn into an anonymiza-
tion group. Then na is set to be n− i+ 1.
The algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
3.1.2.2 The edge creation Algorithm
At each iteration, the input to edge creation is a sequence of vertices v of length
n sorted in the descending order of their degrees, an index i and a number na. The
goal is to anonymize the vertices vi, vi+1, . . . , vi+na−1 to degree di by adding edges to
the original graph. The output is an index, which equals i+na if the anonymization
succeeds, or equals j if vj cannot be anonymized, where i < j ≤ i+ na − 1.
For each vj in the vertex sequence (vi, vi+1, . . . , vi+na−1), edge creation wires
it to vl for j < l ≤ n, such that the edge (j, l) does not previously exist and
dl < di, until dj = di. The former condition avoids creating multiple edges. The
latter condition minimizes the need for reordering v. If in the end edge creation
successfully anonymizes these na vertices, it reorders the new vertex sequence v in
the descending order of their degrees. Otherwise, it returns the index j such that
vj cannot be anonymized with the wiring constraint. Then the repairing algorithm
relaxed edge creation is invoked.
The algorithm is described in Algorithm 2.
We consider three heuristics to examine the candidate vertices in v for the
creation of edges.
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Algorithm 3.2: The edge creation algorithm
Input: v : a sequence of n vertices sorted in the descending order of their
degrees, i : an index, na : the number of vertices that are going to be
anonymized starting from vi.
Output: j : an index.
1 for j ∈ (i+ 1, i+ na − 1) do
2 while dj < di do
3 Create an edge (j, l) where j < l ≤ n such that (j, l) does not
previously exist and dl < di;
4 if The edge cannot be created then Return j ;
5 Sort v in the descending order of degree;
6 Return j;
The first heuristic examines v from vj+1 to vn, that is, in the decreasing order
of their degrees, and creates the edge (j, l) whenever the constraint is satisfied.
The second heuristic examines v from vn to vj+1. The last heuristic randomly
selects a candidature vl and creates the edge (j, l). Below we denote by 1, 2, and
3, respectively, the variants of the complete algorithm with these three heuristics.
Intuitively, the first heuristic incurs larger anonymization cost than the second
heuristic does. This is because the first heuristic increases the degree of vertices
with large original degree, so that the largest degrees in the some anonymization
groups might be increased. In order to anonymize these groups, more edges will
be added. The third heuristic should behavior in between. On the other hand, the
first two heuristics construct deterministic anonymized graphs whereas the third
heuristic can generate random anonymized graphs, which has consequences on the
preservation of utility.
3.1.2.3 The relaxed edge creation Algorithm
The edge creation algorithm is not guaranteed to output a k -degree anonymous
graph. The failure occurs when an edge (j, l) with the wiring constraint cannot be
43
created for some j. In this case, relaxed edge creation is invoked. It relaxes the
wiring constraint.
The algorithm examines v from vn to v1 and iteratively creates an edge (j, l) if
only the edge does not previously exist, until dj = di. Then relaxed edge creation
returns the index l. Notice that this iteration can always stop because in the worst
case vj will be wired to all the other vertices. Finally relaxed edge creation sorts
the new vertex sequence v in the descending order of degree and feeds it as the
input of greedy examination in the next iteration.
The algorithm is described in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3.3: The relaxed edge creation algorithm
Input: v : a sequence of n vertices sorted in the descending order of their
degrees, i, j : two indices.
Output: l : an index.
1 for l = n to 1 do
2 if vj and vl are not connected then
3 Create an edge (j, l);
4 if dj = di then
5 Sort v in the descending order of degrees ;
6 Return l;
Notice that this process may compromise the k -degree anonymity of the vertex
sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vi−1) if the returned l is less than i, i.e., vj is wired to some
vertex that has been anonymized. In this case, greedy examination needs to
examine v from the beginning in the next iteration, i.e., i is set to be 0. In the
other case where l > i, greedy examination still examines v starting from vi in
the next iteration. However, as relaxed edge creation examines v from small
degree to large degree, there is a high probability that (v1, v2, . . . , vi−1) is still k -
anonymous.
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3.1.2.4 The Fast K -degree Anonymization Algorithm
The FKDA algorithm combines the greedy examination, edge creation and
relaxed edge creation algorithms. The input to FKDA is a graph G with n
vertices and the value of k. The output is a k -degree anonymous graph G′.
FKDA first computes the vertex sequence v of G in the descending order
of degree. Then at each iteration, it invokes greedy examination to compute
the number na and passes it with i to edge creation. If edge creation suc-
cessfully anonymizes the na vertices, FKDA updates the value of i as i + na.
Then FKDA outputs the anonymized graph G′ if i > n, or enters the next it-
eration otherwise. If edge creation fails to construct the graph, FKDA invokes
relaxed edge creation and updates the value of i according to the value of l
returned by relaxed edge creation. Notice that FKDA can always output a
valid k -degree anonymous graph, because in the worst case a complete graph is
constructed.
The complete algorithm is described in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 3.4: The Fast K -Degree Anonymization algorithm
Input: G : a graph of n vertices, k : the value of anonymity.
Output: G′ : a k -degree anonymous graph constructed from G.
1 v=the vertex sequence of G in the descending order of degree;
2 i = 1;
3 while i ≤ n do
4 na =greedy examination(v, i, k);
5 j =edge creation(v, i, na);
6 if j = i+ na then
7 i = i+ na;
8 else
9 l =relaxed edge creation(v, i, j);
10 if l < i then i = 0;
11 Return G′;
We provide the approximate bounds of the edit distance to the original graph
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produced by FKDA. Suppose ideally the original vertex sequence v is clustered
as follows. The sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vik) is clustered into i groups, each of which
contains k vertices, i.e., the (j + 1)th group contains the vertices vjk+1, vjk+2, . . . ,
v(j+1)k, 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1. The sequence (vik+1, vik+2, . . . , vn) is already k -anonymous3.
In the best case (which is encountered in the second heuristic of edge creation),
the vertices in the sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vik) are only wired to the vertices in the
sequence (vik+1, vik+2, . . . , vn) by edge creation. Suppose the latter sequence is





l=1(djk+1 − djk+l). In the worst case (which is encountered in
the first heuristic of edge creation), each vertex in the sequence (v1, v2, . . . , vik) is
wired to all of its antecedent vertices. Then the largest degree of the (j+1)th group





jk − djk+l) = i×(i−1)2 k2 × boundl.
3.1.3 Performance Evaluation
3.1.3.1 Experimental Setup
We implement KDA and three variants of FKDA, FKDA 1, FKDA 2 and FKDA
3, corresponding to the three heuristics in C++. We run all the experiments on a
cluster of 54 vertices, each of which has a 2.4GHz 16-core CPU and 24 GB memory.
3.1.3.2 Data Sets
We use three data sets, namely, Email-Urv, Wiki-Vote and Email-Enron (de-
scriptions in Appendix A.4).
We conduct experiments on these three graphs. The different sizes of the three
graphs illustrate the performance of KDA and FKDA on small (1133 vertices),
3This is the usual case for large graphs.
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medium (7115 vertices) and relatively large (36692 vertices) graphs.
3.1.3.3 Effectiveness Evaluation
We compare the effectiveness of the algorithms by evaluating the variation of sev-
eral utility metrics: edit distance, clustering coefficient and average shortest path
length(following [102]).
We vary the value of k in the range {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100}. For each value of
k, we run each algorithm 10 times on each data set and compute the average value
of the metrics.
Figure 3.1-3.3, 3.4-3.6 and 3.7-3.9 show the results on Email-Urv, Wiki-Vote
and Email-Enron, respectively.
Figure 3.1, 3.4 and 3.7 show the evaluation results of the normalized edit dis-
tance on the three graphs.
We see that FKDA adds more edges to Email-Urv but fewer edges to Wiki-Vote
and Email-Enron, compared to KDA. In Email-Urv, which is a small graph with
1133 vertices, the differences between large degrees are not large. By using KDA,
the residual degrees of the anonymized vertices with large original degrees can
be compensated by enough number of anonymized vertices with residual degrees,
that is, the anonymized degree sequence is realizable, with only a small number
of repetitions of probing. Thus, the minimum edit distance found by dynamic
programming is still less than the edit distance produced by FKDA. On the con-
trary, Wiki-Vote and Email-Enron are two relatively larger graphs with 7115 and
36692 vertices, respectively. The differences betweens large degrees of either graph
are considerably large. Therefore by using KDA, Probing is invoked a significant
number of times before a k -degree anonymous graph is constructed. Moreover,
























































































































































































Figure 3.6: ASPL: Wiki-
Vote.
relaxed edge creation increases a small degree only if the corresponding ver-
tex can be wired to an anonymized vertex with residual degree. On the contrary,
Probing randomly increases a small degree regardless the actual structure of the
graph. The corresponding vertex may not be able to be wired to an anonymi-
zed vertex with residual degree, because an edge between the two vertices might
already exist. Consequently, more repetitions of probing are invoked. Thus we be-
lieve that eventually, Probing adds more noise than relaxed edge creation does
to the degree sequences of the two large graphs. Therefore, FKDA adds less edges
than KDA does to the two graphs.
Figure 3.2, 3.5, 3.8 and Figure 3.3, 3.6, 3.9 show the evaluation results of the
clustering coefficient and average shortest path length, respectively. The constant
line shows the value of corresponding metric in the original graph.
We see that FKDA produces less similar results with that in the original graphs
























































































Figure 3.9: ASPL: Email-
Enron.
does. This is generally consistent with the evaluation results of edit distance, since
FKDA adds more edges to Email-Urv and fewer edges to Wiki-Vote and Email-
Enron than KDA does.
We further compare the performances of the three variants of FKDA.
In Section 3.1.2.2 we stated that the first heuristic incurs larger anonymization
cost, i.e. edit distance, than the second heuristic does, and the third heuristic per-
forms in between. The results in Figure 3.4 and 3.7 support this claim, although
the differences are small. However, in the small graph Email-Urv, we observe that
FKDA 2 incurs a much larger edit distance than the other two variants and FKDA
1 incurs the smallest edit distance, for k = 50 and k = 100. The reason is as
follows. When k increases, after anonymization, the residual degrees of the vertices
with large original degrees become larger. Therefore, more residual vertices with
smaller original degrees are required to compensate these large residual degrees.
As FKDA 2 creates edges by wiring the anonymized vertices to the vertices from
with a small degree to those with large degree, it makes the degrees of the ano-
nymized vertices and the degrees of the subsequent vertices closer to each other
than FKDA 1 does. Because of the wiring constraint in edge creation, at some
point there are not enough residual vertices to compensate the residual degree of
an anonymized vertex. Then relaxed edge creation is invoked. When k is too
large for the number of vertices (for example, k = 50, 100 and n = 1133 in Email-
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Urv), relaxed edge creation is invoked several times by FKDA 2. Then the edit
distance to the original graph is enlarged. On the contrary, FKDA 1 creates edges
by wiring the anonymized vertex with a large residual degree to the vertices with
large degrees to small degrees. It maintains a sufficient gap between the degrees of
the anonymized vertices and the degrees of the subsequent vertices. The residual
degree of the anonymized vertices can be compensated under the wiring constraint
in edge creation, without invoking relaxed edge creation. Therefore the edit
distance is small. FKDA 3 creates edges by wiring the anonymized vertices to
random residual vertices, so that it incurs the edit distance to the original graph
in between.
The abilities of the three heuristics on the preservation of utility of the original
graph differ from each other, depending on the structure of the original graph.
For example, Figure 3.6 shows that FKDA 1 incurs a larger average shortest path
length in the anonymized Wiki-Vote than FKDA 2 does. This suggests that the
vertices in Wiki-Vote with similar degrees are more connected than the vertices
with very different degrees. So creating edges by wiring an anonymized vertex to
the vertices from with large degrees to those with small degrees (similar degrees to
different degrees) in the edge creation of FKDA 1 does not reduce the average
shortest path length by much. On the contrary, FKDA 2 links vertices with very
different degrees in edge creation, which results in a significant reduction in the
average shortest path length. However, Figure 3.9 shows the reverse result in the
anonymized Email-Enron, which suggests that the vertices in Email-Enron with
similar degrees are less connected than the vertices with very different degrees.
The overall results show that FKDA 1 and FKDA 2 preserve the utilities of the
original graph better than FKDA 3 does. Nevertheless, FKDA 3 has an interesting



























































































FKDA 1 vs. KDA
FKDA 2 vs. KDA
FKDA 3 vs. KDA
Figure 3.13: Speedup of












FKDA 1 vs. KDA
FKDA 2 vs. KDA
FKDA 3 vs. KDA
Figure 3.14: Speedup of











FKDA 1 vs. KDA
FKDA 2 vs. KDA
FKDA 3 vs. KDA
Figure 3.15: Speedup of
FKDA vs. KDA on Email-
Enron.
3.1.3.4 Efficiency Evaluation
We compare the efficiency of the algorithms by measuring their execution time.
We vary the value of k in the range {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100}. For each value
of k, we run each algorithm 10 times on each data set and compute the average
execution time. We also compute the speedup of FKDA versus KDA for each
parameter setting.
Figure 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12 show the execution times on Email-Urv, Wiki-Vote
and Email-Enron, respectively. Figure 3.13, 3.14 and 3.15 show the corresponding
speedups.
We see that FKDA is significantly more efficient than KDA. The speedup varies
from the hundreds to one million on different graphs. The inefficiency of KDA is
due to the decoupling of the checking of realizability of the anonymized degree
sequences from the construction of graph.
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The efficiency of the three FKDA variants is similar. FKDA 1 and FKDA 2 are
slightly faster than FKDA 3. This is because FKDA 3 maintains an additional list
of candidate residual vertices in edge creation.
3.1.4 Summary
In this section, we propose a greedy k -degree anonymization algorithm that anonymizes
a graph by simultaneously adding edges and anonymizing its degree sequence in
groups of vertices.
The algorithm is designed to overcome the shortcomings of the KDA algorithm
proposed in [102]. The simultaneity of degree anonymization and graph construc-
tion in the new FKDA algorithm eliminates the need for realizability testing, which,
as confirmed by our experiments, is a significant factor in the poor efficiency of the
KDA algorithm.
We proposed three variants of the algorithm, corresponding to three wiring
heuristics. The comparative empirical performance evaluation on three real world
graphs shows that the three variants of FKDA are significantly more efficient than
KDA and more effective than KDA on large graphs.
We do not claim that our solution is a panacea for the anonymization of graphs
in general, that objective being anyway a chimerical target given the generality of
background knowledge potentially available to adversaries. It is, however, a very
effective and efficient solution for the protection of privacy in the presence of back-
ground knowledge about vertex degrees. More importantly, our solution shows that
it is possible to knit realizability and construction into one anonymization process
tightly, and therefore pave the way to the development of algorithms catering for
a variety of background structural knowledge.
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3.2 Graph Anonymization with Reachability Con-
straints
3.2.1 Overview
The facility to ease the creation of social ties online is a central feature in any SNS
[21]; such facility requires that some information about users is made available to
both known others, and strangers. This tension between confidentiality and facility
is especially pertinent in sites like LinkedIn or Xing, specializing in professional
networking that eases the formation of weak ties.
Consequently, the need arises for a method that reveals network graph data in
a discretionary manner, with the deterrence of malicious users in mind, while at
the same time providing a certain utility for benevolent users; thus the problem of
achieving discretionary user-centric network data release emerges. This problem is
related to, but distinct from the problem of revealing whole-network data to third
parties. We focus on the problem of revealing user data to end-users with the aim
of helping them to network better. The end-user derives utility from such data
revelation, and may thus willingly choose to participate in such a scheme. We aim
to guarantee such utility while releasing data in a discretionary manner.
Existing research in the area follows a privacy-driven paradigm: it formulates
a certain privacy principle, and develops techniques that bring the network data
to a form that abides thereby, while keeping the associated loss of utility low [7,
81, 102, 15, 33]. The transformed data is then ready to be released. However, the
extent to which such techniques maintain the information utility of the network
and structure thereafter is vague. These studies suffice to measure ad hoc utility
metrics; unfortunately, such metrics do not capture the extent to which an object
as complex as a graph maintains its original properties. Nevertheless, in the case
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where the information recipients are end-users of the social network site, aiming
to utilize it for networking purposes, they would like to have a guarantee precisely
on the utility of the released data, in terms of certain graph properties that may be
valuable for networking, no less than they would desire a certain privacy guarantee
about preventing their own information from being revealed to others.
A network is modeled as an undirected graph G = (V,E), where V is a set of
vertices (nodes) representing entities, and E is a set of edges representing relations
between entities. Nodes and edges may be annotated with attributes (e.g, occupa-
tion or interests for nodes, type or weight for edges), yet in this work we consider
the most basic graph model.
A naive anonymization of G would substitute all entity identifiers in G using
synthetic identifiers. However, such an anonymization does not suffice to conceal
the identities behind the published graph, as the structural information in the
network can itself serve to identify nodes [7, 177, 81, 102]. Thus, a structural ano-
nymization is called for. Besides, a privacy threat is not posed by the identification
of nodes in the network per se, but rather by the disclosure of the positions of
such identified nodes with respect to each other. We contend that, when the data
recipient is an end-user, a structural anonymization would suffice to provide the
confidentiality that users require, while other identifying information can still be
published, as it may be valuable for purposes such as professional networking.
3.2.1.1 A Practical Example
We envisage a scenario in which an SNS user requests to see the network subgraph
involving one’s connections up to a certain number of hops. Such a subgraph
would provide the user with an overview of her position in the broader network
neighborhood of her contacts and their contacts. Thus, it could provide ideas as
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Figure 3.16: Visualization of connections in Xing
to whom she might be able to connect to next. To be truly useful, this subgraph
should correctly reveal the identities of individuals within its scope and also provide
some indication as to the relative positions of such individuals. However, for the
sake of confidentiality, the subgraph should not reveal the precise relationships of
such individuals among each other.
Currently, many SNS platforms, such as LinkedIn4 and Xing,5 provide a func-
tionality through which users can see information about a path connecting them
to other persons; in some cases, one can also see individuals along that path. This
service offers valuable information to networkers. Yet, this practice poses prob-
lems, both from a privacy and a utility point of view: From a privacy perspective,
the revelation of individuals along the path poses a risk to them, as the relation-
ships among distant connections to the querying user may be sensitive and can be
exploited by a malicious user. On the other hand, from a utility viewpoint, the
published information is limited; a user may wish to view her position relative to a
whole neighborhood, so as to identify nodes of interest; single paths do not provide
such information.
Figure 3.16 shows a screen shot of the information provided by Xing in an
example we have created using fictional names. Likewise, Figure 3.17 shows an




names. While the provided information indicates the existence of a connection, it is
limited to a single path, and does not reveal other graph neighborhood information
that may be of legitimate interest to the user.
Figure 3.17: Visualization of connections in LinkedIn
Noticeably, Xing shows all intermediate connections, and even provides names
along a single path, in contrast to LinkedIn. If taken further, i.e., to longer paths, as
it stands, this practice would arguably compromise the privacy of users involved.
Nevertheless, inspired by this practice, we envisage that a user could ask for a
presentation of a fuller view of the network’s neighborhood structure around the
presented path, or, more generally, for the presentation of any network subgraph of
interest. Such a service should be discretionary, not revealing too much informa-
tion about the network’s microstructure that would compromise individual users’
confidentiality, yet at the same time it should be informative.
3.2.1.2 The potential for structural attacks
Nevertheless, revealing a network’s structural information can render users vulner-
able to attacks. A malicious user may create a set of fake accounts and attempt to
forge direct links between those accounts and to one or more targets, so as to di-
rectly elicit private information from them, or to create a unique structure that can
be later identified in a revealed graph. This observation is the basis of the struc-
tural attack introduced in [7]. We aim to design a utility-driven data revelation
scheme that can foil such attacks.
In concrete terms, an attacker who naturally knows the identity of her targets
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could contact those targets directly and try to gain their trust. The chances of
success at securing such targets’ trust will increase if she can present herself as
sharing a mutual friend, implying an endorsement of her request to connect to
the target. When the path to the target is published, it becomes easier for the
attacker to exploit such “friend-of-a-friend” trust. Platforms like LinkedIn and
Xing appear to be vulnerable to such exploits as they publish partial, or full, path
information. However, our approach will obstruct the attacker, as she will not know
with certainty who is connected to whom. A guess at the exact chain that leads to
her target will then be risky; if she mistakenly presents herself as a friend of a friend
to any node in the chain, the chances of gaining that node’s trust will be diminished.
On the other hand, a benevolent networker, truthful about her intentions, will be
able to solicit the assistance of users along the path to the target; as long as those
users assess that she has a legitimate reason to reach her target, they will forward
her request to the next hop.
3.2.1.3 Our proposal
Motivated by the above discussion, we suggest a methodology for revealing social
network data to relevant users following a utility-driven paradigm. Through our
scheme, network data is manipulated under certain constraints, aiming to preserve
the structural properties of the underlying graph, while otherwise distorting the
graph’s microstructure to the farthest extent allowed by those constraints. In this
manner, the trade-off between data utility and data privacy is addressed in a novel
manner, adhering to a utility guarantee. We define the structural constraints in
terms of distance properties between pairs of nodes, and demonstrate that the
resulting graphs can withstand attacks by adversaries possessing prior structural
background knowledge, as suggested in [7]. Specifically, in the experimental sec-
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tion we measure the success rate for any attack based on the identification of an
embedded subgraph in the distorted graphs, as a function of the amount of distor-
tion incurred on it; as we discussed, such an embedded graph may consist of fake
accounts created before graph releasing, and connected among themselves and to
other victim nodes, so as to follow a unique and identifiable pattern.
In our approach, we publish a subgraph of the network graph, containing nodes
of interest with respect to the querying user (possibly along with identifying in-
formation, depending on the application at hand). This subgraph is constructed
so as to faithfully preserve the reachability information in the true subgraph: if a
node is reachable from another node by a path of length lower than a threshold
k, then it should also be similarly reachable in the released graph. However, the
subgraph is otherwise distorted, so as to conceal exact node-to-node relationships,
to the extent allowed by the reachability constraint. Thus, a querying user cannot
confidently infer the potentially sensitive relationships among distant connections.
Yet the same querying user obtains a wide view of her own and her peers’ position
in the overall network. Thereby, a benevolent user is able to obtain valid informa-
tion that is relevant in determining how to expand her network, while a malicious
user is prevented from drawing accurate inferences about the relationships among
people she is not closely related to, and is consequently deterred from attempting
to utilize such information in order to gain their trust towards malicious ends (see
also the discussion in section 3.2.4). We contend that such reachability-preserving
graph transformation maintains crucial information with regard to graph structure
that is valuable to the SNS user (as well as the a researcher or social network an-
alyst), while distorting the graph in a way that renders it proof against structural
attacks. Thus, the data release model we propose provides both higher utility and
higher security than the naive path revelation model discussed in Section 3.2.1.1.
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3.2.2 Reachability Preservation
Real-world social networks of a certain size are usually connected; any two indi-
viduals in them are bound to be linked by a sufficiently large path. The distance
between two individuals, i.e., the length of the shortest path connecting them, is
usually rather small, not exceeding six steps. Milgram’s small world experiment
[110] suggested that the social networks of people in the United States are charac-
terized by such short distances, of approximately three friendship links, on average,
without considering global linkages; Watts [154] recreated Milgram’s experiment on
the internet and found that the average number of intermediaries via which an e-
mail message can be delivered to a target was around six; Leskovec and Horvitz
[94] found the average distance among users of an instant messaging system to be
6.6; Goel et al. [71] tested the extent to which pairs of individuals in a large social
network can actually find paths connecting them; they introduced a rigorous way
of estimating true chain (i.e., search distance) lengths in a messaging network, and
found that roughly half of all chains can be completed in 6-7 steps.
In view of this connectedness of real-world social networks, we deduce that no
previously unknown information is disclosed when the mere existence of a path
among two entities in a network is revealed. Thus, an objective of thwarting the
inference of any linkage whatsoever, as in [33], would set an unnecessarily high goal
and irretrievably alter the nature of the network. Besides, a bona fide SNS user
can reasonably expect to be able to learn whether other individuals in the same
network are reachable at up to a certain distance threshold and also gain a glimpse
of the nature of the network that stands between them. Such information is vital to
SNS users, e.g., job seekers in a professional network, newcomers in a city, or pro-
fessionals looking for new partners. On the other hand, a discretionary revelation
of such reachability information should not reveal the exact relationships among
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people in the exposed neighborhood, as malicious users can may take advantage
thereof to launch attacks and gain access to potentially sensitive information.
As we discussed, professional networking platforms provide a function that con-
cerns us: when users search for someone, they can see the path that leads from
their node to the searched-for person, possibly under the condition that the path
is not longer than 3 hops. Thus, Alice can see that the path Alice → Lara →
Olivia→ Bob, connects her to Bob. An extension of this functionality to paths of
arbitrary length would endanger users’ confidentiality, as Alice would then acquire
intimate knowledge about the relationships of people she is not acquainted with.
Yet, Alice has a legitimate interest to find out whether she is connected to a certain
individual by a path longer than the ones she is already allowed to see, as well as to
identify individuals in her extended neighbourhood, and thereby possibly attempt
to expand her social circle.
Motivated by such needs, we propose a discretionary graph publication model
that provides useful connectivity and reachability information, along with other
rich graph information, without correctly revealing the graph’s microstructure con-
cerning individuals lying along the presented connections. The connections shown
in a graph published by our method are not necessarily true. Still, the published
graph is constructed so that it does provides fairly correct reachability information.
In effect, a bona fide user can use such information to explore the possibility of
connecting to others, and attempt such a connection by whatever means a given
SNS platform provides. Still, a malicious user would not be able to exploit the
presented network view without risking being exposed. In effect, graph reacha-
bility information is made available in a way that preserves certain properties of
the underlying graph, while confining the potential that sensitive information is
exposed.
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Furthermore, by our proposal, users in the network can specify a distance
threshold parameter d, so that they can quantify their own comfort zone. Figure
3.18(a) depicts an example of a graph shown to user Alice, in which it is revealed
that another user, Mike, is reachable within 4 hops. This happens under the con-
dition that Mike has agreed to have the information about being reachable by 4
hops available to such other users; i.e., Mike has set his personal distance threshold
to d = 4. Alice then gets the highlighted path information if she wants to see her
position relative to Mike’s position, even though this particular path may not be
the exact path between Alice and Mike. Figure 3.18(b) shows what Alice would see
in case Mike has not opted to make his information available to users within 4 hops.
To encourage users’ participation, Alice’s ability to view Mike’s information can be
made conditional on her making her own information available to users within 4
hops, i.e. her own personal distance threshold being at least 4.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.18: Example of path revelation.
Given such a facility, we expect that users will be willing to accept the dis-
cretionary revelation of their own presence in the network, as they stand to gain
in terms of increased networking functionality. Naturally, when releasing network
data to third parties, we expect end-users to be primarily concerned with the pro-
tection of their confidentiality rather than with the utility of the released data.
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However, when network data is released among SNS end-users themselves, as in
our primary motivating scenario, we expect that these end-users will have a stake
in data utility and be willing to opt in such a scheme, as they will be among the
beneficiaries of the information that will be provided. By setting a personalized
exposure distance threshold d, users can tailor the tradeoff to their own needs and
sensibilities. In the following discussion, it is always assumed that we are dealing
with a set of users whose distance threshold permits their inclusion in the revealed
graph.
3.2.2.1 Problem Definition
Let G = (V,E) be a simple undirected graph that represents part of a social
network; such a graph can consist of the network neighborhood of a querying
user’s node. V is a set of vertices representing entities in the network, and E is a
set of edges representing relations between entities. We start out by providing the
following definition.
Definition 1. The k-reachability graph of G, Gk, is a graph having the same
vertices V as G, such that an edge between two vertices exists in Gk if and only if
the distance between them is at most k.
For example, the 2-reachability graph of the graph G1 at the left side of Fig-
ure 3.19 is the graph in the middle of the figure. If k is set to be the longest
distance (i.e., the diameter) in G, then the k-reachability graph becomes trivially
similar to the transitive closure of G. However, for intermediate values of k, Gk is
rich in information, showing which entities in the network share connections of up
to a certain length.
Our main claim is that, given a network neighborhood G and a certain k of






Figure 3.19: Graphs G1 and G2 having the same G
2
same k-reachability graph Gk as G, while differing from G in as extensive a way as
possible otherwise, provides high-utility information about G in a manner discre-
tionary with respect to the confidential information of the users involved. We aim
to devise a method that generates G′ given G. We define the following problem:
Problem 1. Given a graph G(V,E) and an integer k, produce a graph G′(E ′, V ),
such that |E| = |E ′| and Gk = G′k, while the difference between G and G′, measured
as the edit-distance of their edge sets, Dist(G,G′) = |E∪E
′\E∩E′|
|E| , achieves a required
value θ.
In this problem, the graph G represents the network neighborhood around a
querying user’s node u. The parameter k defines the view of that neighborhood
that a user wishes to obtain. By definition, the obtained graph G′ effectively reveals
which users are within k hops of u or of each other.
Furthermore, we propose that each user u in the network may set: (i) an one-
to-one distance threshold du, which defines that any user u
′ lying at most du away
from u can obtain information about their connection; and (ii) a universal distance
threshold ku, which defines that the information of u lying ku or more hops away
from any user u′ can be revealed to a third user u′′. A cautious user u would
set a low du threshold (i.e, would prefer to reveal distance information only to
close connections), and a high ku threshold (i.e., would prefer not to let one’s close
connections to be accurately known by strangers). Generous default values could
be set as du = 3 and ku = 2.
For a user’s node in the network, say u′, let d(u, u′) be the actual network
distance between u′ and the querying user u. Then, if k ≥ d(u, u′) > du, i.e., if u′
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has not given consent for her network distance from u to be revealed to u, then u′
shall not be included in the neighborhood graph G we examine, as presented to u.
Furthermore, if ku > k, i.e., if u
′ has not given consent for the information that
her network distance from any other node is at most k hops to be revealed to third
parties, then, once again, u′ is not to be included in G, as presented to such third
parties. In effect, G, as presented to a querying user u would only contain the nodes
of those users who are comfortable having their distance from u, being less than k,
revealed to u (or whose distance from u is larger than k) and are comfortable with
information about their at-most-k-hop connections to other users being revealed to
u as well. Thus, users can define their own privacy objectives [79].
The requirement that Gk = G′k in Problem 1 defines our ideal objective. A
graph G′ that satisfies this reachability requirement for a large value of θ may
not exist, and, even if it exists, may be hard to find. After all, this reachability
requirement is strict, and does not allow much flexibility. In many practical cir-
cumstances, a more flexible version of the same requirement may still satisfy our
objectives. Therefore, we suggest such a relaxed version of the reachability require-
ment that would be easier to satisfy while still maintaining much of the information
we wish to preserve.
3.2.2.2 Relaxing the Reachability Requirement
Let d(v1, v2) (d
′(v1, v2)) be the distance of vertex v2 from vertex v1 in G (G′). Then
the standard reachability requirement, i.e., the requirement that Gk = G′k, can be
analytically expressed as follows:
Definition 2. Reachability Requirement (RR) A graph G′(V,E ′) is said to
satisfy the reachability requirement with respect to an original graph G(V,E) for a
given integer k, if and only if |E| = |E ′|, and, for any pair of nodes v1, v2 ∈ V , it
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holds that d(v1, v2) ≤ k ⇔ d′(v1, v2) ≤ k.
The strictness of the standard reachability requirement emanates from the fact
that a distance that does not exceed k in G should not exceed k in G′ either, and
vice versa. A slightly less rigorous version of this requirement would impose a
lighter constraint by allowing for some laxity in the preservation of distances with
a definite threshold k. In effect, we can relax the requirement by demanding only
that a distance not exceeding k − 1 in G does not exceed k in G′, and vice versa.
This relaxation is twofold: First, we reduce the amount of distances involved, as
we now care only for distances in the range [1, k − 1] instead of the range [1, k].
Second, we introduce some laxity in the preservation of distances within this range,
by allowing that each distance in the range [1, k − 1] in G is mapped to a distance
in a wider range, namely the range [1, k] in G′, and vice versa. We express this
relaxed requirement as follows:
Definition 3. Relaxed Reachability Requirement (RRR) A graph G′(V,E ′)
satisfies the relaxed reachability requirement with respect to an original graph
G(V,E) for a given integer k, if and only if |E| = |E ′|, and, for any pair of
nodes v1, v2 ∈ V , the following implications hold:
d(v1, v2) < k ⇒ d′(v1, v2) ≤ k
d′(v1, v2) < k ⇒ d(v1, v2) ≤ k
Under this relaxation, G′ still presents representatively small distance values
(i.e., values d′ ≤ k) for short distances in G (i.e., d < k) and avoids the misrepre-
sentation of longer distance values in G (i.e., values d > k) as short in G′ (i.e., as
d < k). Thus, we contend that a graph G′ satisfying the relaxed, instead of the
standard, reachability requirement with respect to G provides slightly less precise,
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but still rich, information about the distances between vertices of interest, yet al-
lows for much-desired higher flexibility in modifying the graph, which allows for a
higher degree of protection against structural attacks. In the following section we
present an algorithm that generates graphs satisfying either the RR or the RRR
with respect to an original graph G, and hence provides an avenue for revealing a
modified, utility-preserving and discretionary version of G.
3.2.2.3 Algorithm
The problem could be tackled by an exhaustive-search algorithm that would try
out all the combinations of edges that could make a modified graph. However, such
an exhaustive search becomes computationally prohibitive as the size of the graph
grows. Instead, our Similar Reachability Graph (SRG) algorithm (Algorithm 5)
modifies the graph step by step, by alternatively adding or deleting one edge at a
time. At each step, we opt for a modification that satisfies the standard (or relaxed)
reachability requirement. As long as modifications that satisfy the requirement are
possible, we keep updating the graph, while keeping track of the distortion inflicted
thereon (i.e., the number of edges altered). Once the inflicted distortion reaches a
desired level θ, the algorithm terminates and the modified graph is output.
Our SRG algorithm makes use of a basic operation that computes the distance
matrix D of a graph G. Having the D of the original graph G, as well as the distance
matrix D′ of a modified graph G′, we can check whether the standard or relaxed
reachability condition is satisfied, and calculate the respective k-reachability graphs
Gk and G′k as well. To that end, we employ the Warshall-Floyd algorithm [60],
with extra pruning and optimization provisions, so as to eschew the computation
of distances larger than the k threshold, which is, unnecessary for our problem.
At first, SRG constructs lists of edges that are candidates for addition (deletion).
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All edges in G are candidates for deletion, while edges that are candidates for
addition are those that do not exist in G, but exist in Gk. In more detail, SRG starts
out with the original graph G, and proceeds to perform iterative modification steps.
At each iteration, it progressively checks all allowed combinations of λ edges to
delete and λ edges to add, starting with λ = 1 and increasing λ progressively, until it
detects an add/delete combination that produces a modified graph G′ satisfying the
(relaxed) reachability requirement, (R)RR, with respect to G. Having succeeded
in this iteration, it proceeds to modify the obtained graph G′ further in the next
iteration.
Algorithm 3.5: SRG
Input: graph G with V vertices and E edges;
reachability k; distortion threshold θ;
Result: Modified Graph G′
1 compute distance matrix D(G);
2 initialize G′ as G;
3 initialize delete-candidate edge list L1, length `1;
4 initialize add-candidate edge list L2, length `2;
5 while Dist(G,G′) < θ do
6 for λ← 1 to min{`1, `2} do












9 delete C1 from and add C2 to G
′;
10 if G′ satisfies (R)RR wrt G then
11 update L1 and L2;
12 Break for loops;
13 else
14 add back C1 and delete C2;
15 Return G′(V,E ′);
We emphasize that the satisfaction of the (R)RR is always checked with respect
to the original graph G, not to the modified graph of the preceding step. Thus,
throughout the modification iterations, we always maintain a modified graph G′
that satisfies the (R)RR with respect to G.
These modification iterations terminate when the modified graphG′ has achieved
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a desired difference from the original graph G, for the sake of withstanding struc-
tural attacks. We measure the difference between graphs G(V,E) and G′(V,E ′) in
terms of distortion, defined as the ratio of the number of edges they do not share
to |E|: Dist(G,G′) = |E∪E′\E∩E′||E| ; since |E| is not changed by the algorithm, the
distortion depends on the amount of edges altered, |E ∪ E ′ \ E ∩ E ′|. Distortion
values near 100% (i.e., half the maximum possible value of 200%) provide the high-
est obfuscation, as one cannot tell with confidence neither that an edge in G′ also
appears in G, nor that it does not. This metric has also been used as a vague way
of measuring information loss in previous research [102]; we employ it here simply
as a measure that show how much a graph is being distorted, without making any
claim that correctly captures any other quality.
Our SRG algorithm works with both the standard reachability requirement
(RR) and the relaxed one (RRR). The satisfaction of this requirement is checked
in Step 10, by comparing the distance matrix of the modified graph, (G′), to that
of the original graph. In the next section we proceed to an experimental study, in
which we opt for using the RRR; this choice allows for higher flexibility, while still
preserving, as we will show, rich structural information.
The SRG algorithm is a heuristic, and its practicability rests largely on the
expectation that a modified graph G′ satisfying the (R)RR will be arrived at early,
before the value of λ grows beyond value 2. This expectation is verified by our
experiments. For the sake of completeness, we provide a worst-case complexity
analysis. In a worst-case scenario, half of the possible edges are present in the























graph modifications in total. Since
the distance matrix computation by the Warshall-Floyd algorithm costs O (n3), the






. In practice, we expect our algorithm to terminate
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without raising such high computational demands, as soon as a graph G′ satisfying
the (R)RR is discovered (Lines 10-12).
3.2.3 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our algorithm using real data sets. The experiments ran
on an Intel Core, 2 Quad CPU, 2.83GHz, 4GB machine running Windows 7. The
algorithm was implemented in Standard C, while computations of matrix utility
measures were conducted in Python.
3.2.3.1 Data Description
We used two real data sets, representative of social network graphs, which are made
freely available for research purposes. The former, Flickr6[59], contains user-to-user
links in an online social network for image and video hosting. Five subgraphs used
in our experiments are uniformly sampled, with 50 vertices and around 100 edges
for each. The latter data, Gnutella7, describes a peer-to-peer file sharing network.
Nodes represent hosts in the network topology and the edges connections between
hosts. We uniformly sample 5 connected subgraphs of the 2002 Gnutella network
snapshot, containing 50 vertices and around 52 edges for each subgraph. We em-
phasize that the data sizes we test are representative of the small neighborhoods
graphs that arise in the applications we envisage. We focus on how the structure of
such graphs can be published in a discretionary and information-rich manner. We
are not making any assumptions on how, and to what extent, other information in
those graphs, e.g., node attributes, may be revealed. The problem of publishing
such attributes can be treated using techniques for microdata anonymization [31],
as in [33], and is orthogonal to the problem of publishing the graph structure.
6Available online at http://socialnetworks.mpi-sws.org/
7Available online at http://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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3.2.3.2 Utility Assessment
We claim that, apart from, and because of, satisfying the reachability constraint,
graphs generated by our SRG algorithm preserve other structural properties of
the original graph G. To demonstrate our claim, we compare graphs obtained
by our methods to graphs of the same distortion obtained via the randomized
anonymization technique proposed by Hay et al. [109]. This technique modifies
the original graph by randomly deleting a prescribed number of edges and randomly
adding the same number of edges; thus, the resulting graph has the same number




















































































(d) GD, Gnutella, dist 0.5
Figure 3.20: Degree distribution (DD) and geodesic distribution (GD) results
In our first experiment, we present the degree distribution and distribution of
pairwise shortest-path (geodesic) distances, of the original Flickr graph, its SRG-


























































































































Figure 3.21: Earth mover’s distance of degree distribution and geodesic distribution
RAA having the same distortion. Figure 3.20 (a)(b) shows the results for graphs
in which we allow distortion 0.16 and set k = 2 and k = 3 separately. We observe
that, as expected, the distribution of those features with SRG resembles those of
the original graph more faithfully than those of RAA.
Next, we present results on the same measures with the Gnutella data. Fig-
ure 3.20 (c)(d) presents our measurements when we allow distortion to reach 0.5 and
set k = 2 and k = 3 separately. In both figures the distributions for SRG graphs
stand relatively closer to those of the original graph. This outcome further confirms
our contention that our method provides a solid way of keeping other structural
graph properties under tight control. Interestingly, we observe how, even under the
relaxed reachability requirement, the SRG graph with k = 3 does not allow any
shortest-path distance to exceed the original graph’s diameter 4 (Figure 3.20 (d)).
Next, to obtain a more precise estimation of the degree to which SRG graphs
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resemble the original ones, we measure the metric that express their structural
divergence: the Earth-Mover’s Distance (EMD) [132] between the original and
modified degree distributions, for different distortion values. Figure 3.21 (a)(c)
shows the EMD between the degree distributions on SRG graphs with k = 2 and
k = 3, and RAA-perturbed versions of the original Flickr and Gnutella graphs,
respectively, and the original ones, as a function of their distortion, while Figure
3.21 (b)(d) shows the EMD between the geodesic distributions. We observe that,
as expected, the measured metric on the SRG graphs diverge from those of the
original graph much less than those on the RAA graph, even though all graphs are
obtained with the same distortion.
Remarkably, the SRG graph with k = 2 fares better than that for k = 3 with
Flickr data, but not with Gnutella data. This deviation is not surprising; the pa-
rameter k that allows for the best preservation of other structural graph properties
under the same distortion depends on the nature of the data at hand; in some cases,
a lower k may be advantageous, as it enforces the preservation of short-distance
links; in other cases, a higher k may be preferable, as it encompasses more vertex
pairs under its scope.
Then, we assess the divergence between original and anonymized graphs on
other graph properties: the average local clustering coefficient, the average shortest
path length, the graph diameter and radius. For each data set, the results are
averaged over 5 subgraphs, with 5 runs for each subgraph. Figure 3.22 shows the
results for the Flickr and Gnutella data. Again, we observe that the SRG graphs
produce measures that fall much closer to those of the original graphs than the RAA
graphs do. These results corroborate our claim that SRG graphs can maintain the
properties of the original despite the inflicted distortion.
Given that we employ the relaxed reachability requirement in our experiments,
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the results to reachability queries are expected to have a slight error. We end
our utility assessment by quantifying this error in terms of precision and recall
measures on reachability queries, in which a user asks whether a target node is
reachable within a certain number of k hops. In addition, we present our measures
of false negatives and false positives under the same settings.
In particular, let Vo (Vm) be the set of vertices within k hops of the querying
node in the original (modified) graph. The precision P and recall R are measured
as follows:
P = |Vo ∩ Vm||Vm| R =
|Vo ∩ Vm|
|Vo| (3.1)
Similarly, our false negatives and false positives metrics are measured as:
FN = |Vo \ Vm||V | FP =
|Vm ∩ Vo|
|V | (3.2)
where V is the graph’s complete vertex set. We measure each of these metrics on
each vertex and average our results over all vertices in the graph. Figure 3.23 shows
our results with both the Flickr and Gnutella data, for graphs modified by the SRG
and RAA algorithms, for queries involving number of hops k = 2 and k = 3. For
example, each dot on the red line in Figure 3.23(a) represents the average precision
for 2-hop queries. As in our previous measurements of graph properties, all results
are averaged over 5 extracted subgraphs and 5 runs for each subgraph, so as to di-
minish the effect of randomness. In all examined cases, the SRG algorithm achieves
higher precision and recall measures, and lower false negatives and positives, than
RAA; the difference is more conspicuous with the Gnutella data. This outcome
reconfirms that the SRG algorithm preserves reachability information more accu-




















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.23: Precision and Recall, False negatives and False positives, Flickr (a-b)
and Gnutella (c-d)
3.2.3.3 Resistance to Structural Attacks
We now turn our attention to assessing the extent to which are graphs can resist at-
tacks based on an adversary’s structural knowledge. The resistance to such attacks
ensures that the network’s structure is released in a way that does not allow the
inference of individual users’ identity, while at the same time providing the utility
that we expect, as we have witnessed in the previous section. We contend that the
graphs released by our method are capable of withstanding structural identification
attacks with a high probability, hence providing a measurable amount of protection
on that front.
To illustrate this protection, we experimentally measure the extent to which our
distorted graphs can resist structural attacks of the kind suggested in [7]. While
[7] proposed a specific attack algorithm, the walk-based attack, we go one step
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further and measure the success rate for any attack based on the identification
of an embedded subgraph in the distorted graphs, as a function of the amount
of distortion incurred on it. Such a structural attack is assumed to succeed if
the adversary can identify an embedded graph in the released graph; as we have
discussed, such an embedded graph may consists of fake accounts created before
graph releasing and which are connected among themselves and to other, victim
nodes, so as to follow a unique and identifiable pattern.
The identification of the maliciously embedded subgraph depends on the infor-
mation of degree and internal structure. Intuitively, the more distorted a graph is,
the less likely it becomes that a structural attack will succeed, and hence higher
protection of individual users is afforded. Besides, the more distorted a graph is,
the less it can be relied upon to provide truthful information at its microstructure.
Arguably, a graph that presents high distortion at its microstructure while still
maintaining truthful overall structural properties at its macrostructure would sat-
isfy our purposes. On the other hand, in case all edges in the embedded subgraph
are preserved after the transformation process and no others are added, then the
attack can be launched successfully. We contend that this state of affairs rarely



































Figure 3.24: Success rate of structural attack
We measure the success rate of the described structural attack vs. the distortion
of the graph in which a malicious subgraph has been embedded. For each data set,
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we embed 50 different subgraphs prior to the graph’s distortion. For each of the
resulting attacked graphs, we conduct 10 separate runs of SRG perturbation, where
we randomly shuﬄe the order in which edges are examined so as to obtain non-
deterministic results; thus we obtain 10 different distorted versions of the original
attacked graph, at the same desired distortion level. The success rate of the attack
on the original data, for the obtained distortion, is measured as the total ratio of
successful attacks over the total 10× 50 runs.
Figure 3.24 (a) and (b) shows our results, for the Flickr and Gnutella data
sets, respectively, and for two different values of the reachability parameter k. Our
results confirm our expectations: as distortion grows, it becomes harder for the
attack to succeed. Remarkably, we obtain low success rates even at distortion levels
in which, as our utility assessment experiments show, we also preserve structural
graph properties with satisfactory fidelity.
3.2.4 Discussion
Previous suggestions on discretionary social network publication follow a similar
format: they define a privacy principle the published graph should obey, and pro-
ceed to alter the given graph so as to satisfy this constraint. Still, they do not
offer a respectively comprehensible utility guarantee; as a consequence, they do
not focus on providing data that a social network user may find useful. After all,
such techniques are designed with the assumption that the whole-network data is
published to an external data recipient, e.g., a researcher; their aim is not to enable
user-centric revelation of network subgraphs to SNS users themselves.
We suggested a user-oriented alternative, aiming to provide a picture of a sub-
graph of interest that preserves certain structural properties, thereby offering a
utility guarantee. The subgraph consists of an end-user, as a central user, and a
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neighborhood of other users that the central user is interested in. In this case,
users’ confidentiality is catered for by distorting the graph as far as possible under
a utility constraint. Unlike the common scenario in the literature, our method is
mainly designed for daily usage scenarios where SNS users want to assess their
position among their peers and their ability to expand their online network in a
desired direction. This facility would be especially useful for users that subscribe to
SNSs with the aim of expanding their social or professional circles. Users who value
such information would be able to opt in such an information revelation scheme in
a give-and-take manner, as they would also be willing to disclose some of their own
information to gain from the networking potential the scheme provides.
The graph is distorted in some respects by our approach, so as to forestall at-
tacks by adversaries with structural knowledge, yet it preserves certain topological
properties in other respects. Arguably, our methodology facilitates certain desirable
user behaviors. Eventually, we argue that we can promote networking in an SNS
by benevolent users, while protecting such users from malicious attackers aiming
to exploit the same information to undesirable ends.
Our results show that by using our proposed approach, not only is reachability
information guaranteed, but other structural properties are also preserved, which
means that users can be provided with views of their extended neighborhood that
will be representative of the real network, even if these are somewhat distorted
in order to thwart malicious users. We envision that such views could consist of
abstracted visual representations of one’s extended neighborhood, e.g. in the form
of concentric circles, or clouds that will indicate reachability and overall structure,
so that a user may assess the distance to another user of interest, as well as the
density, complexity, clustering and other structural properties of the network neigh-
borhood. Our method allows for the creation of various such network views that
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would be beneficial to the benevolent user. For instance, one looking at the graph
formed by one’s friends can accurately infer how tightly connected those friends are
with each other; for example, a large diameter implies one’s social connections are
wide spread, while a small one implies that one is connected only to people already
well-connected with each other. Such information may be of particular utility to
a public personality (election candidate, actor, athlete) visualizing ones fan club.
Alternatively, someone using a network to promote their work (e.g., a musician)
may be interested in identifying the most influential nodes in that network, and the
number of such nodes. The preservation of properties such as degree distribution
is instrumental for that purpose.
3.2.5 Summary
This method addresses the problem of social network data sharing under con-
fidentiality concerns, from a utility-oriented standpoint, focusing on revealing a
subgraph of connections in a user’s neighborhood. We defined a utility guarantee
involving a reachability property and suggested a method to distort the graph to
a desired extent while observing this requirement. Our technique preserves crucial
properties while blurring individual linkages; thus, it offers a perturbed, albeit in-
formative, view of the network. Our experimental study confirms that (i) graphs
obtained with our scheme do preserve large-scale structural properties of the orig-
inal graphs more faithfully than graphs that have undergone the same amount of





In the previous chapter we study graph structure for network data privacy prob-
lems. We propose novel algorithms for solutions. In this chapter, we study the
utility of network data, the achievements of which are expected to benefit various
applications, i.e., building of weak social ties and bridging social capital. To do
this, we focus on the analysis that explores connectedness on graphs. Specifically,
we study the graph structure for the problem of structural community detection.
One of the building blocks of community detection, be it in application domains
such as sociology [56], biology [138, 54], politics [141] or marketing [128] where the
underlying connectivity structure can be naturally thought of as a graph, is the
ability to recognize clusters of vertices. From this strict structural point of view,
communities correspond to sets of vertices that are more densely interconnected to
each other than they are to the rest of the graph. The structure of a community
help us to understand the individual behaviors and information diffusion in social
networks.
We model a network as a simple graph G(V,E). We propose three approaches
that detect communities based a wide range of graph structural properties, in-
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cluding degree and clustering coefficient, and closeness among the vertices and the
physical forces among the vertices when simulating the whole graph as a physical
system.
4.1 Force-directed Layout Community Detection
4.1.1 Overview
The main idea that underscores the process of finding communities in this work is
to obtain a representation of the graph in a Euclidean space and then cluster the
vertices based on the Euclidean distance. This is different from common graph clus-
tering algorithms, in that most of them cluster the graph and detect communities di-
rectly or indirectly according to geodesic distance. We use Fruchterman-Reingold’s
force-directed algorithm (FR) [64].This graph layout approach transforms the con-
nections among vertices, based on attractive forces and repulsive forces pulling ver-
tices together and pushing them apart, respectively, into proximity in a Euclidean
space.
This hints that the vertices within one community are placed relatively closer
since it is denser inside the community. In other words, vertices within communi-
ties have more connections to each other than connections to the vertices in other
communities. It is thus a good opportunity to adopt the techniques in data clus-
tering to look for the communities based on the graph layout. Furthermore, we
extend FR from two dimension to one dimension and three dimensions, and even
higher dimensions as well. We evaluate the significance of the number of dimensions
on our method’s effectiveness and efficiency. For disjoint community detection, the
data clustering technique that we take advantage of is the k-means clustering (KM),
while for overlapping communities, we employ the Fuzzy C-mean clustering (FCM),
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which can indicate the strength between each vertex and communities, and thus
does not restrict each vertex to belong only to one group. FCM is a variant of KM.
All these algorithms’ complexities are not high and neither is FR’s. Our method
building on these techniques is thus efficient for large social networks.
We evaluate effectiveness by measuring modularity. For graphs with known
community structures, we measure the precision as well, by comparing memberships
to communities that our approach discovers with those to the known communities.
4.1.2 Background
The idea of force-directed algorithms is to achieve an “aesthetically pleasing” graph
layout by simulating the whole graph as a physical system. Edges in the graph are
seen as springs binding vertices. Vertices are virtually pulled closer together or
pushed further apart according to physical forces. The positions of the vertices are
adjusted, and this procedure continues until the the system comes to an equilib-
rium. In addition, Fruchterman and Reingold’s force-directed algorithm [64] aims
to achieve even vertex distribution. The authors define the attractive force and the
repulsive force as fa(d) = d





and d is the distance between every pair of vertices. area is the area size for display
the graph.
K-means clustering [104] partitions objects to k clustering, assigns each object
the cluster with the nearest mean and adjusts their membership until an optimum
is reached. As a soft version of k-means, Fuzzy C-means clustering (FCM ) [13]
assigns a fuzzy degree of membership to each cluster to each object . Instead
of belonging to only one cluster, objects classified via this algorithm can belong
to several clusters with different strengths. As a general version of k-means, the
expectation-maximization algorithm (EM ) [5] models clusters using statistic distri-
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butions. The reason we adopt k-means, rather than EM, is that k-means is effective
enough for this problem and k-means is more efficient. We experimentally show
this in Section 4.
4.1.3 Algorithm
We propose an algorithm that can systematically enumerate all possible number
of clusters and find the configuration with the highest modularity. Therefore, the
algorithm iterates by changing the value of k from 1 to |V | which is the number
of vertices in the network. We show the changes of modularity with a change in
k values. If the number of clusters is prior knowledge, we can set the number of
iterations to be 1 to this number.
Algorithm 4.1: Force-directed Layout Community Detection Algorithm
Input: graph G with n vertices, the number of trials t, t ≤ n;
Result: Clusters Ci, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′)
1 v = Fruchterman Reingold(G), v ∈ Rn∗2, v =[v1;v2;...;vn];
2 Sort degree(G);
3 k ← 1;
4 for each k ≤ t do
5 C ′i = K-means(v);
6 Ci = Refinement(C
′
i);
7 Calculate modularity and record the maximum;
8 Return Ci,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′) with the maximum modularity;
Our method starts from the FR algorithm. The inputs for the algorithm are
limited to only the graph edges. The output is the coordinates of vertices in Eu-
clidean Space. Then we sort the degrees of the vertices and initialize the centers of
the clusters for the clustering using the vertices with highest degrees. The idea is
that the vertices with a high degree have a higher chance of being the community
centers. The centers may change during the clustering. We refine the clusters after
the data clustering in Euclidean space. If there is any vertex that does not have
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any connection with other vertices in the same cluster, or it has fewer connections
inside its cluster than outside its cluster, then it is grouped to the cluster where it
has the maximum number of connections. In other words, this vertex is grouped to
the cluster that has the greatest number of immediate neighbors. The refinement
process may change the number of clusters, which is actually good for those who
only roughly know the number of clusters. They can input the maximum number
of clusters they believe exists, and let our method find out the exact number of
clusters in the network without trying all the values of k from 1 to |V |.
Algorithm 4.2: Refinement
Input: Clusters Ci, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k);
Result: Clusters C ′i, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′);
1 for i from 1 to k do
2 for v ∈ Ci do
3 find the cluster Cj where v has the maximum number of immediate
neighbors;
4 if i 6= j then
5 Cluster v into Cj;
6 Return C ′i,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′);
We call the above algorithm FR-KM for the experiments. The other two ver-
sions of the algorithm are similar to FR-KM but depend on different clustering
methods. We name the one using the expectation-maximization algorithm FR-EM
and the one using the fuzzy c-means algorithm FR-FCM. For FR-FCM, there’s
no refinement of the memberships for the vertices, since we intend to deal with
overlapping communities.
4.1.4 Experimental Evaluation
We conduct experiments on both synthetic and real world graphs including two
benchmark graphs for the community detection algorithm. The experiments run
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Table 4.1: Performance Comparison between FR-EM,FR-KM and GN
KarateClub AmericanFootball EmailURV
modularity running time modularity running time modularity running time
GN 0.4013 0.016 0.5976 1.014 0.5323 3193.532
Walktrap 0.3944 0.0000001 0.6015 0.015 0.5250 0.92
InfoMap 0.402038 0.015 0.599176 0.047000 0.521420 5.912000
FR-KM 0.417406 0.020000 0.601731 2.179000 0.542659 15.388000
on an Inter Core, 2 Quad CPU, 2.83GHz, 2GB machine running Windows 8 OS.
The algorithms are implemented in C.
4.1.4.1 Data Sets
We use a batch of benchmark graphs [92] to evaluate the effectiveness of our method.
The real-world benchmark graphs we use are Zachary’s Karate Club data and
American College Football data (see Section 4.2.3.1). We also test on the Email-
URV data set, Wikipedia data set, and Facebook data set (see Appendix A.4).
They represent large online social network data.
4.1.4.2 Analysis of non-overlapping community detection
We compare our method to the algorithms of Girvan and Newman(GN ) [69, 114],
which is one of the state-of-the-art algorithms in community detection. We also
compare our method with Walktrap algorithm [123] and InfoMap algorithm [129],
which has been shown to perform quite well for community detection (see [62]).
Table 4.1 shows the performance of the algorithms. In this comparison, we use
the normal two dimension FR algorithm with 400 iterations for KarateClub and
AmericanFootball data and 1000 for Email-URV data. The number of trials is
set to 30. For all three graphs, our method produces partitions with the highest
modularity among the four algorithms. Although Walktrap and InfoMap are faster



































Figure 4.1: Performance Comparison between multiple dimension FR-KM and GN
time of our method is still tolerable. As the size of graph becomes larger, our
method becomes faster. If the number of clusters is known in advance, then the
number of trials is 1, instead of the 30 that we set. If so, our method takes much
less time. GN is much slower for larger graphs. For the other two real-world data
sets, Wiki-Vote and Facebook, we are unable to make the comparison due to GN ’s
scalability, but we will show the running time of clustering these two graphs by our
method.
Figure 4.1 shows the performance comparison between multiple dimension FR-
KM and GN. We extend the normal two dimension FR algorithm to one dimension
and three, four, and five dimensions. We set the number of trials as 30. For karate
club data, the number of trials is equal to its number of vertices. We run each FR-




































Figure 4.2: Modularity for varying number of clusters
of 100. We find that the larger the number of iterations of FR-KM, the longer time
it takes. However, the number of iterations of FR does not have a decisive influence
on the modularity. This suggests that there is no need to increase the number of
iterations to get higher modularity. In terms of dimension, we find that for small
graphs, projecting them to one dimension or three dimensions may get a higher
modularity sometimes, but for large graphs, the two dimension FR-KM performs
best. It is faster, and clusters graphs with higher modularity. That is why we shall
adopt the normal two dimensional FR in our algorithm when it comes to large
graphs. FR-KM outperforms in both effectiveness and efficiency with large graphs
compared with GN.
Figure 4.2 shows the modularity when the initial input number of clusters k
varies. The final number of clusters may be different from the values of k on the
x-axis here. Our method changes the number of clusters during cluster refinements,
which produces a local optimum number of clusters. Therefore, we can see from
the result that the trend of the line is horizontal in general. This suggests that we
can find a local optimum around initial k value even without knowing the number
of clusters beforehand. This local maximum is probably the global optimum or
close to the global optimum.















FR_KM on Email-URV Data
FR_EM on Email-URV Data
FR_KM on Wiki-Vote Data
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Figure 4.3: Running time for






















Figure 4.4: Precision for vary-
ing average degree of synthetic
graphs
URV data, Wiki-Vote data and Facebook data. For each data set, the time for
projecting the graph onto Euclidean space is the same, but the clustering time
differs. KM running time remains the same in general as the initial number of
clusters increases while EM ’s running time linearly increases as the initial number
of clusters increases. Compared with KM, EM takes much more time. The trends
are similar among the results for the three data sets.
We compare our method with GN, InfoMap and WalkTrap algorithm, and two
other community detection algorithms, CFinder ([67]) and the game-theory algo-
rithm ([32]). Figure 4.4 shows the precision achieved by the algorithms on the
generated graphs with different average degrees. Since the community structures
are known, precision is obtained by counting the number of correctly clustered
vertices. The results show that our method outperforms the CFinder, GN and
InfoMap, and produces results comparable with the game-theory algorithm and
WalkTrap. The reason for CFinder having a low precision may be that not every
vertex in the graph is clustered. The clusters consists of 3-cliques only in our exper-
iment. The reason for InfoMap having the low precision may be that the number
of community this method detects is large and most of the communities are of a
small size. Many communities are of size of two vertices only.
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4.1.4.3 Analysis of overlapping community detection
In Figure 4.5 we show that by integrating soft clustering algorithm, FCM, in our
algorithm, we find that the two communities are overlapping on four vertices (vertex
3, 9, 10, 31) that are marked both in green and blue. This is under the assumption
that if the membership strength is larger than 0.8, then the vertex belongs to
that cluster only. Figure 9 shows the membership strength of each vertex to each
cluster. If we take 0.7 as a threshold for belonging strength, then the clusters will
have more overlapping vertices. [91] points out that vertex 3, 9, 10, 14 and 31 are
often misclassified by traditional algorithms. We believe that vertex 3, 9, 14 and
































Figure 4.5: Zachary’s Karate Club data








































Our method’s ability to work with large social network data contributes to low com-
plexities in the basic techniques we utilize. FR’s complexity is t(O|E|+O(|V |2)),
where |E| is the number of edges, |V | is the number of vertices and t is the number
of iteration. Time complexity of k-means clustering is O(kt|V |), where |V | is the
number of vertices and t is number of iterations. Time complexity of refinement is
O(d|V |), since we check each vertex’s immediate neighbors, the number of which
is, at most, |V | − 1. d is the max degree of the vertices. Therefore, for the whole
algorithm, time complexity is t · (O|E|+O(|V |2)) +O(kt|V |) +O(d|V |). For large
networks, |V | and |E| are the most significant elements that affect time complexity.
4.1.5 Summary
We propose a graph-layout based community detection algorithm. We use Fruchterman-
Reingold algorithm to project the graph onto a Euclidean space and we cluster the
vertices according to their Euclidean distance. Then we refer to the original graph
information to refine the communities detected. We evaluate the effectiveness and
efficiency on both real-world data and synthetic data. For disjoint community de-
tection, the results show that FR-KM is more effective on both small graphs and
large graphs than GN, and is much more efficient than GN on large networks.
FR-KM is also more effective than Walktrap and InfoMap algorithms, in terms of
modularity. Compared with GN, CFinder, InfoMap, WalkTrap and game-theory al-
gorithms on the synthetic graphs with known communities in advance, our method
is more effective than GN and CFinder and has a good performance comparable
to the WalkTrap and game-theory algorithms according to the results of precision
testing. For overlapping detection, the result for Karate Club data shows that
FR-FCM is reasonably effective.
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4.2 Fast Disjoint and Overlapping Community
Detection
4.2.1 Overview
The idea of this method is for each vertex to seek the community to which it belongs
by visiting its neighbour vertices. Decisions are made based on the degrees, cluster-
ing coefficients of the neighbors, and the number of common neighbors. Degree and
clustering coefficient are two importance properties of graph topology. Clustering
coefficient measures the cliquishness of neighborhood, and thus indicates clustering
in the graph locally [82, 155].
This method starts from a micro perspective, which is different from that of
the previous work in the last section. Considering the size of networks in modern
applications, we try to design a scalable method in order to deal with the large
graphs within a reasonable time. Therefore, we try to minimize the number of
pair-wise computations among vertices. Instead of comparing all pairs of vertices in
a graph, we only explore each vertex’s immediate neighbourhood. Indeed, vertices
in the same community are more likely to be neighbours [70]. This significantly
reduces the complexity except in the case of dense graphs. In our method, as
vertices can independently explore their neighbourhood and join a community by
following an immediate neighbour, the algorithms are intrinsically data parallel. We
devise a parallel algorithm for disjoint community detection and implement it on a
Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). In the case of overlapping community detection,
a vertex is allowed to belong to several communities if strong connections exist
between the vertex and any of those communities.
We empirically evaluate the performance of our algorithm with both real world
networks and synthetic networks. We evaluate the quality of communities using
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metrics from different classes [165], as well as one metric recently proposed in [125].
The metrics include modularity, conductance, internal density, cut ratio, weighted
community clustering, and Normalized Mutual Information [91]. The metrics indi-
cate the community quality from different perspectives. We measure the efficiency
by running time. We compare our algorithms with several state-of-the-art algo-
rithms.
4.2.2 Algorithm
We propose an algorithm that delegates the job of finding communities to indi-
vidual vertices. Each vertex seeks its community independently. The decisions of
which community to join are made based on the degrees and clustering coefficients
of neighbours, as well as on the number of common immediate neighbours. We hy-
pothesize that vertices tend to join groups with more connections. In other words,
the vertices try to attach themselves to dense structures, i.e. structures with more
connections among vertices in this structure.
4.2.2.1 Fast Disjoint Community Detection
The algorithm starts by calculating the degree and local clustering coefficient for
each vertex (line 1). The local clustering coefficient is defined as
cc[i] =
ejk : j, k ∈ V, ejk ∈ E
degree[i] ∗ (degree[i]− 1)
It is the ratio between the number of edges between vertices within its neighborhood
and the number of edges that could possibly exist between them. It quantifies how
closely the vertex connects with its neighbors.
Then each vertex looks around its immediate neighbours. If the degree of the
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Algorithm 4.3: Fast Community Detection
Input: graph G(V,E) with |V | vertices, |E| edges;
Result: Clusters Ci, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′)
1 Compute degree[v] and cc[v], v ∈ V ;
2 for each v do
3 if degree[v]<degree[vj] then /* vj ∈vneighbour */
4 g[v] ← vi, where degree[vi] = max(degree[vj]) ;
5 else
6 g[v] = v;
7 for each v do
8 if g[v] = v and degree[v] = degree[vi] then
9 if v and vi has more than half common vertices;
10 then
11 g[v] ← vi, if vi has smaller id;
12 else
13 vg ← g[v];
14 c1← number of common neighbours between v and j;
15 c2← number of common neighbours between v and (vneighbour \ vg);
16 if c1 < c2 then
17 g[v] ← vi, where degree[vi] = max(degree[vj]), vj ∈(vneighbour \ vg)
18 for each v do




23 until g[i] = i; find standalone vertex
24 g[v] ← i;
25 k ← different numbers in g[v];
26 for i from 1 to k do
27 for v ∈ Ci do
28 find the cluster Cj where v has the maximum number of immediate
neighbours;
29 if i 6= j then
30 Cluster v into Cj;
31 Return Ci,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′);
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vertex, for example vertex v, is the largest among its immediate neighbours, vertex
v stands alone and does not follow other vertices. If the degree of vertex v is
not the largest among its immediate neighbours and itself, vertex v follows the
neighbour with the largest degree among v’s immediate neighbours (line 2-6). If
more than one vertex among the immediate neighbours have the largest degree,
then vertex v follows the one with the largest clustering coefficient, compared to
other neighbours.
In the second round, each vertex adjusts their decisions (line 7-17). If the
standing-alone vertex v has neighbours with the same degree, check the number
of common neighbours of vertex v and v′s neighbour that has the same degree. If
there are enough common neighbours, these two vertices are assumed to be in the
same community. If the vertex v does not stand alone but follows some neighbour,
we check the number of common neighbours vertex v has with the vertex that it
follows, and the number of common neighbours it has with the other neighbours.
If vertex v has more common neighbours with its other neighbours than the one
it follows, then vertex v turns to the vertex with the second largest degree in the
neighbourhood or stands alone if it itself has the second largest degree.
In the third round, each vertex finalizes the community which it desires to
join (line 18-24). If the vertex that vertex v follows is also following vertex vi, then
vertex v also turns to vertex vi. In the end, each vertex follows a vertex that stands
alone. With all the other vertices that follow this vertex, they form a community.
After each vertex chooses its community (line 25), we post-process the mem-
berships to refine the communities (line 26-30). If any vertex has more connections
outside the community than inside the community, it changes its membership. This
refinement process may change the number of communities from the last step.









communities is needed. In the experiments, the graph is given as an edge list. The
output is the communities.
Figure 4.7 shows a graph with 8 vertices and 14 edges. After the first round,
vertex 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 all follow vertex 1 (g[1]=1, g[2]=1, g[3]=1, g[4]=1, g[5]=1,
g[6]=1), while vertex 7 and 8 follow vertex 6 (g[7]=6, g[8]=6). In the second round
for each vertex, the status of vertex 1 is unchanged. The status of vertex 2, 3, 4, 5
is also unchanged, because they have more common neighbours with vertex 1, that
they follow, than with other vertices ({vertex 2, 3, 4, 5}\themselves), vertex 7 and
8 still follow 6, while vertex 6 changes to stand alone instead of following vertex
1 because vertex 6 has more common neighbours with 7 and 8 than with vertex
1. No more changes happen in the third round and the refinement, and thus, the
final result is that we find two communities: one community is labelled by vertex
1, and has vertex 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; the other community is labelled by vertex 6, and
has vertex 6, 7, 8.
We also devise a parallel version. Both the first and second rounds are paral-
lelized. In the first round the vertices look for the vertex with the largest degree
in the neighbourhood at the same time. In the second round, each vertex makes a
decision concurrently. The rest of the algorithm is sequential.
4.2.2.2 Fast Overlapping Community Detection
For the case of overlapping communities, we extend FCD with modifications in the
second round and post-processing, with an additional input parameter θ.
In the second round, each vertex adjusts its decision (line 7-16). If the vertex v
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does not stand alone but follows some neighbour, and vertex v has more common
neighbours with its other neighbours than the one that it follows, then vertex v
turns to stand alone, so that vertex v leaves the opportunity of finding its commu-
nities to the post-processing part. This aims to cluster controversial vertices after
other vertices choose their communities, and therefore there are clear local pictures
for the controversial vertices to make decisions.
When post-processing the memberships to refine the communities (line 25-29),
the number of connections of each vertex v with each cluster is counted. N vi is
the number of immediate neighbours that v has in Ci, representing the number of
connections. For any vertex v, N vmax equals max(N
v
i ) where 1 ≤ i ≤ k (line 27). It
is the maximum number of immediate neighbors of vertex v that it has with some
cluster. Each vertex is grouped into the cluster with the most connections, and the
clusters that have significant number of connections compared with the maximum
number, satisfying the criteria of N vmax − N vi ≥ θ. The parameter θ, overlapping
factor, determines the degree of overlapping. If θ equals 0, vertex v is grouped to
the clusters that have N vmax connection with v. If θ equals 1, vertex v is grouped to
the clusters that have N vmax or N
v
max-1 connections with v. The larger θ is, the more
clusters one vertex may be clustered into, and thus the more overlapping vertices
there are. A vertex changes its membership if the community to which it currently
belongs does not have enough connections with it. Note that overlaps may still
exist if θ equals 0.
4.2.2.3 Complexity Analysis
The time complexity for calculating the clustering coefficient is O(n · d2), where n
is the number of vertices and d is the average degree of vertices in the graph. The
complexity for the first round is O(n · d). The complexity for the second round is
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O(n · d2). The complexity for the third round is O(n2) in the worst case which is
very unlikely to happen. The usually complexity for this part is O(α · n) where α
is smaller than the graph diameter generally and presents a value less than 2 in our
experiments. The complexity for the refinement is O(n · d2). Therefore the time
complexity for the whole algorithm is O((d2 + α) · n) in the worst case. For the
parallel version, the complexity for the first round is O(d). The complexity for the
second round is O(d2). The rest is the same as that of the sequential version. Thus
the time complexity for the whole parallel algorithm is O(d2 + α · n) in the worst
case.
The two algorithms can be applied to the networks according to the preliminary
knowledge of communities, e.g. whether they are disjoint or overlapped.
4.2.3 Experiment
We conduct experiments on both synthetic and real world graphs, including three
benchmarks for community detection. We ran the sequential algorithms on an
2.83GHz Inter Core, 2 Quad CPU machine with 2GB of main memory under Win-
dows 8 OS. The parallel algorithm ran on the same machine with a GeForce GTX
560 Ti graphics card having 2048 MB of global memory, 8 multiprocessor and 48
CUDA cores per multiprocessor. The algorithms are implemented in Visual C++
10.0. The parallel algorithm is implemented using the application programming
interface CUDA for the C language. CUDA [42], the C language Compute Unified
Device Architecture, is provided by NVIDIA and works on NVIDIA graphic cards.
The CUDA programming model consists of a sequential host code combined with
a parallel kernel code.
We compare our algorithm for disjoint community detection with three state-
of-the-art algorithms: InfoMap [129], WalkTrap [123] and Girvan and Newman
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Algorithm 4.4: Fast Overlapping Community Detection
Input: graph G(V,E), parameter θ;
Result: Clusters Ci, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′)
1 Compute degree[v] and cc[v], v ∈ V ;
2 for each v do
3 if degree[v]<degree[vj] then /* vj ∈vneighbour */
4 g[v] ← vi, where degree[vi] = max(degree[vj]) ;
5 else
6 g[v] ← v;
7 for each v do
8 if g[v] = v and degree[v] = degree[vi] then
9 if v and vi has more than half common vertices;
10 then
11 g[v]← vi, if vi has smaller id;
12 else
13 vg ← g[v];
14 c1← number of common neighbours between v and j;
15 c2← number of common neighbours between v and (vneighbour \ vg);
16 if c1 < c2 then g[v] ← v;
17 for each v do
18 if g[v] 6= v then
19 i← g[v];
20 repeat
21 i← g[i] ;
22 until g[i]= i; find standalone vertex
23 g[v] ← i;
24 k ← different numbers in g[v];
25 repeat
26 for each v do
27 find clusters {Ci|N vmax −N vi ≥ θ, 1 ≤ i ≤ k};
28 if v /∈ Ci then Cluster v into Ci;
29 until reach equilibrium;
30 Return Ci,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., k′);
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(GN )[69][114]. InfoMap is based on information theory. Walktrap is based on ran-
dom walk. InfoMap has been empirically shown to have better performance, com-
pared to other algorithms for community detection [62]. We compare our algorithm
for overlapping community detection with two algorithms: the game-theory algo-
rithm and speaker-listener label propagation algorithm (SLPA)[161], which show
good performance [160, 161]. In the experiment, we directly use the original C++
code of the game-theory algorithm provided by author of [32] and Java executable
file of SLPA provided by author of [161].
4.2.3.1 Data sets
We generate a batch of benchmark graphs [92] with known community structure,
number of vertices, the average degree, maximum degree, minimum and maximum
size of micro and macro community due to the hierarchical structure, and fraction
of edges between vertices belonging to the same or different communities. The first
set of graphs are generated with 2,000 vertices and different average degrees while
the other parameters remain the same. They have no overlapping communities. For
overlapping communities, we generate two sets of graphs. The first set of graphs
has 10,000 vertices and different average degrees, while the other parameters are
the same. Every five graphs have a similar average degree. We run the algorithm
on all the graphs and we take and compare the average values. The second set of
graphs generated have a varying number of vertices from 10,000 to 50,000, and for
every number of vertices, five graphs are generated.
The real-world benchmark graphs used are listed as follows. Among them,
Zachary’s Karate Club data, American College Football data and Dolphin network
are widely used for evaluating community detection algorithms.
Karate Club data is a social network of karate club members studied by
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the sociologist Wayne Zachary. The network has 34 members (vertices) and they
are separated into two different groups due to a controversy between one of the
instructors and administrator of the club.
American College Football data is a network with 115 teams (vertices)
which are separated into 12 conferences. An edge exists between two vertices if
there is a match between two teams. More games happen among teams within the
same conference than teams from different conferences.
Dolphin Network is collected by David Lusseaua [105]. The network repre-
sents frequent associations between 62 dolphins (vertices) in a community living
off Doubtful Sound, New Zealand.
Email-URV data is collected by Guimer et al. [1]. The network contains
user-to-user (address- to-address) links from the network of e-mail interchanges
among faculty and graduate students at Rovira i Virgili University of Tarragona,
Spain. It is available on Alex Arenas Website [1].
Arxiv HEP-PH , collected by Leskovec et al. [96], is a collaboration network
containing scientific collaborations between authors who submitted papers to High
Energy Physics. It is available on the SNAP website [136].
Wiki-Vote , collected by Leskove et al. [95], contains user-to-user (who-vote-
whom) links from the Wikipedia network. It is available on the SNAP website [136].
Each vertex represents a user. An edge is created from a user to a candidate if a
user votes for Wikipedia admin candidates.
Email-Enron data set contains user-to-user (address-to-address) links. It was
made public by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during its investiga-
tions. We obtained it from [136]. Each vertex represents an email address. An edge
exists between vertex i and vertex j if address i sends at least one email message
to address j.
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Table 4.2: Description of data sets
Number of Vertices Number of edges
Karate Club 34 78
Dolphin 62 159
American College Football 115 610
Email-URV 1,133 5,451
Wiki-Vote 7,066 100,736
Arxiv HEP-PH 11,204 117,649
Email-Enron 33,696 180,811
Epinions 119,130 704,276
Epinions data set contains user-to-user (who-trust-whom) links from Epinions
network. It was collected by Epinions staff P. Massa. We obtained it from trustlet
website [146, 108]. Each vertex represents a user. An edge corresponds to a trust
or distrust statement from one user to another user.
We extract the largest component of the networks that have more than one
component. The number of vertices and the number of edges of each data set are
listed in Table 4.2
4.2.3.2 Metrics
We use five metrics to qualify the disjoint communities: modularity, conductance,
internal density, cut ratio and weighted community clustering (Equ. 2.1 - 2.6).
Modularity, conductance, internal density and cut ratio are selected from four
classes of metrics for community [165] so that we can eliminate the bias of having
only one kind of metric. Weighted community clustering is a recently proposed
metric [125]. We use the revised modularity (Equ. 2.2) to measure the quality of
overlapping communities. In our experiments, we take the average of the conduc-
tances of communities found for the conductance of the whole network, and it is
the same for the other metrics, except modularity.
We compute the NMI (Equ. 2.7) value of the set of communities detected,
and the known set of communities of the graphs that we generate. NMI works
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(a) FCD (b) InfoMap (c) WalkTrap (d) GN
Figure 4.8: Communities for Karate Club data by different algorithms
(a) FCD (b) InfoMap (c) WalkTrap (d) GN
Figure 4.9: Communities for Dolphin data by different algorithms
in the same way for the comparison of disjoint community sets and overlapping
community sets.
4.2.3.3 Experimental Assessment for Disjoint Community Detection
Figure 4.8 shows the communities found in the Karate Club network by each al-
gorithm. Figure 4.9 shows the communities found in the Dolphin new network by
each algorithm. Vertices of the same color are in the same community.
Figure 4.10 shows the measurement results on the four real data sets. The x-
axis is labelled by the names of data sets. The y-axis is the value of metric. For
each data set, the metric values for the communities detected by each algorithm are
compared. Figure 4.10 (a) shows that the communities that FCD and ParallelFCD
found have a lower modularity on these four data sets. However, this does not
indicate that our algorithm is not better than the other three algorithms. Figure 4.8
shows that our algorithm identifies two communities, that coincides with the truth
that the members of the Karate Club separated into two different groups due to a
controversy, and thus the result of our algorithm is actually more reasonable than
the other three algorithms even though the modularity values are lower. Figure 4.10
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(b) shows the conductance results. The lower the conductance, the better the
communities found. In this case, our algorithm has the lowest conductance on two
data sets and highest conductance on the other two data sets. Figure 4.10 (c)
shows the internal density results. The higher the internal density, the better the
communities found. In this case, our algorithm has the highest internal density in
three of the four data sets, and the lowest in one data set. Figure 4.10 (d) shows
the cut ratio results. The lower the cut ratio the better the communities found. In
this case, our algorithm has the lowest cut ratio in one of the four data set, and the
highest in the other three data sets. Figure 4.10 (e) shows the weighted community
clustering results. The higher the WCC, the better the communities found [125]. In
this case our algorithm has a lower WCC in three of the four data sets. Figure 4.10
(f) shows the running time. For the four data sets, FCD performs the fastest among
the algorithms. ParallelFCD performs faster than InfoMap, WalkTrap and GN on
the Email-URV data. Comparing the performances of the same algorithm on the
four data sets, we can see the big differences which are due to the different graph
structures, e.g. different number of vertices, number of edges, different densities.
To sum up the results on these four real data sets, our algorithm, FCD and its
parallel version, finds communities with better values in terms of internal density
and conductance, but not with the other metrics. However, as we can see from
the results for Karate Club, the communities detected by our algorithm stay more
truthful than those of the other algorithms. In this sense, our algorithm is effective.
From the comparison of running time, FCD is obviously more efficient than the
others.
Figure 4.11 shows the results on the first set of benchmark graphs. It shows
that the metric value changes as the graphs increase in average degree. The x-axis






































































































































































































































(h) Average Community Size





















































































































































































































Figure 4.13: Running time for large graphs
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represents one metric value for the communities detected by one algorithm. Figure
4.11 (a) shows the modularity results. It shows that WalkTrap has the highest
modularity in general, although in some cases, GN and FCD have the highest
modularity, and FCD has a higher modularity than InfoMap. Figure 4.11 (b) shows
the conductance results. It shows that InfoMap has the highest conductance and
GN has the lowest. Figure 4.11 (c) shows the internal density results. It shows that
InfoMap has the highest internal density, and GN has the lowest density. Figure
4.11 (d) shows the cut ratio results. It shows that InfoMap has the highest cut ratio,
and GN has the lowest. Figure 4.11 (e) shows the WCC results. It shows that
FCD and WalkTrap have a higher WCC, and InfoMap and GN have a lower WCC.
As FCD and ParallelFCD detect the same communities, the green line and the red
line overlap in Figure 4.11 (a)-(e). Figure 4.11 (f) shows the running time. FCD
and ParallelFCD are shown to be faster in most cases. GN is much slower than
InfoMap, WalkTrap and FCD. ParallelFCD is not obviously faster than FCD, due
to the data communication between the host CPU and device GPU. Figure 4.11 (g)
shows the measurement of NMI. It shows that both InfoMap and WalkTrap display
higher NMI values. Figure 4.11 (h) shows the average and deviation of community
size. The results reveal that the average size of communities is the closest to the
ground truth when the average degree of the graph is about 10 or less than 10. In
other words, FCD shows better performance in sparse graphs.
Comparing the metric values of the communities found by algorithms and the
ground truth, we can see that in some cases FCD finds communities closer to the
ground truth while in the other cases GN and WalkTrap find communities closer
to the ground truth.
Figure 4.12 shows the distributions of sizes of communities in four randomly
picked graphs. The x-axis is the size of the community. The y-axis is the frequency
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of community size. The results show that FCD and WalkTrap find communities
of closer sizes to the ground truth relatively in general while in the last case, GN
finds the communities of the most similar sizes as the known ones.
To sum up the results on these synthetic graphs, FCD (ParallelFCD) is more
stable than InfoMap and GN in terms of effectiveness. InfoMap is the best in
terms of internal density but the other three algorithms are better in terms of
conductance, cut ratio and WCC. GN and WalkTrap are the best in terms of
conductance and cut ratio but the other two algorithms are better in terms of
internal density. Comparing the detected communities with the ground truth gives
a different evaluation of detected community quality, as the good metric value does
not always indicate the closeness of the detected communities to the ground truth.
The running time shows that FCD is faster than the other three in general.
Another set of experiments demonstrating the running time are carried out on
Wiki-Vote, Arxiv HEP-PH, Email-Enron, and Epinion network. We sample sub-
graphs from the networks. Every subgraph contains k percentage vertices of the
original networks, where k = 10, 20, ..., 90. We run the FCD and InfoMap algo-
rithms on these subgraphs and the original graphs. The running time is recorded.
Figure 4.13 shows the running time changing, as the number of vertices of networks
increases. Each figure shows the results for one data set. The x-axis is the number
of vertices. The y-axis is the time measured in seconds. Due to WalkTrap and GN
algorithms’ scalability on large graphs, we only compare the InfoMap and FCD al-
gorithms here. The results show that both algorithms are able to work with graphs
with more than 100,000 vertices. For graphs such as Email-Enron with 33,696 ver-
tices, the algorithms are able to finish the task in a few minutes. In most cases
FCD is faster than InfoMap.
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4.2.3.4 Experimental Assessment for Overlapping Community Detec-
tion
We set the parameter of θ to be 0 in this set of experiments, as we do not expect a
large amount of overlaps in our synthetic graphs. We also examined higher values
of θ on some graphs randomly chosen from the data sets and comparisons indicate
a lower quality of detected communities with higher values of θ.
Figure 4.14 shows the results for the graphs with varying average degree. The
x-axis is the average degree of the graphs. The y-axis is the value of metric.
We conduct experiment on five graphs with similar average degree and then take
the average of the values to reduce bias against different graph structures. Thus,
each dot represents one metric value averaged over five values of the communities
detected by one algorithm. Figure 4.14 (a) shows the results for NMI. It shows
that our algorithm FCD-OV results in the highest NMI value compared to the
game-theory and SLPA algorithm, which indicates that the communities found by
FCD-OV are the closest to the true community structure in the input graphs.
Figure 4.14 (b)-(f) show the measurement results for community quality. As the
community structure of the generated graphs are known, we compare the quality
of the communities detected by the three algorithms and the quality of the known
communities that is labelled as original in the figures. It is obvious that FCD-OV
results in the values that are closest to the original ones, suggesting that FCD-
OV has a better capability to find true communities. Figure 4.14 (g) shows the
average size of the set of communities found as well as the original average size of
the communities in each graph. FCD-OV finds the communities with the average
sizes that are closest to the known ones.
Figure 4.15 shows the same measurements as Figure 4.14 on the graphs with
varying size. The x-axis is the number of vertices in the graphs. The y-axis is the
109
value of metric. As the graph size increases from 10,000 to 50,000, we measure the
values of each metric for communities found in each graph. We conduct experiment
on every five graphs with the same size and then take the average of the values to
reduce bias against different graph structures. Figure 4.15 (a) shows the results
of NMI. It shows that FCD-OV has the highest values. Figure 4.15 (b)-(f) show
the measurement results on community quality. Figure 4.15 (g) shows the average
size of the set of communities found as well as the original average size of the
communities in each graph.
The results in Figure 4.15 suggest that the communities found by FCD-OV are
the most truthful to the known communities. They also suggest that the change
of metric values for the communities is almost independent of the size of graphs
except the cut ratio.
Figure 4.16 shows the average size and standard deviation of each set of the
communities in graphs of different average degrees. Figure 4.17 shows the average
size and standard deviation of each set of communities in graphs with different
sizes. In Figure 4.16, the x-axis is the average degree of the graphs, and the y-
axis is the size of the community. In Figure 4.17, the x-axis is the size of the
graph, and the y-axis is the size of the community. It shows that the average size
of the communities detected by FCD-OV is closer to the average size of known
communities.
Figure 4.18 shows the plots of community distribution for six randomly selected
graphs. The x-axis is the size of the community. The y-axis is the ratio of the
number of communities of certain size and the total number of communities in the
graph, i.e., the frequency of community size. The known communities are mostly
within size 100 to 200, while many communities detected by the game-theory and




































































































































































(g) Average Community Size
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Figure 4.17: Measurements on graphs with varying size
FCD-OV overlap with the lines for the known communities, and this indicates
that most of the communities detected by FCD-OV are of the sizes of the known
communities or close to the sizes of the known communities.
Figure 4.19 shows the running time of three algorithms on the two sets of
generated graphs. In both cases, FCD-OV costs the least time compared to the
game-theory and SLPA algorithms. The running time also shows that FCD-OV
detects community in graphs with 50,000 vertices within one and a half minutes.
The high efficiency of FCD-OV is exhibited.
To sum up, we empirically evaluate FCD algorithms. For disjoint community
detection, we examine FCD on four real graphs and a set of synthetic graphs.
Knowing few ground truths about the communities in the real graphs, we mea-
sure the community quality by calculating the values of chosen metrics. For syn-
thetic graphs, we measure the extent to which the detected communities match the
ground truths. Compared to the InfoMap, WalkTrap and GN algorithms, FCD
is the fastest while it produces results of comparable quality. FCD shows better
performance on several metrics.











































































































































































































































Figure 4.19: Running time comparison
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We measure the community quality by calculating values of the metrics and com-
pare the detected communities with the ground truths. Compared to the game-
theory and SLPA, FCD identifies communities closer to the ground truths. FCD
also takes less time to find the communities.
4.2.4 Summary
In this section, we propose two fast community detection algorithms, one for disjoint
community detection and the other for overlapping community detection. They ini-
tiate each vertex to independently seek out the community in its neighbourhood.
Each vertex chooses its community and peers, based on a knowledge of degrees and
clustering coefficients of neighbours and the number of common neighbours. The
algorithms are parallelizable and thus we devise a GPU version of the algorithm for
disjoint community detection for parallel computation. In the case of disjoint com-
munity detection, we empirically evaluate the performance of FCD, and compare
it to the InfoMap, WalkTrap and GN algorithms. We find that FCD is the fastest,
while it produces results of comparable quality. We assess effectiveness based on the
values of modularity, conductance, internal density, cut ratio, weighted community
clustering, and normalized mutual information as well as community size. In the
case of overlapping community detection, we empirically compare the performance
of FCD for overlapping communities with the game-theory and SLPA. We find that
FCD for overlapping communities is more efficient, and more effective.
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4.3 Local Closeness Community Detection
4.3.1 Overview
We propose an algorithm for the detection of structural communities in simple
graphs. The algorithm is able to detect overlapping communities. The algorithm is
based on a local notion of closeness centrality [18, 63]. Closeness centrality measures
how close a vertex is to all the other vertices, and indicates the importance [119]
of vertices in a graph. We utilize such measurement of importance for locating
densely connected members of communities. We try to propose an algorithm for
direct community detection using the metric of closeness centrality. However, we
observe a problem in efficiency. The computation of closeness centrality is costly.
Therefore, we alleviate the problem by defining a local notion of closeness centrality.
We leverage the fundamental concepts used in the local outlier factor algorithm
by Breunig et al. [24]. The local outlier factor algorithm finds outliers for clusters
with nonuniform density. We adapt the idea of a local density to the definition of a
local notion of closeness centrality. This is done by computing distance, reachability
distance and density of a vertex within its restricted neighbors, as in the local outlier
factor algorithm local reachability density and local outlier factor are computed
with the nearest neighbors. To account for the graph structure, we also define the
adjusted geodesic distance, which is the geodesic distance between a vertex and
its surrounding neighbor with adjustment regarding the number of shortest paths.
Based on this definition of distance, a local notion of closeness centrality and a
local closeness factor are defined. Vertices are paired with their neighbors based on
their respective local closeness factor to form the communities. We find that the
local notion of closeness centrality yields a more effective and efficient algorithm
for community detection than closeness centrality does.
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We compare the performance of our algorithm with that of three state-of-the-art
community detection algorithms for overlapping communities: a label propagation
algorithm [161], a game theory algorithm [32] and a probabilistic model-based algo-
rithm [166]. We empirically evaluate the performance of our algorithm with varying
parameters. We calculate effectiveness by calculating the normalized mutual infor-
mation [91] and omega index [39] between the set of communities found and the
known set of communities.
We show that our algorithm displays competitive performance on both gen-
erated graphs and real world graphs. It is more effective and efficient than the
algorithms compared for sparse graphs on a large scale.
Our contribution is an algorithm and its evaluation for the detection of poten-
tially overlapping communities. The algorithm localizes the closeness centrality
with the notions of local reachability density that we have adapted to the case of
graphs and geodesic distance from the local outlier factor algorithm. The closeness
factor we introduce is local, in the sense that only a restricted neighborhood of
each vertex is taken into account.
4.3.2 Motivation
In this section, we introduce the concepts of closeness centrality and local outlier
factor, and how these concepts constitute the idea of our community detection
method.
4.3.2.1 Closeness Centrality
In graph theory, a natural distance metric that is defined by the length of shortest
path exists between any pair of vertices. It is called geodesic distance. The farness
of a vertex is defined as the sum of its geodesic distances to all the other vertices,
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and its closeness is defined as the inverse of the farness [133]. Thus, the more
central a vertex is, the smaller its total geodesic distance to all other vertices. The







V is the set of vertices of a graph. The closeness centrality of a given vertex
v is the sum of the inverse of distance of between v and all the other vertices in
the graph. The geodesic distance between vertex x and vertex v is denoted by
d(x, v). Closeness centrality indicates the importance of a vertex [119] in terms of
its closeness to the rest vertices.
The naive algorithm that we design for community detection integrates this
indicator. The experiment demonstrates the effectiveness of closeness centrality. It
shows that this closeness centrality based community detection algorithm rivals the
three algorithms that it is compared with. However, it suffers from an efficiency
issue. The complexity for computing closeness centrality is O(n3). n is the number
of vertices in the graph. This is because the computation of closeness centrality
involves the computation of geodesic distances between all pairs of vertices. This
complexity is considered to be a computational high for large graphs.
4.3.2.2 Local Outlier Factor
We desire a notion of local closeness centrality to alleviate the above problem.
Therefore we design a such notion by adapting the idea of local density from LOF.
LOF is originally proposed to find outliers for clusters with non-uniform density,
where density is estimated by Euclidean distance among data points. Regions of
similar density are identified by comparing the local density of each data point to







Figure 4.20: Vertex V has 4 one-step neighbors and 20 two-step neighbors.
lower density than their neighbours. LOF measures the extent to which a point is
an outlier based on the relative density of its local neighbourhood. This enables
LOF to spot outliers that cannot be observed from a global view.
The complexity of LOF computation for each object mainly depends on the
parameter k, which specifies the number of nearest neighbor involved in the calcu-
lation of LOF value for each object. The complexity is reduced by restricting the
calculation to k-distance neighbors of each object. The k-distance of an object p
is denoted as k-distance (p). It is defined as the distance d (p, o) between p and an
object o ∈ D such that:
1. for at least k objects o′ ∈ D \ {p} it holds that d (p, o′) ≤ d (p, o), and
2. for at most k − 1 objects o′ ∈ D\ {p} it holds that d (p, o′) < d (p, o)
The k-distance neighborhood of p contains every object whose distance from
p is not greater than k-distance, i.e. Nk-distance(p)(p) = {q ∈ D \ {p}| d(p, q) ≤ k-
distance(p)}. The objects {q} are called the k-nearest neighbors of p.
The definition of a k-distance neighborhood defined in Euclidean space, how-
ever, is not directly suitable for measuring local density in a graph. Distance in
Euclidean space is usually a continuous value. But the geodesic distance between
two vertices in graph is usually an integer value. So it is more likely to find that
many pairs of vertices have exactly the same distance in graphs, compared to Eu-
clidean space. For example, vertex v in figure 4.20 has 4 one-step neighbors and
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20 two-step neighbors. When k = 4, k-distance neighborhood of v is p1, p2, p3
and p4. When k = 24, k-distance neighborhood of v is the whole set of vertices
in the graph except v. When k = 15, we face the problem of choosing part of the
two-step neighbors as the k-distance neighborhood of v. This leads to a situation
in which many vertices have the same measured distances, while they are indeed
structurally distinguishable in that pairs of vertices may have a different number
of shortest paths, e.g. vertex x and y. We consider that a pair of vertices with a
greater number of shortest paths have better reachability, and are intuitively closer.
The choice of neighborhood would be important yet hard because it directly
affects the measurement of importance of vertex v. Hence, we define our restriction
of neighborhood by geodesic distance to the vertex, rather than k-distance, and
we define a distance that integrates a local graph structure. Such considerations
increase the disparity of closeness, and facilitates the comparison of closeness and
community discovery. Then, we define the local notion of closeness centrality called
local reachability density, and local closeness factor for detecting communities.
4.3.3 Local Closeness Factor
In this section we describe the definition of local closeness factor and present the
upper and lower bound of LCF. We also analytically prove that LCF value is an
effective indicator of the importance of a vertex.
4.3.3.1 Definitions
We extend the concept of local density to graphs for finding communities. We define
the local closeness factor beginning with the notion of within-k-step neighbors.
The within-k-step neighbors of vertex v are the vertices that have a geodesic
distance that is smaller, or equal to, k from vertex v. For vertices with the same
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geodesic distance to vertex v, we consider the vertices that have a greater number
of shortest paths with vertex v nearer to v. For example, for vertices that are two
steps to v, we consider vertices that have more common neighbors with vertex v as
being the nearer to v. Therefore, we define a distance between vertex vi and vj as
follows:
Definition 4.
distance(vi, vj) = g(vi, vj)− σ(vi, vj)
Σvt∈Nviσ(vi, vt)
(4.2)
where g(vi, vj) is the geodesic distance of vertex vi and vj. σ(vi, vj) is the number
of shortest paths between vi and vj. Nvi is the set of vi’s within-k-step neighbors.
To calculate distances for within-1-step neighbors or within-2-step neighbors,
the formula can be simplified and approximated by replacing Σvt∈Nviσ(vi, vt) as di,
the degree of vi. The subtrahend in Definition 2 should be in the range of 0 to 1
so that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. distance(vi, vj) > 0, and
2. g(vi, vj1) ≤ g(vi, vj2) if and only if distance(vi, vj1) ≤ distance(vi, vj2).
For within-1-step neighbors, σ(vi, vj) is the same for any j and so is distance(vi, vj).
For within-2-step neighbors, σ(vi, vj) measures the number of common neighbors
between vertex i and j. This definition is integrated with graph structure, and thus
facilitates comparison of local density.
Next, we define reachability distance. Reachability in graph is usually defined
as the number of steps a vertex vi needs to take to reach another vertex vj, which is
measured by shortest path length (geodesic distance). Here, we define reachability
distance as follows:
Definition 5. reachability distance of a vertex vi, rdk(vi), is the maximum of
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the distance between vertex vi and vi’s within-k-step neighbors.
The objective of reachability distance is to reduce the fluctuations of the dis-
tances between vertex vi’s nearest vertices and vertex vi, so that vertices within
the same neighborhood will have a similar reachability distance.
Local reachability density is then defined as:
Definition 6. Local reachability density of a vertex vi is the inverse of the





where Nvi is the within-k-step neighbors of vi, rdk(vj) is reachability distance
of vertex vj, and |Nvi | is the number of the within-k-step neighbors of vi, which
varies for different vi.
Local reachability density is defined based on the same idea as closeness cen-
trality. Local reachability density restricts the local neighborhood to approximate
closeness centrality.
Definition 7. Local Closeness Factor of a vertex vi is the average of the ratio of








The local closeness factor is low if local reachability density of vertex vi’s neigh-
bors are low and the local reachability density of vertex vi is high. The local close-
ness factor is high if its neighbors’ local reachability density are high and it has a
lower local reachability density.
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Figure 4.21: Zachary’s Karate Club example
Figure 4.21 shows a simple example, a real world graph from Zachary’s Karate
Club data. It has 34 vertices and 78 edges. Each vertex represents a member
of the club, and each edge represents the friendship between the members. The
value associated with each vertex is the local closeness factor value calculated and
plotted next to the corresponding vertex. The members fell into two groups due to a
controversy between the administrator and the instructor. The two different colors
represent the two communities detected. Vertices in the centre of the communities
are, core members of the communities, and are plotted inside the darker shadow.
Vertices on the border of the communities are plotted in the lighter shadow. These
vertices have relatively higher local closeness factor values.
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4.3.3.2 Properties of Local Closeness Factor
In this section, we conduct a detailed analysis on the properties of LCF. We aim to
show that our definition of LCF captures the spirit of local closeness for community
detection. Specifically, we a give lower and upper bound for LCF, and show what
LCF value a vertex has in different positions of a community.
4.3.3.3 Bound for LCF
Let V be the set of vertices of a graph G. Let reach-dist-min denote the minimum
reachability distance of the objects in V, i.e. reach-dist-min = {rdk(u)|u ∈ V }.
Similarly, let reach-dist-max denote the maximum reachability distance of the ob-




Then for all vertices u ∈ V , such that for:
1. all the within-k-step neighbours v of u are in V, and
2. all the within-k-step neighbours w of v are in V,
it holds that 1/(1 + ε) ≤ LCF (u) ≤ (1 + ε).
Proof: For all within-k-step neighbors v of u, rdk(u) ≥ reach-dist-min. Then
the local reachability density of u, as per definition 3, is ≤ 1/reach-dist-min. On
the other hand, rdk(u) ≤ reach-dist-max. Thus the local reachability density of u
is ≥ 1/reach-dist-max.
Let v be a within-k-step-neighbour of u. By an argument identical to the one
for u above, the local reachability density of v is also between 1/reach-dist-max and
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1/reach-dist-min.
Thus, by definition 4, we have reach-dist-min/reach-distmax ≤ LCF (u) ≤
reach-dist-max/reach-dist-min. Hence, we establish 1/(1 + ε) ≤ LCF (u) ≤ (1 + ε).
The interpretation of bound is as follows. Let us consider the vertex u that is
in the centre of community C. All the within-k-step neighbours v of u are in C,
and all the within-k-step neighbours of v are also in C. For such a central vertex
u, the LCF value of u is bounded. If vertices in C are evenly connected to each
other, the ε value in the bound can be quite small, thus forcing the LCF of u to be
close to 1.
4.3.3.4 LCF for community detection
We originally introduce the local closeness factor to measure how close a vertex is to
its local neighbourhood. This measurement directly determines the local closeness
of a vertex in a community. The more important a vertex is to a community, the
smaller LCF value it has.
To prove this property of LCF, we first give a definition of relative importance
to a vertex from the perspective of community detection.
Definition 8. For any vertex vc and vp in the same community, we say vc is
more important than vp, if vc has smaller sum of distance to its within-k-step
neighbourhood than vp does.
Practically, vc is usually the core member of a community while vp is the pe-
ripheral member. A core member always has smaller LCF value than a peripheral
member does. This is the fundamental that ensures our community detection
method works correctly and effectively.
Proof: Suppose vc and vp are vertices in the same community, vc is important
than vp. According to definition 8, lrd(vc) > lrd(vp), Thus by definition 7, we have
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LCF (vc) < LCF (vp). 
4.3.4 Algorithm
We first propose a closeness centrality based algorithm (Algorithm 10). To calculate
the closeness centralities, we calculate the distance matrix (line 1), using the Floyd
Warshall algorithm [60]. After obtaining a closeness centrality value for each vertex,
the algorithm binds each vertex with its immediate neighbour (neighbours) if the
neighbour(s) has(have) a closeness centrality value lower than the vertex itself and
the rest of its(their) immediate neighbours (Algorithm 11). Otherwise, the vertex
is bound with itself. v.Cset contains the bound vertices with which vertex v will
possibly be grouped together to form communities.
In the next step, the function checks through each vertex’s bound vertices. For
vertex vi, check its bound vertices (vi.Cset). If any of the bound vertices, i.e.
vj, has been bound with other vertices which are only bound with themselves, we
bind vertex vi with those vertices by updating vi.Cset correspondingly (Algorithm
11.line 6-12). By doing this, the algorithm potentially binds all the vertices that be-
longs to the same community together, because eventually the vertices that belong
to the same community will be bound to the same vertex. Therefore, communities
are detected.
Algorithm 4.5: Closeness Centrality Based Community Detection (CC)
Input: graph G(V,E);
Result: Clusters Ci, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|)
1 Compute distance matrix;
2 Compute cc[v], v ∈V ;
3 Ĉi = Binding(G, cc, iter), i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |Ĉ|);
4 Ci = Refinement(Ĉ), i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|);
5 Return Ci,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|);
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The first two loops of the binding function aim to find the core members of
the communities (Algorithm 11.line 1-12). In this procedure, some vertices may
be misclassified, especially the vertices that are on the borders of the communities.
Therefore the last loop of the binding process conducts a vertex level adjustment. It
adjusts the communities to which a vertex belongs if necessary. The function checks
through each vertex and changes its membership if the number of connections the
vertex has with current communities to which it belongs is less than those it has
with the other communities (Algorithm 11.line 13-17). As some vertices leave their
current communities and join new communities, other vertices’ connections with the
communities may be affected. For this reason, this process can continue for several
iterations. To prevent deadlocks wherein the vertices repeatedly change member-
ships among certain communities, the number of iterations is pre-determined and
input as a parameter.
The last phase of the CC algorithm is a minor refinement, a community level
adjustment (Algorithm 10.line 4). Trivial communities, communities that have
more connections with other communities than within themselves or isolated ver-
tices, may be detected. The algorithm goes through each community and checks
whether each community has more connections inside the community than with
other communities. If not, communities are merged to eliminate the trivial com-
munities (Algorithm 12).
To improve effectiveness and efficiency, we propose the LCF algorithm, an al-
gorithm built upon the local closeness factor values (Algorithm 13). According
to the value computed for each vertex, the LCF value, we can tell how closely a
vertex is connected to its neighbours. Comparing the local closeness factor value
of each vertex with those of its neighbours, a vertex is considered to be in the same
community as its neighbour(neighbours) whose local closeness factor value is the
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Algorithm 4.6: The Binding scheme
Input: graph G(V,E), φ, iter;
/* φ can be lcf or cc values */;
Result: Clusters Ĉi, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |Ĉ|)
1 for each v do
2 if φ[vi] ¡ φ[v] then /* vi ∈vNeighbour, φ[vi] > φ[v] for cc, and all
min replaced by max */
3 v.Cset add vmin ,where φ[vmin] = min(φ[vi]);
4 else
5 v.Cset add v;
6 for each v do
7 for each vj ∈ v.Cset do
8 if vj /∈ vj.Cset then
9 repeat
10 vt ← each vertex ∈ vj.Cset;
11 until vt ∈ vt.Cset ;
12 update vj in v.Cset;
13 repeat
14 for each v do
15 if v has more connections to Ci than the connections within itself,
1 ≤ i ≤ |C| ;
16 then cluster v into Ci;
17 until finish iterations ;
18 Return Ĉi,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |Ĉ|);
Algorithm 4.7: The Refinement scheme
Input: graph G(V,E), Ĉi, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |Ĉ|);
Result: Clusters Ci, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|)
1 for i from 1 to |Ĉ| do
2 if Ĉi has more connections with Ĉj, 1 ≤ j ≤ |Ĉ| and j 6= i then
/* check and merge trivial communities */
3 merge Ĉi and Ĉj
4 Return Ci,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|);
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minimum among all the neighbours. Vertices on the border of communities may
be misclassified, and thus some refinements are made to improve the effectiveness.
The algorithm starts by finding within-k-step neighbors. As geodesic distance
is different from Euclidean distance in that geodesic distance is presented as an
integer, many vertices may have the same geodesic distance with the designated
vertex while their connectedness towards the designated vertex is different. For
instance, vertex vj and vk have the same distance with vi, as both of them are
two steps away from vi. If vj has more common neighbours with vi than vk does,
vj can be viewed to be closer to vi than vk. Pairwise distances are recorded for
computation of reachability distance and local closeness factor value.
Algorithm 4.8: Local Closeness Factor Based Community Detection (LCF)
Input: graph G(V,E), k, iter;
Result: Clusters Ci, i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|)
1 for each v do
2 Find neighbours within k steps;
3 Compute lcf [v], v ∈V ;
4 Ĉi = Binding(G, lcf, iter), i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |Ĉ|);
5 Ci = Refinement(Ĉ), i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|);
6 Return Ci,i ∈ (1, 2, ..., |C|);
After finding within-k-step neighbours and calculating the reachability distance,
local reachability density and local closeness factor value for each vertex (Algorithm
13.line 1-3), the algorithm triggers the same binding (Algorithm 11) and refinement
process (Algorithm 12) as the CC algorithm (Algorithm 13.line 4-5). The binding
process (Algorithm 11) binds each vertex with its immediate neighbour (neigh-
bours) if the neighbour(s) has(have) a lower local closeness factor value than the
vertex itself and the rest of its immediate neighbours. Otherwise, the vertex is
bound with itself.
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4.3.4.1 Choice of Parameters
In this section, we show how to choose parameters and how parameters affect the
effectiveness of our detection method.
• k
In our definition, k specifies the within-k-step neighbourhood involved in the
calculation of LCF value. In practice, k = 2 serves better than k = 1, and k = 2
does not incur much more computational complexity than k = 1 does. k = 2 is
also more efficient than k = 3. Considering both efficiency and effectiveness, we
choose k to be 2 in our experiments.
• Iteration t
In the last step of the binding function, some vertices migrate, or in other words,
change memberships, among communities during each iteration. As the iteration
continues, the community memberships gradually become stable.
Figure 4.22 shows the example curve of relations between the number of iter-
ations and the number of migrations. Red curve belongs to a data set of 10,000
vertices, while the blue curve belongs to that of 50,000 vertices. The x-axis stands
for the number of iterations, while the y-axis stands for the number of vertex mi-
gration occurred in each iteration. The two curves are almost overlapped, which
means that the relation between iteration and migration is independent of the size
of the data set. For both curves, the number of migrations drop rapidly as iteration
continues and starts oscillating after the point wherein iteration equals to 4. For
t ∈ [4, 10], we find that there is no big difference in the effectiveness.
Efficiency-wise, it takes 0.5 and 2 seconds respectively for a data set of 10,000
vertices and a data set with 50,000 vertices to finish a 10-iteration micro adjustment.

























Figure 4.22: The number of vertex migrations during each iteration.
4.3.4.2 Complexity Analysis
The complexity for the CC algorithm is O(n3) as the complexity of pair-wise
geodesic distance calculation is O(n3). n is the number of vertices of the graph.
For the LCF algorithm, we set k to 1 for small graphs or 2 for large graphs, as
explained in previous subsection, so the complexity for finding neighbours and cal-
culating LCF values is O(d · n) or O(d2 · n) where d is the average degree of the
graph. The complexity for calculation of LCF value and binding the vertices is
O(β · n) in the worst case, where β should be smaller than the graph diameter
in general. The complexity for vertex level adjustment is between O(t · e) and
O(t · n · e). t is the number of iterations and is chosen to be a small integer as
explained earlier. e is the number of edges in the graph. The complexity for the
post-processing refinement is O(e). To sum up, the complexity for LCF algorithm
in the worst case can be O(t ·n ·e). However the worst case rarely happens. In nor-
mal cases, the complexity is approximately O(t · e) for sparse graphs. We compare
the running time in the experiments to show the efficiency in practice.
4.3.5 Experiment
We conduct experiments on both synthetic graphs and real world graphs. The
experiments ran on a cluster of nodes of Intel Xeon 2.27 GHz 64 bit processors.
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Table 4.3: Description of data sets
Data sets Vertices Edges Description Communities
DBLP 317,080 1,049,866 Co-Authors 13,477
Amazon 334,863 925,872 Co-Purchase 151,037
The nodes operate Linus 2.6 with gcc version 4.4.6. The algorithm is implemented
in C/C++.
We compare our algorithm to the speaker-listener label propagation algorithm
[161] and game theory based algorithm [32], which have been compared to some
other algorithms and show better performance [160, 161]. We also compare our
algorithm to BigClam, a probabilistic model based algorithm [166]. We directly
use the original codes provided by authors. We examine the threshold from 0.01
to 0.5, with interval 0.05, and take results with the maximum values of NMI for
the SLPA algorithm in order to obtain better communities. For the game-theory
algorithm, we run the algorithm on each graph once with 2,000,000 iterations. Note
that our closeness centrality-based algorithm is not evaluated on the set of graphs
with increasing size, duo to computational prohibitions.
4.3.5.1 Data sets
We use two real world networks from [165] and a batch of benchmark graphs [90]
to evaluate the effectiveness of our method. Table 4.3 shows the information about
the two data sets. In DBLP network, an edge exits between two authors (vertices)
if they co-authored, and authors are in the same community if they published to
the same journal or conference. In the Amazon network, an edge exists between
two products (vertices) if they are frequently co-purchased. The products are in
the same community if they are in the same product category.
The benchmark graphs are generated with a known community structure in-
cluding the number of vertices, average degree, number of overlapping vertices,
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number of memberships of the overlapping vertices, etc. We generate three sets
of graphs. Graphs in the first set have 10,000 vertices and five different average
degrees varying from 5.8 to 12.6 while the other parameters are the same. We
generate five graphs for each average degree. We run the algorithms on all the
graphs and take the average of the metric values. Graphs in the second set have
a different number of vertices, varying from 10,000 to 50,000. For every number
of vertices, we generate five graphs. Graphs in the third set are generated with
an increasing number of memberships of the overlapping vertices while the other
parameters remain the same. Similarly, for every number of memberships of the
overlapping vertices we generate five graphs. We run algorithms on all of them and
take the average values of each metric.
4.3.5.2 Metrics
To measure the quality of detected communities, either disjoint communities or
overlapping communities, we use the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) [91]
and Omega Index [39]. We compute the NMI and Omega Index value based on the
communities detected, and the known communities of the input graphs. Therefore
we use the benchmarks as the main data sets for the experiments, as the commu-
nities of the graphs generated are known.
We also use modularity, conductance, internal density, cut ratio and weighted
community clustering to qualify the communities. We compare the size of commu-
nities detected with the ground truth as well.
4.3.5.3 Result analysis
Figure 4.23 shows the comparison of the NMI values of the detected communities
measured on the three sets of graphs. The x-axis shows change in a certain graph
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property of the graphs. The y-axis shows the NMI value. Each line shows the NMI
values of the communities detected by one algorithm. Figure 4.23 (a) shows the
NMI value changeing with an increasing average degree. The x-axis is the average
degree of the graphs. The y-axis is NMI values. For each average degree, we have
five graphs, so we take the average of the NMI values from each graph. The results
show that LCF detects communities with the highest NMI values on graphs with
smaller average degrees. This has been proved further. Figure 4.23 (b) shows that
the NMI value changes with increasing graph size. These graphs have different
sizes but similar average degrees of around 6. The x-axis is the number of vertices.
It shows that LCF finds communities with the highest values on the graphs of all
the sizes tested. Figure 4.23 (c) shows the NMI value changes with an increasing
number of memberships of the overlapping vertices. The x-axis is the number of
memberships of the overlapping vertices. The graphs in this set also have small
average degrees of about 7. The figure shows that LCF finds communities with the
highest NMI values.
Figure 4.24 shows a comparison of the OMEGA values on the three sets of
graphs. Figure 4.24 (a) shows the OMEGA value changes with increasing average
degrees. The x-axis is the average degree of the graphs. The y-axis is OMEGA
values. For each average degree, we have five graphs, so we take the average of the
OMEGA values. Figure 4.24 shows that LCF detects communities with the highest
OMEGA values on graphs with smaller average degrees. Figure 4.24 (b) shows that
the OMEGA value changes with increasing graph size. The x-axis is the number
of vertices. It shows that LCF finds communities with the highest values on the
graphs of all the sizes tested. Figure 4.24 (c) shows the OMEGA value changes
with increasing number of memberships of the overlapping vertices. The x-axis is
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Figure 4.24: Omega value comparison on three sets of graphs.
(c) shows that communities found by LCF have higher OMEGA values when the
number of memberships of the overlapping vertices is larger, while communities
found by SLPA have higher OMEGA values when the number of memberships of
the overlapping vertices is smaller.
The above results show that the NMI values for LCF are higher than the other
algorithms on sparse graphs, which further indicates that the communities found
by FCL match the actual communities best. The results of OMEGA show that
the OMEGA values for LCF are highest, and hence, most truthful communities
detected, in the case of sparse graphs and the case of more memberships of the
overlapping vertices.




























































































































































(f) average community size
Figure 4.25: Comparison of modularity, conductance, internal density, cut ratio,
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Graphs with E[d] = 10.49
Graphs with E[d] = 12.6
Graphs with E[d] = 5.87, no refinement
Graphs with E[d] = 7.48, no refinement
Graphs with E[d] = 8.25, no refinement
Graphs with E[d] = 9.35, no refinement
Graphs with E[d] = 10.49, no refinement
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Figure 4.26: Effects of the number of iterations and effects of refinement
metrics. In each sub-figure, the x-axis is the average degree. The y-axis is the value
of a metric. Figure 4.25 (a) shows the comparison of modularity. Figure 4.25 (b)
shows the comparison of conductance. Figure 4.25 (c) shows the comparison of
internal density. Figure 4.25 (d) shows the comparison of cut ratio. Figure 4.25 (e)
shows the comparison of weighted community clustering. Figure 4.25 (f) shows the
comparison of average community size. We compare the values for the communities
detected by the algorithms directly, with the values of the ground truth (which
are labelled “Original” in the figures). The figures show that for all the metrics
measured, LCF produces the values that are closest to the ground truth. This
further indicates the high quality of the communities discovered by LCF algorithm
in sparse graphs.
Figure 4.26 shows how the number of iterations affects the detected commu-
nities and corresponding values of NMI and Omega on the graphs with different
average degrees, and how the refinement affects them. The x-axis is the number of
iterations, and the y-axis is the NMI or Omega value. Each line plots the average
values from five graphs with the similar average degrees. The figures show that as
the number of iterations increases, the values of NMI and Omega increase, and the
differences between the cases with refinement and without refinement decrease.
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Figure 4.27: Changing values of NMI and Omega with parameter k varying.
overlapping vertices shows similar results, but the increment and decrement are
larger, and with the number of iterations increasing, the differences between the
cases with refinement and without refinement shrink by a large amount. NMI
values tend to be stable after the 3rd iteration, and thus setting iteration to 3 or
4 is a good choice, taking both efficiency and effectiveness into consideration. We
adopt 4 iterations in the experiments.
Figure 4.27 shows how the choice of parameter k affects the values of NMI
and Omega on the graphs with different average degrees and graphs with different
numbers of memberships of the overlapping vertices. The x-axis is the average
degree or the number memberships of the overlapping vertices. The y-axis is NMI
or Omega value. From these two figures, we can see that for the these graphs,
setting k to 2 generates highest OMEGA and NMI value in most cases.
Figure 4.28 shows a comparison of the running time for each algorithm to com-
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plete each task of finding communities on the three sets of graphs. The y-axis shows
the running time recorded in seconds. Figure 4.28 (a) focuses on the efficiency com-
parison between the CC algorithm and the other algorithms. We can see that for
the same task, the CC algorithm takes a much longer time than the others, and
thus, it is not efficient. This demonstrates one of the reasons why we propose the
LCF algorithm. Figure 4.28 (b) (c) and (d) show how the LCF algorithm performs
the faster than the other algorithms in general. For graphs with 50,000 vertices,
LCF is capable of finding communities in about 60 seconds and for graphs with
10,000, it takes only a few seconds.
Figure 4.29 shows the comparisons for the real world networks. Figure 4.29
(a) and (b) show a comparison based on NMI values on the DBLP network and
Amazon network, separately. The detected communities are compared to all the
communities based on the ground truth, or the most important 5000 communities
given by [165]. NMI for the game-theory algorithm is missing on the Amazon data,
due to its scalability. Figure 4.29 (c) shows the running time. The results on these
two data sets show that the higher the NMI value, the more time it takes. In
terms of both running time and NMI values, LCF performs best in the case of top
important communities on the Amazon network. In the other cases, LCF shows a
stable performance compared to the other algorithms.
4.3.6 Summary
In this section, we try to propose an algorithm for overlapping community detec-
tion in sparse graphs, that leverages closeness centrality. However, using closeness
centrality for community detection seems to be inefficient. Therefore, we look for
a local notion of closeness centrality to lessen the the problem. We adapt the idea











































































































































































Figure 4.29: Comparison of NMI value and running time on real world networks.
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computing distance, reachability distance and the density of each vertex within its
restricted neighbourhood. We devise our algorithm based on the local closeness
factor. We conduct experiments on real world graphs and benchmark graphs with
known communities. We show that, on the generated graphs, our solution not
only outperforms the algorithm using closeness centrality, but also outperforms
SLPA, BigClam and game-theory algorithms in sparse graphs, in terms of effec-
tiveness. LCF finds communities closer to the ground truth in large sparse graphs.
Efficiency-wise, LCF is faster than both algorithms. For a graph with 10,000 ver-
tices, it only takes a few seconds; and about 60 seconds for a graph with 50,000
vertices. Therefore, LCF is effective and efficient. On the real world graphs, LCF
shows competitive performance combining effectiveness and efficiency.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis, motivated by the protection of interpersonal trust [97] and institu-
tional trust and the facilitation of building weak ties and bridging social capital
[55], we model social networks as simple graphs and study social network analysis
on both privacy and utility problems from the graph perspectives. Specifically, we
studied graph anonymization problems and community detection problems. We
reviewed the concepts and the existing algorithms for each problem, and then sep-
arately studied the fundamental problems. We proposed algorithms to solve the
problems found. Through a comprehensive experimental study on both the real
world network and synthetic data sets, the proposed solutions were shown to be
efficient and effective.
In Chapter 3, we discussed the fundamental problems that we found in graph
anonymization. We proposed approaches to solve the problems. The main results
are revisited as follows.
• We proposed an FKDA algorithm to overcome the shortcomings of the KDA [102]
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algorithm to achieve k-anonymity of the graph. FKDA anonymizes a graph by
simultaneously adding edges and anonymizing its degree sequence in groups
of vertices, and thus is significantly more efficient than KDA and more ef-
fective than KDA on large graphs. The comparative empirical performance
evaluation on three real world graphs verified these results.
• We proposed a Similar Reachability Graph algorithm (SRG) for revealing a
subgraph of connections in a user’s neighborhood. We aimed to offer an infor-
mative view of the network for users while resisting certain structural attacks.
(SRG) guarantees the graph reachability-related utility while it perturbs the
graphs to certain extent to defend against attacks.
We do not claim that our solutions are a panacea for graph anonymization
in general, given the generality of background knowledge potentially available to
adversaries. However, they are effective and efficient solutions for the protection of
privacy in the presence of certain background knowledge such as vertex degrees.
In Chapter 4, we discussed the fundamental problems that we found in commu-
nity detection. We proposed novel algorithms for the related problems. The main
results are revisited as follows.
• We proposed the FR-KM algorithm based on the Force-directed graph draw-
ing method, which was inspired by the idea of dimension reduction. The
algorithm projects the graph onto Euclidean space, and clusters the vertices
according to their Euclidean distance. Real world case studies and empirical
comparison with the state-of-the-art algorithms confirmed that our algorithm
is efficient and reasonably effective for finding communities in the networks.
• We proposed the Fast Community Detection Algorithm (FCD) and its paral-
lel version to detect communities in the networks that are modeled as simple
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graphs. The algorithm is vertex centric. It initiates each vertex to indepen-
dently seek the community in its neighbourhood. The empirical experiment
results state that the algorithms find communities with comparable quality,
and are the fastest in general, compared to the InfoMap, WalkTrap and GN
algorithms.
• We proposed the Local Closeness Factor Algorithm (LCF) for community
detection in sparse graphs that leverages a local notion of closeness centrality
to lessen the the problem. We adapted the idea of local density to graph and
define the local closeness factor. It is computed by computing distance, reach-
ability distance and the density of each vertex within its restricted neighbour-
hood. The empirical experiment results state the effectiveness and efficiency
of the LCF algorithm on large sparse graphs.
In conclusion, by leveraging graph features and structural properties, we can
design effective and efficient methods to better understand the connectedness of
the social networks, and thereafter benefit benign users.
5.2 Future Work
Social networks are temporal and dynamic in essence. Evolving networks have a
high potential for capturing natural and social phenomena over time. Examining
the structural changes (e.g. evolving communities) over time provides insights into
structural evolution patterns, factors causing the changes, and ultimately predict
the future structure of the network.
Chakrabarti et al. [30], one of the pioneers, studied the evolutionary clustering
on attributed data, and proposed a framework incorporating the temporal smooth-
ness in the clustering process. Backstrom et al. [8] studied community evolution
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in social networks with known communities. At a personal level, they investigate
the relationship between individuals’ decisions to join communities and network
structures. At a global level, they looked into the evolution of community mem-
bership and content. Sun et al. [140] in 2007 proposed one of the first approaches
towards community detection in dynamic graphs. Thereafter, density-based meth-
ods [86, 58, 29], modularity methods [49, 74, 116, 144] and generative-model-based
methods [167, 101] have been proposed. Some authors adapted their methods from
static scenarios to dynamic scenarios. For example, [121] [159] were extended from
Label Propagation algorithms [162, 127, 51] are extended from [47], and [34]
was extended from spectral graph clustering.
However the lack of the proper benchmarks or thorough and empirical com-
parisons of the existing methods brings difficulties to users when choosing the
appropriate methods for applications.
We would like to work on these specific problems in the future: generation of
dynamic synthetic benchmarks incorporating ground truth clusterings, dynamic
community detection that capture both the current community structure and evo-
lution patterns, evaluation of dynamic community detection algorithms as well as
future structure prediction.
On the other hand, while this thesis has presented solutions on simple graph
models, we would like to extend the work to richer models that contain more than
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Appendix A
On the Privacy and Utility of
Anonymized Social Networks
We try to empirically quantify the trade-off for the k-degree anonymity algorithm
[102] and k-automorphism algorithm [177]. The k-degree anonymity algorithm
transforms the original graph into one in which, at least, k vertices have the same
degree. The transformed graph is k-degree anonymous. The k-automorphism algo-
rithm is a state-of-the-art algorithm that protects against most structural attacks.
The algorithm transforms the original graph into one in which, at least, k subgraphs
are structurally identical. The transformed graph is k-automorphic.
A.1 k-degree anonymity
The k-degree-anonymity approach [102] aims to prevent attacks involving adversary
knowledge of degrees. Before the graph is released, the original one is transformed
so that an adversary cannot identify the vertices based on her knowledge of the
degree of the published graph. It is transformed by adding edges, in such a way
that each vertex has the same degree as at least k − 1 other vertices. In other
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Figure A.1: k-degree anonymous graphs, for various values of k
words, a vertex cannot be identified with a probability higher than 1/k based on
degree. The transformed graph is k-degree-anonymous.
The k-degree-anonymity algorithm is described in Section 3.1. Figure A.1a
shows a graph with degree sequence [1,2,1,2,6,2,1,1,1,1]. Figure A.1b shows its
2-degree anonymous graph with degree sequence [2,2,2,2,6,6,2,2,2,2]. Figure A.1c
shows its 3-degree anonymous graph with degree sequence [2,2,2,6,6,6,2,2,2,2], and
Figure A.1d shows its 4-degree anonymous graph with degree sequence [3,6,3,6,6,6,6,3,3,3].
A.2 k-automorphism
This approach [177] aims to prevent structural attacks, namely attacks involving
adversary knowledge such as degree, neighbors, shortest-distances from hubs and
so on [177]. Before it is published, the original graph is transformed so that an
adversary cannot identify vertices based on her knowledge of the structure of the
published graph. It is transformed by adding and removing edges (and possibly
vertices), in a way that each vertex is structurally undistinguishable from at least
k− 1 other vertices. In other words, a vertex cannot be identified with probability
higher than 1/k based on the graph structure. The algorithm transforms the orig-
inal graph into one in which every subgraph is structurally identical to k− 1 other
subgraphs. The transformed graph is k-automorphic.
The k-automorphism algorithm starts from a naive anonymized graph. It par-
titions the naive anonymized graph into blocks, and then it makes groups of at
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least k blocks. For each group, all blocks in the group are made isomorphic by
alignment. Consequently, each vertex in one block has a symmetric vertex in, at
least, each of the k − 1 other blocks in the same group. Every vertex has, at least,
k− 1 symmetric vertices in total. Dummy vertices may be introduced in this step.
After obtaining isomorphic subgraphs in each group, the edges across blocks are
considered. If there exists an edge between v1 in block i and v2 in block j in a
group, then edges are inserted to make sure that all of v1’s the symmetric vertices
in other blocks have edges with the corresponding vertices, the symmetric vertices
of v2. Finally, the anonymized graph is the graph obtained after alignment and
edge-copy on all groups.
To preserve utility and minimize information loss, the algorithm adopts a greedy
method, together with the notion of frequent sub-graph [89] in the first stage of the
algorithm, graph partition, and block grouping. In each iteration, frequent sub-
graphs with minimum support k are extracted from the whole graph and then
expanded hop-by-hop in parallel, unless the overall grouping cost increases. Be-
cause of the expansion of blocks, there may be fewer edges crossing over blocks,
less edges are inserted in the edge-copy stage, but these larger size of blocks also
means higher costs in graph alignment. Therefore, whether an overall optimal ano-
nymization cost is achieved is part of the criterion for block expansion. The final































































Figure A.2: k-automorphic graphs, for various values of k
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Figure A.2b shows a 2-automorphic graph with vertices 0, 1, 2, 5, 6 which have
been partitioned into one block, and vertices 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 in another block.
After graph alignment, vertices 3 and 1 are symmetric, and so are vertices 6 and
4, 7 and 0, 9 and 5, and 8 and 2. No additional vertices are added in this case.
Only edges are inserted. But in the case of 5-automorphism (Figure A.2c), dummy
vertices are added. When modifying the graph to create a 5-automorphic graph,
the original vertices 0, 1, 4 have been put in one block, and vertices 3, 6, 8 one
block, and vertices 2, 5, 9 in one block. After anonymization, together with the
added vertices, vertices 1, 2, 6, 10, 11 become symmetric, vertices 0, 3, 9, 12, 13
become symmetric, vertices 4, 5, 8, 14, 15 become symmetric, and the remaining
vertices become symmetric. Throughout this work, the whole graph is one group.
A.3 Utility Metrics
We are concerned in this work with the structural properties of the social network.
We therefore consider the following utility metrics: diameter, radius, density, de-
gree centrality, closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, eigenvector centrality,
clustering coefficient, mean geodesic distance, algebraic connectivity, earth mover’s
distance and edit distance. These metrics quantify various structural aspects and
properties of the graph, such as connectivity and centrality. These features are
typically used by analysts, for instance, studying the influence, power, authority,




The main motivation of this work is to quantify the trade-off between privacy and
utility for real social networks. We study snapshots of six social media: Facebook,
Epinions, Wikipedia, Orkut, Enron and URV.
The Facebook data set contains user-to-user links from Facebook New Orleans
networks. It was collected by Viswa-nath et al. [150] from December 29th, 2008 to
January 3rd, 2009. We obtained it from MPI [112]. The graph is undirected. It has
90,269 vertices and 3,646,662 edges. Each vertex represents a user. An edge exists
if two users are friends. It was crawled using a breadth-first search: visiting all
the friends of one starting single user and iteratively visiting their friends. Due to
the privacy policy, only those users who made their profiles visible to the network
could be visited and crawled. We randomly sampled ten graphs from the original
network data, with 6,339 vertices and an average of 34,539 edges in each graph.
The Epinions data set contains user-to-user (who-trust-whom) links from the
Epinions network. It was collected by Epinions staff P. Massa. We obtained it
from the trustlet website [146][108]. The whole graph is directed and edge-labeled.
It has about 132,000 vertices and 487,372 edges. Each vertex represents a user.
An edge corresponds to a trust/distrust statement from one user to another user,
since users of the Epinions website, a product review website, can comment on
products as well as other users’ comments and make statements about whether
they trust others. An edge from vertex i to vertex j labeled with value 1 means
a trust statement was made by vertex i stating his/her appreciation about the
content or the behavior of the other user. Distrust statement means the opposite
situation. While we measured the utility metrics on the samples of the whole data
set, we also divided the data set into two parts, and measured the utility metrics
on them separately: one with trust statements only and the other one with distrust
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statements only.
The Wikipedia data set contains user-to-user (who-vote-whom) links from the
Wikipedia network. It was collected by Leskove et al. [95] in January, 2008. We
obtained it from the SNAP website [136]. The graph is directed. It has 7,115
vertices and 103,689 edges. Each vertex represents a user. An edge is created
from a user to a candidate if a user votes for Wikipedia admin candidates. As the
original data set contains several components, we use the largest one among them
which has 7,066 vertices and 100,736 edges.
The Orkut data set contains user-to-user links from Orkut network. It was
collected by Mislove et al. [111] from October 3rd to November 11th, 2006. We
obtained it from MPI [112]. The graph is undirected. It has 3,072,441 vertices and
223,534,301 edges. Each vertex represents a user. An edge is created between two
users if they list each other as friends. The data set was crawled with a breadth-
first search. The crawling was conducted using HTML screen-scraping technique.
Similarly we extract ten sample graphs with 9,217 vertices and, on average, 19,550
edges in each graph.
The remaining two data sets are networks of email exchanges: each vertex
corresponds to an email address, and edges correspond to messages between email
addresses. The Email-Enron data set contains user-to-user (address-to-address)
links. It was made public by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during its
investigations. We obtained it from [136]. The graph is undirected. It has 36,692
vertices and 367,662 edges. Each vertex represents an email address. An edge
exists between vertex i and vertex j, if address i sends at least one email message
to address j. We excerpt ten sample graphs with 10,108 vertices and on average
180,811 edges in each graph.
The Email-URV data set contains user-to-user (address-to-address) links from
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Table A.1: Description of data sets
NO.of vertices NO.of edges type
Facebook 6,339 34,539 undirected
Wikipedia 7,066 100,736 directed
Orkut 9,217 19,550 undirected
Epinions 13,182 83,147 undirected
Epinions-trust 11,446 66,464 directed
Epinions-distrust 4,334 11,748 directed
Email-Enron 10,108 180,811 undirected
Email-URV 1,133 5530 undirected
the network of e-mail interchanges among faculty and graduate students at Rovira
i Virgili University of Tarragona, Spain. It was collected by Guimer et al. [1]. We
obtained it from Alex Arenas Website [1]. The graph is undirected. It has 1,133
vertices and 10,902 edges. Each vertex represents an email address. An edge exists
between two vertices if there is an email communication between them. As with
the Orkut data set, the graph is one connected component.
A.5 Experiments
The experiments are conducted on an Intel Core, 2 Quad CPU, 2.83GHz machine
with 4GB main memory running Windows 7 OS. The programs for the metrics
are implemented in two programming languages, C and Python. We calculate
betweenness centrality and algebraic connectivity in python, utilizing functions in
Networkx package [113]. All the other metrics are calculated in C, some of which,
such as eigenvector and closeness centrality, with the help of the functions provided
by the snap network analysis library [136]. For the ten sample graphs we randomly
extract from each original network (Facebook, Epinions, Orkut, Email-Enron), as
we mentioned before, we evaluate the metrics on all graphs and get the average

















































the anonymization algorithm on all the samples, then conduct the measurements
and take the average values. We treat all the graphs as undirected graphs for the
adoption of the k-automorphism algorithm.
Figure A.3 shows the density of each graph before and after anonymization for
varying values of k. The x-axis shows the value of k, and the y-axis shows the
density. When k equals 0, y-axis shows the densities of the original graphs.
In view of different data sets, the email-urv graphs show especially high densi-
ties. In view of the same data set, modified graphs have greater densities than the
original graphs, and a larger k does not always correspond to a larger density. In
view of different algorithms, the k-degree anonymity algorithm increases density
much less than the k-automorphism algorithm does.
Figure A.4 shows the diameter and radius of each graph before and after ano-
nymization for varying values of k. The x-axis shows the value of k, and the y-axis
shows the diameter and radius. Figure A.4(a)(c) show the diameter and radius of
the original graphs and the k-degree anonymous graphs. Figure A.4(b)(d) show
the diameter and radius of the original graphs and k-automorphic graphs.
We can see that modified graphs corresponding to relatively smaller values of k
have both smaller diameter and radius than the original graphs do. As k increases,






























































































Figure A.4: Graph diameter and radius
radius. In the figure, all the modified graphs have diameter around 6 when k equals
5, while large differences exist among the diameters of the original graphs.
Figure A.5 shows the mean geodesic distance of each graph before and after
anonymization for varying values of k. The x-axis shows the value of k. The y-axis
shows the mean geodesic distance. Subfigure(a) shows the values of the original





































































































































Figure A.6: Algebraic connectivity
original graph and the k-automorphic graphs.
We can see that as k increases, the differences among mean geodesic distances
of the modified graphs for all the data sets decrease. This figure also shows that
the mean geodesic distance is smaller for a smaller value of k, similar to diameter
and radius.
Figure A.6 shows the algebraic connectivity of each graph before and after
anonymization for varying values of k. The x-axis shows the value of k, and the y-
axis shows the algebraic connectivity. Subfigure(a) shows the values of the original
graphs and the k-degree anonymous ones. Subfigure(b) shows the values of the
original graph and the k-automorphic ones.
Due to the limitation of machine memory size, we are unable to calculate al-
gebraic connectivity for all the data sets. Since the calculation of algebraic con-
nectivity is based on the adjacency matrix, for very large graphs, the memory is
not large enough to afford having the whole graph represented in an adjacency ma-
trix. Nevertheless, from the available result, we see that as k increases, algebraic
connectivity increases in general.
Figure A.7 shows the geodesic distributions for the Email-Urv graph, both be-
fore and after anonymization. The x-axis shows the value of geodesic distance, and


































































Figure A.7: Geodesic distribution
of all geodesic distances. Subfigure(a) shows the distributions of the original graphs
and the k-degree anonymous graphs. Subfigure(b) shows the distributions of the
original graph and the k-automorphic graphs.
From Figure A.7(b) we can see that as k increases after a certain value, the
distributions of the geodesic distance become uniform in larger ranges, while the
changes of the distribution made by the k-degree anonymity algorithm is much less,
as we can see from Figure A.7(a).
Figure A.8 shows the degree distributions for the Email-Urv and Wiki graph
both before and after anonymization. The x-axis shows the vertex degree, and the
y-axis shows the ratio of the number of vertices with a certain degree to the total
number of vertices of the graph. Subfigure(a) shows the distributions of the original
graphs and the k-degree anonymous graphs. Subfigure(b) shows the distributions
of the original graph and the k-automorphic graphs.
We can see that degree distribution of the anonymized graph significantly differs
from the degree distribution of the original graph.
Figure A.9 shows the global clustering coefficient and average local clustering
coefficient over all the vertices of each graph, before and after anonymization, for
varying values of k. The x-axis shows the value of k, and the y-axis shows the

































































































































































































































































































(d) k-automorphism. average local clustering
coefficient
Figure A.9: Clustering Coefficient
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graphs and the k-degree anonymous graphs. Figure A.4(b)(d) show the metrics
values of the original graphs and k-automorphic graphs.
We can see that the modifications caused by k-automorphism algorithm is sig-
nificant in some cases.
Figure A.10 shows the four centrality measures of each graph, before and after
anonymization, for varying values of k. The x-axis shows the value of k, and the
y-axis shows the centralities. We can see that as k increases, the degree centrality
of modified graph increases significantly (Figure A.10a). Closeness centrality (Fig-
ure A.10d) and betweenness centrality (Figure A.10f) have a similar trend as the
diameter, radius and mean geodesic distance changed during the anonymization.
For each vertex, we consider the corresponding value in the eigenvector of the
adjacency matrix of the graph for the original graph and, then, for the modified
graph. Figure A.11 shows the number of vertices that were in the top 10% with the
highest value in the original graph and that remain in the top 10% in the modified
graph. The x-axis shows the value of k, and the y-axis shows the ratio of the
number of remaining vertices to the total number of vertices of each graph.
For all the k-automorphic graphs, at least 30% of the top 10% important vertices
fall out of the range, while for some cases of the k-degree anonymous graphs, more
than 30% of the vertices also fall out of the range.
Figure A.12 shows the EMD between the degree distributions of each graph,
before and after anonymization, for varying values of k. The x-axis shows the value
of k, and the y-axis shows EMD. We can see that as k increases, EMD increases in
general. This suggests that the difference of degree distributions between graphs
before and after anonymization increases.
Figure A.13 shows the edit distance for each data set, and for varying values of
























































































































































































































































(h) k-automorphism. eigenvector centrality












































































































































































































































































(d) Wiki-Vote edit distance. k-degree anony-
mity
Figure A.14: Edit distance vs density
see that as k increases, the edit distance increases.
To verify the effect of graph density, we sample the graphs with different den-
sities from the Facebook and Wiki-vote data set. We anonymize each sample and
measure the edit distance. Figure A.14 shows the edit distances for graphs with
various densities. The x-axis shows the density. The y-axis shows the edit distance.
We can see that, as k increases, the edit distance increases in most cases.
This comprehensive set of experiments on graphs from real social networks
demonstrate that utility metrics are impacted by k-degree anonymity and k-automorphism
anonymization. Especially for k-automorphism anonymization, we can see signifi-
cant impact. With increasing values of k, the density of anonymized graph increases
in general, and is up to six times that of the original graph in the worst case, for
all the data sets considered. Diameter, radius, and mean geodesic distance can
be two to three times smaller or larger in the worst cases, though they remain
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unchanged in some cases. Degree centrality continuously increases. Clustering co-
efficient, closeness and betweenness centrality remain the same in the best case,
but the clustering coefficient increases significantly in some cases. The number of
top 10% influential vertices remaining, evaluated based on eigenvector centrality,
decreases. The highest proportion is about 70%, while the lowest approaches 20%.
Privacy is guaranteed by the design of k-degree anonymity for degree attacks
and k-automorphism for most structural attacks. However, this is achieved at a
high cost. Significant modifications are induced by the graph perturbation.
A.6 Summary
We empirically quantify the trade-off between utility and privacy for the k-degree
anonymity and k-automorphism graph anonymization algorithm. We measure and
compare several utility metrics for a series of real graphs from various social media
before and after their anonymization under varying settings.
The study shows that anonymization is not anodyne. It protects privacy by
significantly modifying a graph before its publication at the expense of utility. Fur-
thermore, although the general trend of the effect on some metrics, for instance





Swarm Optimization Methods for
Graph Drawing
Effective graph drawing is needed for presentation and qualitative analysis. It is
generally agreed that an effective graph drawing should have the following aesthetic
characteristics [10]:
1. Minimal edge crossing,
2. Vertices are evenly distributed in the space,
3. Connected vertices are close to each other, and
4. Symmetry may exist in the graph.
In 1963, Tutte [147] proposed an algorithm to draw planar graphs by fixing
selected nodes on a face and placing the rest of the nodes at the barycenters of their
neighbors. In 1981, Sugiyama et al. [139] proposed a method for the hierarchical
drawing of directed graphs. Eades [52] proposed a force-directed algorithm in 1984.
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Kamada and Kawai [85] proposed the spring embedding algorithm in 1989. In
1991, Fruchterman and Reingold improved the force-directed method [64]. These
algorithms were further improved, and some of them are applied to large graphs
[66, 22, 23, 80, 83, 151, 134] later.
Within the graph drawing literature, the name “force-directed algorithm” has
often been used to refer to spring-electrical models [52, 85, 64]. Graphs drawn by
these algorithms are aesthetically pleasing, symmetric, and tend to have minimal
cross edges. In general, force-directed methods define an objective function which
maps each graph layout into a real number representing the energy of the layout.
This function is defined in such a way that low energies correspond to layouts in
which adjacent nodes are near some pre-specified distance from each other, and
in which non-adjacent nodes are well-spaced [52]. A layout for a graph is then
calculated by finding a (often local) minimum of the objective function.
We introduce the Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm to solve the graph
drawing problem. Inspired by the paradigm of birds flocking, Kennedy and Eber-
hart proposed Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) in [53]. It is a global optimiza-
tion method, where the system is initialized with a swarm of random particles and
the algorithm searches for optima by updating generations. the PSO algorithm
is widely used in many combinatorial optimization problems [163] for its simple
implementation and fast speed. The layout of a graph drawn by the force-directed
algorithm is obtained by finding an optimal solution of the objective function. That
is to say, the layout problem can be converted to an optimization problem.
We propose a new method called PSOGD for drawing undirected graphs using
PSO and a force-directed algorithm [85]. The graph is initialized with a swarm of
random particles which store the position information of all vertices in the graph.
All particles automatically update their position and velocity in order to find the
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optimal layout until the algorithm terminates.
Particle Swarm Optimization is a global optimization method based on swarm,
where the system is initialized with a swarm of random particles and the algorithm
searches for optima by updating generations. Suppose that the dimension of search
space is D, and the number of the swarm size is N . The position vector and velocity
vector of particle i can be represented as follows:
Xi = (xi1, xi2, ..., xij, ..., xiD) (B.1)
Vi = (vi1, vi2, ..., vij, ..., viD) (B.2)
The memory position vector of the particle i previously visited and the global
memory position vector of the swarm found so far are denoted Pi and Pg:
Pi = (pi1, pi2, ..., piD) (B.3)
Pg = (g1, g2, ..., gD) (B.4)
The fitness f(Pi) of each particle can be evaluated by putting its position into
a designated objective function. The particle’s velocity and its new position are
updated as formula B.5 and B.6.






Here, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., D}, i ∈ 1, 2, ..., N . The superscript t denotes the iteration
number; ω is the initial weight; r1 and r2 are two random values in the range of 0
and 1; c1 and c2 are the cognitive and social scaling parameters which are positive
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constants. The steps of PSO algorithm is described as following.
The steps of PSO algorithm is described as following.
Step1: Initialization of PSO.
Step2: Update V and X by formula B.5 and B.6.
Step3: Calculate fitness of each particle.
Step4: Update Pi and Pg.
Step5: If terminal condition is met, end the algorithm; else go to step2.
There are two key techniques in the algorithm. One is the encoding schema of
the swarm. The other is the definition of the fitness function. In a simple graph
G = (V,E), xi denotes the current position of vertex i in d-dimension Euclidean
space. Generally the value of d is 2 or 3. The objective of graph drawing is to find
the positions of all vertices so that the drawing can give a good layout of the graph
PSO algorithm has powerful global search capability. The first step of PSO
is to determine the encoding schema of the swarm. An efficient encoding schema
enables the problem simple and intuitive. Considering of the objective of graph
drawing, each particle of the swarm corresponds to the position information of all
vertices. Each particle is encoded as a n-dimensional vector X as following.
x = (x1, x2, ..., xi, ..., xn) (B.7)
Here, n = |V | and xi denotes the position of vertex i in d-dimension Euclidean
space.
A particle with such an encoding schema corresponds to a kind of layout of
graph drawing. It is evident that finding the best particle of the swarm is to find
the optimal layout of graph drawing. Each particle of the swarm updates the
velocity and position vector in the process of evolution by formula B.5 and B.6.
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The selection of fitness function is critical to the PSO algorithm. An effective
fitness function can make the particles of the swarm find the optimal solution. In the
PSOGD algorithm, a particle corresponds to a kind of layout of graph drawing. The
objective of graph drawing is finding a good visual representation of the connectivity
information between vertices. There are different styles of representation, suitable
to different types of graphs or different purposes of presentation. However, no
uniform criteria can be used to evaluate the performance of different representation.
Here, inspired by the spring-electrical model, we use the idea of the force-directed
algorithm in [87, 118] to define the fitness of the swarm. The attractive force is





The repulsive force is defined as formula B.9.
fr(i, j) = k
2 · ln(||xi − xj||) (B.9)




. area is the windows size for display the graph. C
is a constant.








The fitness function maps a position vector into a real number representing the
energy of the layout. It means that low energies correspond to layouts in which
adjacent nodes are near some pre-specified distance from each other, and in which
non-adjacent nodes are well-spaced. That is to say, the particle with the minimal
fitness value is the global optimal particle. The layout of a graph is obtained by
190
searching for the minimum of the fitness function. The objective of the PSOGD
algorithm is to search for the fitness that is as small as possible.
The pseudo code of the algorithm is described in Algorithm 14
Algorithm B.1: Graph Drawing by Particle Swarm Optimization
Input: G(V,E), the number of iteration T ;
Result: the layout of the graph
1 set parameter(swarm size m, initial weight ω);
2 particle by the formula B.8-B.10;
3 select Pg;
4 for t = 1 to T do
5 for i = 1 to m do
6 update V and X by formula B.5, B.6;
7 for j=1 to —V— do
8 for k=1 to —V— do
9 calculate fa(j, k) by formula B.8;
10 if (j, k) ∈ E then
11 calculate fr(j, k) by formula B.9;
12 calculate f(P ti ) by formula B.10;




15 Return optimal layout;
In the experiments, we compare PSOGD algorithm with F-R [64] algorithm.
Table B.1: Parameters of the algorithm
ω m c1 c2 t W L C
0.72 10 2.02 2.02 200 1.0 1.0 0.75
We choose 10 artificial graphs and 3 real network graphs, and divide them into
four groups. Group 1 consists of 4 general graphs: g1, g2, g3 and g4. Group 2
consists of 5 symmetric graphs: g5, g6, g7, g8 and g9. Group 3 only consists of one
graph g10. Group 4 consists of 3 real network graphs. Different groups of graphs
are intended to test the performance of the algorithms from different aspects. The
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Figure B.1: Drawing of group 1 by PSOGD and F-R
parameters of the algorithm are set in Table B.1. Here, m is the number of particles
in the swarm, and t is the number of iterations. The meaning of other parameters
is described in the paper. The information of group 4 is listed in Table B.2.
Table B.2: Information of Group 4
Karate Dolphin American
club (g11) network (g12) football (g13)
number of vertices 34 62 115
number of edges 78 105 613
Figure B.1 shows the results of the PSOGD and F-R algorithms on group 1.
The layouts of these graphs drawn by the two algorithms are similar. Figure B.2
is the drawings of PSOGD and F-R on group 2. It can be seen that the drawings
by two algorithms all look nice, symmetric, and have fewer crossing edges except
for graph g6. The drawing by PSOGD is better than the one by F-R, which has
a crossing edge. The results in Figure B.1 and B.2 illustrate the effectiveness of
PSOGD algorithm.
Figure B.3 shows the results of the PSOGD and F-R algorithms on group 3. Five
drawings all represent the relationship of vertices and edges in graph g10, but the
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Figure B.2: Drawing of group 2 by PSOGD and F-R
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Figure B.3: Drawing of group 3 by PSOGD and F-R
TABLE VI 
DRAWINGS OF GROUP 4 BY PSOGD AND F-R 







EVOLUTIONARY DRAWINGS WITH VARYING NUMBER OF PARTICLE ON 4 GRAPHS BY PSOGD 



































































































































































































































Figure B.4: Drawing of group 4 by PSOGD and F-R
193
TABLE VI 
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Figure B.5: Evolutionary drawing with varying number of particles by PSOGD
PSOGD algorithm gets 5 different kinds of layouts. Such results are caused by the
randomness of the PSOGD algorithm. PSO is a stochastic optimization method,
and different initial solutions will get different results. The different drawings show
the diversity of the layouts obtained by PSOGD algorithm.
Figure B.4 is the results of of the PSOGD algorithm and F-R algorithm on group
4. To make the position of vertices clear, we only give the corresponding drawings
with vertices. The vertices in the drawings by both algorithms look distributed
evenly.
We draw the evolutionary drawings with a varying number of particles on graph
g3, g4, g8 and g9 by PSOGD algorithm. Figure B.5 shows that when m is 1, the
drawings of four graphs are not good. They show better layouts with the increasing
number of particles. When m is 10, four graphs all appear the nice layouts. When
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On the basis of the results of table VII, we also compared 
the running time of PSOGD algorithm on graphs g3, g4, g8 
and g9 with the varying number of particles from 1 to 20. The 
result is showed in Fig.4. It is obvious that the running time 
gets longer and longer with the increasing number of the 
particles. Such result can be analysed from the time 
complexity of PSOGD algorithms.  In each iteration the time 
complexity of the PSOGD algorithm is ܱሺ݉ሺ|ܸ|ଶሻሻ. That is 
to say, the time complexity is proportional to the number of 
particles. Therefore, we get the result in Fig.4. It can be seen 
from the evolutionary drawings of graph g3 and g8 in table 
VII that there are no larger improvements on the drawings 
with the increasing m from 10 to 20, but the running time has 
increased a lot. Therefore, simple depending on the increasing 
the number of particles is not able to improve the 
effectiveness of the algorithm for some graphs. 
 
Fig.4 Comparison of running time with different number of particles 
Fig.5 compares the running time of PSOGD and F-R 
algorithms on 10 different graphs. The number of the 
iterations is 200 and the number of particles is 20. In each 
iteration the time complexity of F-R algorithm is ܱሺሺ|ܸ|ଶ ൅
|ܧ|ሻሻ. It can be concluded that the running time of PSOGD is 
higher than that of F-R algorithm from the time complexity. 
The result in Fig. 5 confirms the conclusion. Although the 
time complexity of PSOGD is higher than that of F-R, the 
layouts of some graphs obtained by PSOGD are better than 
that obtained by F-R. 
 
Fig. 5  Comparison of running time of two algorithm on 10 graphs 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
We propose PSOGD, a force-directed algorithm computing 
the equilibrium using particle swarm optimization (PSO).  The 
main idea of the force-directed algorithms is to minimize the 
energy of a spring-electrical system defined corresponding to 
the graph. In order to search for the minimal energy, we use 
PSO which has strong global search capability.  The fitness of 





















































































































(a) Fitness curve of group 1
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(b) Fitness curve of group 2
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PSOGD(c) Fitness curve of different
layouts of g o p 3
Figure B.6: Fitness curve
an increases to 20, they all get the best layouts.
Figure B.6 compares the change of the fitness value during the optimization
process of the PSOGD algorithm on the 3 groups of graphs. Figure B.6(a) is the
fitness curve of group 1. Figure B.6(b) shows the fitness curve of group 2. Figure
B.6(c) shows the fitness curve of five different layouts of group 3. From these fitness
curves in Figure B.6, it can be seen that the PSOGD al orithm can converge aft r
a number of iterations. We do not give the number of iterations. It dep nds on
many elements, such as size of the graph, the swarm size, etc. The number of the
iterations in Figure B.6 is only an experimental result. In the -R algorithm, there
is no detailed explanation on the termination conditions.
Based on the results in Figure B.7(a), we also compared the running time of the
PSOGD algorithm on graphs g3, g4, g8 and g9 with the varying number of particles
fro 1 to 20. Figure B.7(b) sh ws the result. It is obvious that the running time
gets longer with the increasing number of particles. Such a result can be analyzed
from the time complexity of the PSOGD algorithms. In each iteration, the time
complexity of the PSOGD algorithm is O(m|V |2). That is, the time complexity is
proportional to the number of particles. Therefore, we get the result in Figure B.7.
It can be seen from the evolutionary drawings of graph g3 and g8 in Figure B.5
that there are no larger improvements on the drawings with the increasing m from
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and g9 with the varying number of particles from 1 to 20. The 
result is showed in Fig.4. It is obvious that the running time 
gets longer and longer with the increasing number of the 
particles. Such result can be analysed from e time 
complexity of PSOGD algorithms.  In each iteration the time 
complexity of the PSOGD algorithm is ܱሺ݉ሺ|ܸ|ଶሻሻ. That is 
to say, the time complexity is proportional to the number of 
particles. Therefore, we get the result in Fig.4. It can be seen 
from the evolutionary drawings of graph g3 and g8 in table 
VII that there are no larger improvements on the drawings 
with the increasing m from 10 to 20, but the running time has 
increased a lot. Therefore, simple depending on the increasing 
the number of particles is not able to improve the 
effectiveness of the algorithm for some graphs. 
 
Fig.4 Comparison of running time with different number of particles 
Fig.5 compares the running time of PSOGD and F-R 
algorithms on 10 different graphs. The number of the 
iterations is 200 and the number of particles is 20. In each 
iteration the time complexity of F-R algorithm is ܱሺሺ|ܸ|ଶ ൅
|ܧ|ሻሻ. It can be concluded that the running time of PSOGD is 
higher than that of F-R algorithm from the time complexity. 
The result in Fig. 5 confirms the conclusion. Although the 
time c mpl xity of PSOGD is higher than that of F-R, the 
layouts of some grap s obtained by PSOGD are better than 
that obtained by F-R. 
 
Fig. 5  Comparison of running time of two algorithm on 10 graphs 
V. CONCLUSIONS  
We propose PSOGD, a force-directed algorithm computing 
the equilibrium using particle swarm optimization (PSO).  The 
main idea of the force-directed algorithms is to minimize the 
energy of a spring-electrical system defined corresponding to 
the graph. In order to search for the minimal energy, we use 
PSO which has strong global search capability.  The fitness of 





















































































































(b) Comparison of running time of two algo-
rithm on 10 graphs
Fi ure B.7: Comparison of running time
10 to 20, but the running time has increased a lot. Therefore, si ply increasing the
number of particles is cannot improve the effectiveness of the algorithm for some
graphs.
Figure B.7(b) compares the running time of PSOGD and F-R algorithms on 10
different graphs. The number of the iterations is 200 and the number of particles
is 20. In each iteration, the time complexity of F-R algorithm is O(|V |2 + |E|). It
can be concluded that the time complexity of PSOGD is higher than that of F-R
algorithm. The result in Figure B.7(b) confirms this conclusion. Nevertheless, the
layouts of some graphs obtained by PSOGD are better than those obtained by F-R.
To sum up, we propose PSOGD, a force-directed algorithm computing the equi-
librium using particle swarm optimization. The algorithm is simple, as well as its
implementation. We empirically and comparatively evaluated the performance of
the PSOGD algorithm. The results confirmed the symmetry and diversity of the
graph layout and showed that the graphs drawn by PSOGD algorithm are generally
aesthetic.
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